論 著 / articles |
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2023 >
Issue: 65
許詠晴
Yung-Ching Hsu
《論語》中的疾病及其隱喻
Illness and its Metaphor in The Analects of Confucius
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疾病是古今人類共通的生存挑戰,也是孔子謹慎面對的情況之一。《論語》屢論及疾病,扼要地記載古人面對疾病所採取的行動與態度。疾病作為非常事態,對個人生命造成危害,並影響人際互動。古人基於經驗發展出應對的衛生與治療措施,甚至求助於信仰活動,疾病可謂個人、人我、人與超越界的關係叢結點。疾病除作為身體疾病之外,也以隱喻的面貌出現於《論語》。孔子談論人的德行修養與道德議題時,數次以疾病為喻論人的道德缺失,不僅人的身體會生病,道德也可能生病,皆應謹慎應對。本文試就《論語》中的身體疾病解析其間開顯的關係向度,並援借當代隱喻理論,紬繹《論語》道德疾病的隱喻,推敲孔子德行修養之道。
Illness is a survival challenge for people at all times. It is also one of the situations Confucius cautiously dealt with. In The Analects of Confucius, illness was touched upon numerous times with brief documentation of the actions and attitude that ancients adopted in the face of it. Illness is an abnormal situation that threatens individual's life and affects interpersonal interactions. Based on experience, the ancients developed corresponding hygiene and treatment methods. They would even turn to religious activities for help. Hence illness could be considered as the confluence of person, others and self, and the human-transcendence relationship. In addition to physical diseases, illness presents itself as a metaphor in The Analects of Confucius. Confucius used illness as a metaphor for deficiency of virtue a few times when he talked about virtue cultivation and moral topics. It is not only the human body but virtue also can be affected by “illness.” Both must be treated with caution. This study shall analyze the dimensions of relationship presented by physical illness in The Analects of Confucius as well as to clarify the metaphor of moral illness in The Analects of Confucius with the help of modern metaphor theory in order to explain how virtue is cultivated according to Confucius.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2021 >
Issue: 62
熊偉均
Wei-Chun Hsiung
「不形於內」的「德之行」:
郭店楚簡《五行》首章的文義商榷
The Virtuous Conduct “Not Forming Inwardly”
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本文之研究目標是試圖解決郭店竹簡《五行》首章之詮釋困難,並以竹簡《五行》自身的內容做為首要的證據來源。首先,筆者整理帛書派、竹簡派與調和派對首章爭議的不同見解,並點出竹簡派導致詮釋困難的思維架構;接著釐清竹簡《五行》「德之行」、「行」與「德」三者之別,以及考察竹簡《五行》「形」與「聖」之用例,發掘「聖」兼具兩種意涵之「形」,據此為竹簡《五行》首章提供更為全面且融貫之詮釋:作為最高意義的「聖」,必然在「形於內」的基礎上,兼具了內在轉化層面「形於無形」與人倫教化層面「形於眾人」此雙重意義。竹簡《五行》首章據此主張唯有「聖」無論「形於內」或「不形於內」皆可以稱為「德之行」,並確立「聖」具備超越「仁義禮智」四者的獨特地位。
This paper aims at solving the interpretive problem in the first chapter of Wu Xing of Guodian bamboo texts, majorly based on the text itself. It starts by categorizing different interpretations into three groups (the for-silk-texts, the for-bamboo-texts, and the reconciliatory), and points out the thinking patterns which have led the for-bamboo-texts to misinterpretation. It also analyzes the distinction among the virtuous conduct (dezhixing), conduct (xing), and virtue (de), and reexamines usages of the forming (xing) and sageness (sheng) of the Wu Xing to conclude that the concept of sageness includes two different meanings of forming. Therefore, the reason why the conduct of sageness should be regarded as virtuous conduct regardless of whether or not it forms “inwardly” is that the sageness, the supreme virtue, possesses both “imperceivable forming” (personal self-cultivation and transformation) and “societal forming” (interpersonal enlightenment and amelioration), which establishes the virtue of sageness in a unique position superior to the four cardinal virtues.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2021 >
Issue: 62
朱弘道
Hung-Tao Chu
《莊子•養生主》中「薪火之喻」的意義再探
Reexamination of the Metaphor of “Faggots” and “Fire” in Yang Sheng Zhu
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以往研究對於《莊子•養生主》中「指窮於為薪,火傳也,不知其盡也」一句的詮釋基本上可分為兩種:其一是在標舉出形、神的對立作為詮釋工具,分別以此兩者比喻薪火,藉此提出「重神養神」的養生方針;其二則是以「事物自然地流轉變化」為分析脈絡,強調「火」的無窮無盡,並提出「勿使形體的存亡影響己心」的看法。筆者認為,以上兩詮釋各有其理據,亦有其源遠流長之歷史脈絡,因此才為學界所接受。然筆者認為,以往詮釋中,在通假字的使用、目標域與來源域的連結及字義解釋等處,尚有幾項值得討論的面向。本文將嘗試以高亨與劉武的注本作為基礎,轉換以往將「薪火之喻」作「正面」詮釋的共通點,而將其解釋為不應發生的「負面」情況。並嘗試指出,此詮釋除可在文本找到相應之說,亦能夠於以上癥結點給出回應,因此具有其獨特之價值。
