What can science say to moral philosophy? Not much, according to most moral philosophers. In a certain way, they are right – the is/ought divide cannot be crossed any more easily now than centuries ago. This paper argues, however, that a scientific investigation of our moral nature reveals the traditional scope of moral philosophy to be far too narrow. Modern moral theories like deontology and consequentialism typically focus entirely on influencing the process of moral reasoning, disregarding the emotional and motivational processing that determines moral output in most cases. Instead of relying on rational rules to guide us through every dilemma, this paper argues that we should turn to a scientifically informed virtue ethics in order to craft better people and more humane societies.

In grappling with the obscure nature of his writings, interpreters of the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus often tend towards one of two poles. Either they choose to echo the reception Heraclitus faced in antiquity, when his peers dismissed his work as a collection of absurd riddles, or they reiterate the contemporary interpretation that sees in his work a fundamental unity despite his numerous paradoxical statements. This essay will not side with either of these readings. Instead, it will simultaneously engage both polar interpretations of “absurdity” and “unity” to re-read the characteristic “obscurity” of the Heraclitean fragments as a rhetorical strategy underscoring the irreducible ambiguity inherent in ontological and epistemological claims. More specifically, I will investigate Heraclitus’ attempt to conceptualize “Logos,” the fundamental, ontological commonality of Being, the very “order” or “essence” unifying all reality. I will go on to claim that Heraclitus advances an inherently ambiguous and somewhat “paradoxical” conceptualization of Logos, conceiving of this “essence” or “order” not as a common ratio or static unity but as a fiery, continuously-becoming unity-in-flux. Particularly important for my argument will be the explication of the role that language plays in Heraclitus’ thought, language being the medium through which reality becomes (partially) intelligible, even as the flux of this reality invariably exceeds the limited nature of linguistic signifiers. The aim of this essay, then, is to revive and conceptualize the dimension of ambiguity in Heraclitean philosophy that polarizing readings tend to dismiss or disavow, an ambiguity that permeates both the ongoing dialogue between language and reality, and the subsequent conceptualizations of reality as they take form in the realm of language. It is precisely this play between language, reality and ambiguity that remains crucial, not only for the Heraclitean quest for wisdom, but also for contemporary attempts at ontology and epistemology alike.

Kant’s theory of geometry is compatible with non-Euclidean, hyperbolic geometry. That is, on Kant’s theory, the a priori forms of space and time together with the categories of the understanding ground the possibility of hyperbolic constructions in pure intuition. To show this we first develop an interpretation of Kant’s theory of geometry to the extent that it concerns the construction of geometrical objects in pure intuition. Thus we show how the a priori forms and the categories make possible Euclidean constructions in pure intuition. We then proceed to the main result. The latter is independent from some of the details of the interpretation. Under minor assumptions the result can be strengthened to the following: if Kant’s theory is compatible with Euclidean geometry, it is compatible with hyperbolic geometry as well.

Quine’s advocacy of naturalized epistemology has left much debate and controversy in its wake. Now that the dust has settled a bit, many consider Jaegwon Kim’s polemic response to be the definitive refutation of Quine’s view. I think, however, that this issue at heart is significantly murkier than Kim seems to believe, and Kim’s treatment of Quine’s view of naturalized epistemology leaves much to be desired. In this paper, I lay out Quine’s position as explicitly as possible so as to weigh Kim’s critique in greater detail. I find that although Kim successfully touches upon the weak points of Quine’s mission, his conclusions are too strong.

Consequentialism is often criticized on the grounds that it justifies the gross violation of individual rights in order to bring about the best overall consequences. In this paper I argue that such criticism is mistaken and that consequentialism is able to accommodate respect for rights. Consequentialism does not necessarily demand the violation of rights, if rights are understood in a positive sense as capabilities and the ability to realize important goals, instead of merely the negative demand for noninterference from other moral agents. Moreover, consequentialists do not have to view rights as mere conduits to social utility; they can acknowledge the importance of preserving individual rights while taking into account thesocial context in which rights are to be protected.

Hilary Putnam is Cogan University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University. He has developed a reputation for excellence in many areas of philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind, science and language. A sampling of his books include Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings (1964), Philosophical Papers (1975 and 1983), Reason, Truth, and History (1981), Pragmatism: An Open Question (1995), The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (2002), Ethics without Ontology (2004), and Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life (2008). This interview was conducted at Harvard on June 15, 2009.