This paper offers a new interpretation of the following Zhuangzi fragment: “What we can point to are the faggots that have been consumed; but the fire is transmitted (elsewhere), and we know not that it is over and ended” (Yang Sheng Zhu, chapter 3). There are two commonly accepted interpretations. One points out the opposition of form (xing 形) and spirit (shen 神) and suggests taking care of and preserving spirit as a regimen. The other interpretation focuses on the change of everything and the endlessness of fire and suggests that one’s mind should not be affected by the living or dying of things. Both interpretations have a long pedigree and enjoy their own internal support. However, in both interpretations, there are remaining issues related to the use of phonetic loan characters, the connection between source and target domains in the metaphors used, and the interpretation of some word meanings. On the basis of the commentaries of Gao Heng and Liu Wu, I attempt to develop an alternative interpretation. While both of the interpretations introduced above regard faggot and fire as positive metaphors, I instead argue that these metaphors portray negative situations that should be avoided. This novel interpretation has its own unique value because it finds support in Zhuangzi and because it meets the problems of the former two interpretations.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2021 >
Issue: 62
鍾振宇
Chen-Yu Chung
無用與有用的弔詭:論「莊惠之辯」的現代意義
The Paradox of Non-Usefulness and Usefulness
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海德格在二次大戰德國戰敗之日(1945 年5 月8 日),寫了一篇對話式文章紀念此一日子,文章區分兩種用:無用與有用,最後引用了莊惠對話,提出德國要成為「無用的民族」以引領未來世界。海德格認為大戰是現代性擴張精神的結果,而其中最關鍵的就是「有用」的思考與世界觀。本文將莊惠兩種存有論的重點放在「用」的兩種差異上,視莊子為「無用的存有論」,視惠施為「有用的存有論」。這點除了文本根據外,更具有當代意義。透過海德格對於兩種用的區分,筆者試圖闡發莊惠辯論的當代意義。
At the time when Germany was defeated in the World War 2 (May 8, 1945), Heidegger wrote a dialogic essay to memorize the event. In the essay he differentiated two kinds of usefulness: non-Usefulness and usefulness. What merits our attention is that at the end of the essay he quoted the conversation between Zhuangzi and Huishi and proposed that Germany be “the nationality of non-usefulness” so as to lead the world in the future. For him the War resulted from the spirit of expansion of which ideology and worldview of “usefulness” lies at the heart. It is against such a background that this essay attempts to construct an account of Zhuangzi’s and Huishi’s ontologies by differentiating their views on “usefulness”, whereby Zhuangzi is read to represent “the ontology of non-usefulness” and Huishi to stand for “the ontology of usefulness”. Viewed in light of Heidegger’s differentiation of two kinds of “usefulness”, the essay hopes to explicate the contemporary significance of the dispute between Zhuangzi and Huishi, particularly Huishi’s emphasis on usefulness which I suggest can be related to the modern pursuit of usefulness.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2021 >
Issue: 62
佐藤將之
Masayuki Sato
近代日本中國哲學的誕生:
以明治一○年代在東京大學的課程為中心
The Birth of Chinese Philosophy in Meiji Japan
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本文是為了闡明目前學界所稱呼「中國哲學」或「東洋哲學」的學術領域在明治時期的日本如何誕生、如何形成之一番試論。所謂「中國哲學」這樣學術領域是以「哲學」這樣的概念和學科之引進為契機而形成,並且此契機的磁石場是當時剛創立的東京大學。本文經過其創立時期教授與中國哲學相關內容的課程之費諾羅薩(Ernest F. Fenollosa)、井上哲次郎以及島田重禮三位的上課內容之分析,勾勒出江戶時代以來經學或儒學的思想內容由「哲學」的分析框架來獲得新的思想涵義之過程。如此,在德川時代原來被視為經學上的內容逐漸轉換成「人格修養」、「國民道德」等具備近代特質的倫理主張。孔孟等經學上的聖人以及戰國諸子也皆變成了「哲學家」。
This article attempts to elucidate the origin and formation of the “Chinese philosophy” or “Oriental philosophy” as an academic field which took form during the Meiji Era of Japan. The academic field called “Chinese philosophy” originated mainly from the incorporation of the discipline of philosophy into Tokyo University during the 1870s. The main scholars who contributed to the formation of this scholarly field were Ernest Fenollosa, Inoue Tetsujirō, and Shimada Chōrei. Fenollosa was the first teacher who taught the contents of Chinese thought from the viewpoint of philosophy. Inoue Tetsujirō was also the first instructor who took charge of the seminar under the title of “Oriental philosophy” in which he compared the “philosophical significance” of those early Chinese thinkers with those of their counterparts in the Western philosophical tradition. Shimada, succeeding Inoue, was another pioneer because he first taught the whole history of Chinese thought from the ancient to the Manchurian period, though Shimada himself had not received philosophy education in his youth. Their seminars have strengthened the philosophical image of traditional Chinese thinkers, and as a result, those thinkers have been all considered to be “philosophers” by the time of the early twentieth century. It was by this re-interpretation of the significance of traditional thought, especially from the perspective of ethics, that the contents of Confucian canonical studies of the Tokugawa period have been transformed into a new ideological ground for advocating the necessity of self-cultivation and so-called “national morality” in the following Taishō and Shōwa periods.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2021 >
Issue: 61
Jerry J. Yang
楊景德
A Response to Rosenthal’s Arguments against the Intrinsic View of Consciousness
對羅森陶反意識本有主義論證之回應
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Rosenthal argues that if consciousness is seen as intrinsic, it will appear to be simple and unanalyzable, and therefore not amenable to scientific explanation, which requires a relational structure involving an extrinsic property of the mind. I shall first criticize Rosenthal's argument against intrinsicalism by way of conceptual analysis. I shall then examine three of his arguments against the intrinsic view of consciousness: the argument from the distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness, the argument from reporting and expressing, and the argument of the individuation of mental states. I suggest that the content of a mental state can be considered to be an information space, which will allow for an explanation of consciousness. My rejection of Rosenthal's position relies on distinguishing two different forms of intrinsicalism: with and without self-representation. We shall find that both versions have explanatory traction from a naturalistic perspective.
羅森陶指出若意識被當作一種本有性質,它就會是單純與不可分析的,並且因此無法提供科學性的說明,因為科學性說明要求一種具有心靈的外在性質的關係式架構。我首先從概念分析的角度批評羅森陶反本有主義的論證。接著,逐一檢視羅森陶三個反本有主義的論證:及物與非及物意識區分的論證、報告與表達的論證,與個別化心靈狀態的論證。我建議將單一心靈狀態的內容視為一個訊息空間,可以用之來說明意識。我依據兩種不同型態的本有主義來反對羅森陶的立場:一種是包含自我表徵,另一種則不包含。我們將會發現這兩種類型的理論,在自然主義的視角下都擁有解釋的力量。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2021 >
Issue: 61
劉吉宴
Chi Yen Liu
合理性推論的兩個準則
Two Criteria of Reasonable Inferences
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亞當斯和史東內克在傳統的有效性觀點之外,對指示條件句的推論提出了合理性這樣的概念,並對這樣的概念提出了兩個不同的準則。本文從可斷說性的概念分別來對兩者提出形式上的刻畫,以檢視這兩者的關係。本文把亞當斯支持的準則稱為「可斷說性的證成性」,而把史東內克支持的準則稱為「嚴格的證成性」,並認為這兩個準則可以幫助我們釐清條件句推論中的爭議。本文用這兩個準則來重新分析麥基對肯定前件律所提出的反例,試圖說明為何麥基提出的是一個可斷說證成性的反例,而不是嚴格證成性的反例。接著,本文對這個現象提出一個診斷,說明為何這兩個準則只會在條件句的推論中產生實質的分歧。最後,本文論證可斷說性的證成性太過於嚴格而難以成立,主張嚴格的證成性才是一個較好的準則。
Validity is an orthodox way to distinguish between good and bad inferences, which says that when inferences are valid, we can derive true conclusions from true premises. But when inferences involve conditionals, validity does not seem to be a good criterion. Unsatisfied with the traditional view of validity, Adams(1965) and Stalnaker(1975) propose their modified criteria, which are called “reasonable inference” in this paper, to evaluate inferences involving conditionals. In this paper, Adams’ criterion is called “justification of assertibility”, which can derive a highly assertible conclusion from highly assertible premises. Stalnaker’s criterion is called “justification of strictness” in this paper, which can derive a strictly assertible conclusion from strictly assertible premises. This paper examines these two criteria and their consequences. First, by reexamining McGee’s(1985) counterexample to modus ponens, I argue that McGee’s example is an assertibility-justified but not a strictness-justified counterexample to modus ponens. Second, I explain why these two criteria have such a substantial divergence when inferences have conditional conclusions. Third, if my diagnosis is correct and complicated conditionals are allowed in inferences, then the justification of assertibility is too rigid to be satisfied. I conclude that the justification of strictness is a better criterionthan the justification of assertibility.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2021 >
Issue: 61
Tsung-Hsing Ho
何宗興
How to Locate Pain in Mandarin:
Reply to Liu and Klein
如何在中文裡定位疼痛
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Some philosophers argue that pain is an object located in bodily parts because the locative form of pain report is permissible in English. To examine this argument, Liu and Klein recently argue that the linguistic argument cannot work because the locative form is impermissible in Mandarin. They are wrong, however. I demonstrate that the locative form in Mandarin is not only permissible but also common.
有些哲學家主張疼痛是一種處於身體部位的對象,理由是英文可以用定位句式說明疼痛是允許的。最近,Liu 與Klein 檢視中文對於說明疼痛的用法,指出中文不允許用定位句式說明疼痛。然而,我主張他們是錯的,我提供實例來論證如何在中文裡使用定位句式來說明疼痛。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2020 >
Issue: 60
許瑞娟
Jui-Chuan Hsu
郭象注《莊》的詮釋意義─以「逍遙」為討論中心
An Interpretation of Guo Xiang’s Commentary on Zhuangzi
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本文從兩方面重新思考郭象「逍遙」的意涵:首先,重新梳理、詮釋郭象《莊子注》;其次,試圖從高達美哲學詮釋學的重要概念分析郭象「逍遙」思想,挖掘郭象玄學的深層意蘊。郭象將自己的思想融入《莊子》中,提出一個人人皆有逍遙可能的理論,前提是人們必須忘掉性分之外者和慾念,接著要實現性分之內的部分,合此二者才是郭象所稱的逍遙。而聖王不將自己的慾念強加於民,因此能夠能引導眾人同獲逍遙。郭象玄學結合高深玄妙理論與現實應用,使得逍遙成為不論聖凡皆可奉行的境界,在這點上,郭象對道家思想盛行於魏晉功不可沒。
The article rethinks the meaning of “Xiaoyao” in Guo Xiang’s philosophy. First, I provide a novel interpretation of Guo Xiang’s Commentary on Zhuangzi. Then, I analyze his Commentary by applying key concepts in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Guo Xiang incorporated Zhuangzi’s philosophy into his own. He believes that every individual can achieve “Xiaoyao,” but only if each person forgets both what is beyond the reach of one’s nature and desires not belonging to oneself. The Sage King does not impose his own ideas on the people, and thus he guides the people to achieve the state of “Xiaoyao.” Guo Xiang’s philosophy, by demonstrating that everyone can achieve “Xiaoyao” in articulating how the abstract reasoning in Zhuangzi has practical application, greatly contributed to the popularity of Taoist Philosophy.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2020 >
Issue: 60
黃崇修
Chung-Hsiu Huang
程伊川「義理」概念之實踐性展開─以「集義養氣」詮釋中的天人思想為視點
The Practical Significance of Cheng Yi’s Concept of “Yi and Li”: Interpreting “Cultivation of Qi and Accumulation of Yi” from the Perspective of the Heaven-Man Relationship
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本文以朱子認同程伊川「不認義理為不仁」一段話作為問題意識開端,試圖透過對伊川義理的實踐性還原以鋪展伊川義理概念之深層意涵。因此筆者首先自問人為什麼不認義理就是不仁?此處所言義理是在什麼立場下與仁有關?如果與仁有關;義與理又是怎樣的邏輯關係而形成其道德實踐上的價值?針對以上諸問,本文一方面從縱貫面針對孔孟對「義」概念的解讀,從而釐清仁與義在孔孟思想中所具有之定位,另一方面在此基礎下,筆者橫向地就伊川理學背景,也就是周敦頤、張載、明道等師友言說中進行探究,繼而在這些宋代儒學建構過程線索中,找到伊川繼承先秦仁義思想特色與轉進軌跡。透過以上二階段之爬梳,本文聚焦伊川對孟子集義養氣之詮釋形式,試圖在其言說中看到伊川天人思想的特色。也就是說,即便伊川強調理一分殊而形成日後朱子理氣論之重要發展,但在宇宙論視野下,伊川思維結構中亦可能與周敦頤、張載一樣具有《管子》天仁地義思維模式之可能。因此筆者第四節中以「天仁地義」視野,試圖透視伊川義理概念在天仁之普遍性原則下,如何開展出一套地義之個體化原則。而此研究成果,將可回應韋政通先生質疑明道仁學消融主客關係從而學理上缺乏犧牲承擔、捨身取義之實踐問題。同時透過此次研究,我們發現到伊川所強調的義理概念的確能夠成為補充詮釋明道仁學道德實踐力之關鍵因素。此成果對於近年筆者探討「中正仁義」定止工夫之際,給予完整而厚實之系統連結。
Zhu Xi, remarkably, approved of Cheng Yi’s saying, “it is considered not benevolent (仁, “ren”) if one does not acknowledge justice (義, “yi”) and reason (理, “li”).” The purpose of this paper is to understand their agreement by explicating the deeper meaning of Cheng Yi’s concept of “yi and li” by reflecting on the practical aspects of this concept. Why is it not considered benevolent if one did not acknowledge yi and li? What sort of yi and li relates to ren? And finally, in their relation to ren, how do yi and li relate to one another to be morally significant?This paper will first interpret the notion of yi in Confucius and Mencius to clarify its relation to ren. Then, on this basis, it will examine the sayings of Cheng Yi’s neo-Confucian comtemporaries, in particular, the arguments of Zhou Dun-Yi, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao, and Cheng Yi’s other teachers and friends. The purpose is to clarify, in the larger context of the development of neo-Confucianism, what Cheng Yi inherited from Pre-Qin thought on ren and yi, and what he transformed and elaborated.After the above preparation, this paper will discuss Cheng Yi’s interpretation of Mencius’ “cultivation of qi ( 氣, “energy” ) and the accumulation of yi” because the peculiarity of Cheng Yi’s theory of the Heaven-Man relationship comes to light in that interpretation. In other words, although Cheng Yi emphasized one principle with many manifestations which influenced the development of Zhu Xi’s doctrine of li and qi, from the perspective of cosmology, Cheng Yi’s framework, like Zhou Dun-Yi and Zhang Zai, also contains the potential of thinking Heaven as benevolent and humans as having the character of yi (i.e. the idea in Guanzi). Section four thus entertains this possibility and explores how Cheng Yi’s concept of “yi and li” can be articulated in terms of actualizing an individual principle of yi on earth with the universal principle of ren in Heaven in the background.The results of this study can address Wei Zheng-Tong’s critique that Cheng Hao’s doctrine of benevolence, in cancelling the subject-object relationship, neglects the practical question of when to sacrifice one’s life for the sake of yi. At the same time, “yi and li” in Cheng Yi crucially supplements and strengthens the understanding of how Cheng Hao’s doctrine of ren is effective as moral practice. This result provides the pivotal link that shows the systematic coherence of the samadhi skills “zhong-zheng(中正, “moderation”), ren, and yi.”
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陳士誠
Shih-Chen Chen
陸象山以二心為一之自我論人之善惡
Lu Xiang-Shan on Human Good and Evil by the Self of Two Minds in One
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本文乃處理象山二心為一之說,以發掘其倫理學意涵及其哲學史根源。二心即是道心與人心;而所謂為一,乃表二心間之統一。依唐君毅之詮釋,視之為同一心之或升或降即表此統一;其次乃依象山文本,筆者視這統一乃表示為決意於或順或逆其本心間的人自我之概念,因而所謂順逆本心即只是人自我之心意識中的兩端緒而已。合此,人自我若順其本心即是其心之上升;反之,若違逆之,則是同一心之下降;在這自我概念下,即能說明人之道德規範與歸責之可能性。此本心與人心之分別,乃是對其概念進行先驗分析而至者,以便能揭示本心概念之特質。但此本心概念並未涵蓋人道德意識之整全,而只這整全中的一部分,因這概念未蘊含犯惡之可能性,所以未能說明犯惡者自身及對其惡之可能歸責。而這人自我之概念所表者乃其心意識之兩端,這才表道德意識之整全:本心是我的本心,我亦是那犯惡者,由是,這自我乃是善惡之可能性之最高主體。以上之分析乃在象山所引用的孟子文本中所建立者,也即是,象山二心為一之說,不論其倫理學意涵抑或其哲學史根源,乃藉孟子學之連結中所達至者。
In this paper I discuss Xiangshan’s unity of two minds in order to explore its ethical implications and the roots of its philosophical history. The two minds mean Dao mind and human mind, and the so-called one mind is the unity of the two. And this unity in my paper is regarded as the one-mind’s rise or fall by the interpretation of Tang Junyi(唐君毅), and as a concept of self to combine two minds in according to Xiangshan’s text, the unity is a self who makes a decision for or against his original mind, thus it is two beginnings of the same mind. In a word, the mind rises when the self’s decision conforms with his original mind, and the same mind falls when his decision violates it. In according to the concept of self the possibility of human’s moral norm and responsibility can be explained. The distinction between the two minds is established by a transcendental analysis of their respective conceptual content, and the point is to reveal the character of original mind. But the concept of original mind doesn’t demonstrate the whole but only a part of moral consciousness, because it doesn’t imply the possibility of evil and thus fails to explain the concept of evildoer and the possible responsibility for his evil. The concept of the self indicates the two beginnings of the human consciousness and as such constitute the whole of moral consciousness: the original mind is mine, and I am also the evildoer, thus the self is nothing but the ultimate subject for the possibility of good and evil. The above analysis is based on the Mencius text quoted by Xiangshan. That is, Xiangshan’s two minds in one, in both its ethical implications and philosophical history, is dependent on his interpretation of Mencius text.
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黃文宏
Wen-Hong Huang
論曾天從「理念的真理認識」的難題
On Zeng Tian-Zong’s “Aporia of the Knowledge of Ideal of Truth”
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本文處理曾天從在其所謂的「理念的真理認識」或「哲學認識」中,所遭遇到的三個難題,並試著根據他所提供的解決線索與保證,來為這些難題給出一個可能的解答。在筆者看來,這三個難題並不真的是難題,但是透過對「理念的真理認識」的這三個難題的思考,可以讓我們更了解曾天從的理念的真理認識的型態,以及其真理論的哲學體系的內容與方向。
This article examines three aporias (difficult problems) encountered by Zeng Tian-Zong (1910-2007) in his notion “Knowledge of Ideal of Truth” or “Philosophical Knowledge”, and proposes a possible answer to these problems based on the clues and guarantees he provides. On the reading proposed here, while these problems turn out to not be genuine difficulties, examination of these aporias in his knowledge of the ideal of truth, better elucidates the nature of his “Knowledge of Ideal of Truth” as well as the content and direction of his philosophical system of Aletheiology.
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書 評 / book reviews |
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楊德立
Tak-lap Yeung
解讀及評價:
Rolf-Peter Horstmann《康德之想像力》
Interpretation and evaluation
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Rolf-Peter Horstmann 近作《康德之想像力》(Kant’s Power of Imagination),是針對「想像力」在康德學統下備受忽視的情況而作。這部102 頁的著作,仔細分析了《純粹理性批判》和《判斷力批判》中與想像力相關的內容,意圖從內部理順康德的想像力理論,並論證想像力在建構認知對象過程裡的獨特貢獻。他提出了「建構認知對象的兩階段模式」,闡明想像力在認知過程中獨一無二的功能與位置,並在此基礎上論證想像力是一種獨立、自足的認知能力。由於想像力是一種獨立認知能力,因此至少在理論哲學和知識論脈絡下,康德學者沒有忽視想像力的理由。
Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s recent work, Kant's Power of Imagination, is a response to the neglect of “the power of imagination” in the Kantian circle. In this 102-page book, Horstmann analyzes passages relevant to imagination in Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment in detail, with the aim of making Kant’s theory of imagination coherent. He argues for the unique contribution of imagination in the context of the constitution of cognitive objects. Horstmann proposes a “two-stage model of constructing cognitive objects” in his examination of the irreplaceable function and special position of imagination in the cognitive process, and from this, he argues that imagination is an independent, self-standing cognitive faculty. Since imagination is an independent cognitive ability, at least in the context of theoretical philosophy and epistemology, Kant scholars have no reason to ignore it.
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論 著 / articles |
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林建德
Chien-Te Lin
傳統判教的哲學反思─試論學術與信仰間之可能平衡
A Philosophical Reflection on Traditional Pan Jiao
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現代化客觀的佛教學術研究,易於挑戰乃至否定傳統佛教既有觀點,如不承認佛經皆佛親說(包括「大乘非佛說」),各式的「判教」在史學考證下亦難有立足之地,天台五時判教即是一例。本文試著對此作進一步探討:首先,說明信仰與學術兩種立場的對峙;其次,學術研究雖在知識層次占了上風,但僅能視為是「一種」理解而非「唯一」觀點;第三,佛法之「宗教性」 重於以方便善巧引渡不同根機眾生,如「五時」的「時」除了「時間順序」 外或也指「時節因緣」;第四,傳統判教仍具有意義,背有亦有一套信仰邏輯以建立自宗合理性基礎;第五,除了以正誤、真偽評斷,「權實」應是更理想的評價語彙。最後,對於佛教史理解,或可藉「多重佛史」持多元開放態度而非定於一說。如此,以「歷史之錯誤」斷言傳統判教,就客觀學術雖言之成理,但就信仰實踐而言卻是「宗教之正確」,所以即便是「錯誤」也會是「美麗的錯誤」。
It is easy for modern academic research to challenge and even reject the traditional views of Buddhism. The denial of certain sutras, and also the rejection of Mahayana Buddhism, are cases in point. Various Pan Jiao (判教, “doctrinal classifications”) are untenable under the inspection of historical and philological study; Wu Shi Jiao Pan in Tiantai Buddhism is an instance. This article attempts to present six points to further explore this. First, I argue that there is certainly a conflict between the orientation of academic research and the practice of faith. Second, in terms of level of knowledge, while the academic approach has the upper hand, it is not the sole valid perspective for understanding Buddhism. Third, the religiosity of Dharma is concerned with facilitating the extradition of different humans. In this sense, the timing in the “five-stage distinction” emphasizes causes and conditions no less than chronological order. Fourth, the traditional view toward Buddhist teachings still has its value, insofar as the logic of belief provides a rational basis for this view. Fifth, Quan (權) and Shi (實) form better evaluative standards and criteria than correctness and objectivity. Finally, this study argues that it is better to hold a pluralistic and open attitude for interpreting Buddhist history. In this way, the five-stage distinction, while a “historical distortion” for an objective scholar, is actually “religious correctness” for the Buddhist practitioner. Even if it is an error, it is a “beautiful error.”
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林修德
Hsiu-Te Lin
面對中國哲學研究立場分歧的一種嘗試
On Disagreements within Chinese Philosophy
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本文的核心論題是中國哲學研究方法,本文企圖指出研究關懷的重要性,強調研究關懷的根本分歧將導致研究立場及其進路的不同,並進而衍生出歧異且難以交流的學術意見。研究關懷是更深層的研究動機,研究者能嘗試在彼此相異的研究關懷中找到某些共通點,從而藉此建構出公共性的研究關懷網絡及其分工整合機制。本文嘗試以「求真」做為公共的研究關懷,倡議中國哲學研究關懷得以從傳統「澄清文本意涵『是』什麼?」的模式中,進一步連結「做為普遍真理的中國哲學該『如何』在當代具體實踐?」 的探究。
The main topic of the paper concerns “research methodologies in Chinese philosophy.” It looks like we are talking about more than one methodology. In this paper, I point out that the researcher’s concern plays an important role in academic judgment. Different researchers’ concerns lead to different stances and methods. And different stances and methods in turn lead to different conclusions. What I coin as “the researcher’s concern” might be provisionally understood as a sort of meta-motivation (something that motivates motives). I suggest that among these different concerns we may seek something common. This something common could then be the basis for a public network, which functions as an integrative mechanism encompassing and addressing those different concerns. This paper argues that “seeking truth” should be the common concern of research. It further argues that with this as the basis, the traditional mode of research, being concerned with the meaning of the text, should be integrated with the present concern with how to practice Chinese philosophy after modernity.
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林慈涵
Ci-Han Lin
《莊子》的判斷模式
The Two Modes of Judgment in Zhuangzi
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本文試圖將隱含於《莊子》的「判斷模式」明朗化,並由此顯現出兩種主體性。「固化主體」以「成心」為用,「成心三元素」中的「我」啟動固化機制,開展出「成心→同一化標準→分判價值→自己」的判斷模式,呈現出「已成」與「固定」的存在狀態;「虛化主體」則是以「鏡心」為用,「鏡心三元素」中的「他者」讓主體能如實接收物本身,開展出「鏡心→差異化標準→分判價值→自然」的判斷模式,呈現出「虛空」與「流動」的存在狀態。兩種主體分別是莊子的批判與理想。
This paper brings to light the two types of subjectivity implied in Zhuangzi’s modes of judgment. A person who has a “Fixed Subject” or fixed sense of self uses chengxin, or a thought pattern developed over time to think. This thought pattern develops over three stages; the subjective self comes to be fixed from this process. Through this analysis, the mode of judgment can be schematized as “chengxin → standardization → value of judgment → self.” From this process the subject has an “established” and “fixed” existence. A person who is an “Empty Subject” uses jingxin or sees things as they actually are. This mode of judgment also undergoes a three-stage formation/development, in which “the other” allows the subject to apprehend reality as it is in itself. The steps in such a judgement are: “jingxin → standard of differentiation → value of judgment → ziran (something in itself).” Under this mode, the self is “empty” or selfless and eternally “flowing”. These two modes present the subjectivity that Zhuangzi rejects and prefers respectively.
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58 期〈論海德格對康德「敬重」之詮釋─《現象學基本問題》和《康德與形上學問題》之研究〉一文作者提供之補充修正表
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洪巳軒
Szu-Hsuan Hung
墨子對於「兼愛」之論理與實踐精神
Mozi’s Argumentation and Practical Spirit of “ JianAi”
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以西方倫理學理論為基礎,進而嘗試系統性地建構墨子關於兼愛的理論是許多研究者採用的研究方式。然而,本文發現墨子在面對批評兼愛者與認同兼愛者之時,採用了不同的論說方式。面對批評者,墨子以反證其論點不能成立的辯論手法促使其認同兼愛;面對認同者,則採用互利原則以增強其實踐兼愛的信念。不過,用以擊破反對者論點的辯論內容以及增強實踐信念的互利原則,仍不足以窺見兼愛的實踐精神。本文從墨子實踐兼愛的相關文獻中,揣摩其精神境界:發現在此實踐精神中,兼愛本身即為價值根源,兼愛的行為本身是義;而不論利己或利他的效益,都只是兼愛行為所產生的附加價值。以兼愛的價值認同所引發的實際行動本身就是義,因現實環境之限制所產生的利與不利,皆無損於兼愛的實踐精神。
Mozi’s theory of Jian Ai was reconstructed under the form of western philosophy by many scholars. However, I discover that Mozi used different kinds of argumentations to justify Jian Ai concerning different audience. When facing the opponent, Mozi justified Jian Ai by refuting arguments. And he encouraged supporter’s faith through publicizing the principle of reciprocity. However, the practical spirit of Jian Ai is not elucidated by the principle of refutation and reciprocity. This research tries to figure out the practical spirit of Jian Ai from Mozi. My conclusion is that to practice Jian Ai is the value itself. Regardless of any additional benefit, action of Jian Ai is morality. Moral practice is originated from Jian Ai. Although the realistic benefit is limited by causality the practical spirit of Jian Ai is intact.
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Foong-Ee Pong
馮鳳儀
The Affordance of the Graceful Fish Metaphor:
An Interdisciplinary Approach Exploring the Practical Dimension of the Zhuangzi
從「承給意義」論遊魚之喻
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This article explains Zhuangzi’s philosophy by analyzing the metaphor of the graceful fish. I argue that to discover the essence of the graceful fish metaphor, we have to look into the relationship between the fish and the water in which it dwells. The article consists of five sections. First, I start by a brief review of common readings of the metaphors of the water and the fish and their insufficiency to relate to the idea of Dao/daos in the Zhuangzi. Second, I propose an interdisciplinary approach based on the notion of “affordance”─a substitute for “value/meaning”─that enables us to unveil the underlying key element pertaining to the image of the graceful fish: the ground. Third, an analysis of the graceful fish metaphor is presented after the explanation of affordance. Forth, I draw on the concept of vulnerability to explain the natural ability we are born with but buried due to a dominant completed heart-mind. I explain how vulnerability steers our way by comparing two images found in the Zhuangzi: infants vs. Hundun. Fifth, I sum up my findings and conclude that the Zhuangzi provides pragmatic advices for individuals─especially those who now live in a modern society that embrace social plurality─to live their lives to the fullest within any given social context by constantly adapting to the situation and therefore creatively exploring the limitless possibilities in the social world.
本文透過遊魚之喻以解釋《莊子》哲學。我提出要掌握遊魚之喻的意義,必須要探討魚與水之間的關係。本文共分五節。首先,我就既有的解讀方法,也就是分別論魚與論水的譬喻作一概要說明,並指出此一進路在解釋莊書中「道」的概念上的不足。接著,我提出「承給(承擔、給予)意義」,一個替代「價值/意義」的語辭,來發掘遊魚之喻所隱涵的關鍵:立足之地。在第三節,我循承給意義來進行關於遊魚之喻的解讀。第四節透過「脆弱性」的概念,來解釋我們在成心主導下所失去的一種自然能力。我也透過討論莊書中嬰兒與渾沌這兩個對比形象,來說明脆弱性的導引作用。最後,我總結,莊書提供深具實踐意義的建議,讓人─尤其是身處涵蘊多元價值之現代社會的你我─在所處情境中不懈因應,在任一既定社會脈絡內展開充實的生活,採取具創造性的態度去發掘社會世界中的無限可能性。
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許從聖
Tsung-Sheng Hsu
氣相應、性偽合、參於天地─荀子的感通論建構
The Construction of Xunzi’s Correspondence Theory
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《周易•咸卦》彖辭對二氣交感的歷程描述,蘊含自然創造與人文化成的雙重意指。從男女之間相感、親悅到結合的嫁娶行動與事件,發展為生生化育、延續恆久的夫婦對待倫理,也暗示男女媾合的生命繁衍與萬物化生的創造歷程,兩端雖非同質且不對稱,卻有微妙的聯繫與呼應關係,此為感通論的基本內容框架。值得注意的是,《荀子•大略》強調「夫婦之道」於倫理關係中的奠基性地位,實可與《周易•咸卦》所述感通論旨趣相互發明。本文進而深究感通在荀子思想所具有的多向視域與建構進程,擴及〈非相〉、〈性惡〉、〈禮論〉、〈天論〉等重要文獻,梳理氣、性、情、偽、度、參、神明等與感通相涉的核心詞義及相互關係,構成三層動態連貫的感通論體系:一,從「性偽之分」到「性偽合」的發展序階變化,敘明「自我感通」的具體實現歷程與實踐工夫;二,從「度己以繩」到「接人用抴」的推擴實踐,闡發「人我感通」的共在聯繫感受與倫理義涵;三,從「明於天人之分」到「參於天地」的關係轉化與辯證哲思,解明天地自然對人類創建文化生活的方向指引與智慧啟發。
The description of the flow of Qi (氣) in Yi Jing (Book Of Changes)’s “Xian Gua” includes emphasizes not only natural creation but also human culture. From the courting and marriage between men and women, develop the everlasting ethics of the relationship between husband and wife, and at the same time implying that even though they are not one in the same, there is a relationship between the relationship between males and females and also reproduction and change in the universe. This is the basic framework that makes up the theory of correspondence. It is worth noting that Xunzi “Talueh” is the first none Chinese writing to put an emphasises on couple’s ethics and in actually this correspondence theory and the Yi Jing “Xian Gua” are complementary.This paper delves Xunzi’s multidirectional approach to correspondence in the writings of Xunzi, such as: “Fei Xiang” (〈非相〉), “Xing E” (〈性惡〉), “Li Lun” (〈禮論〉) and “Tian Lun” (〈天論〉), and also the interaltionship between corresponce and Qi (氣), human nature, emotion (qing 情), man-made (wei 偽), empathy (du 度), participate (can 參), shen-ming (神明) and so on. Forming a dynamic and coherent correspondence theory system consisting of three layers in sequence: First, explain the concrete realization course and practical work of auto-affection; Second, elucidate the common feeling and ethical significance implied in the process of self-induction with others; Third, to tell the real human experience and response to the nature, the universe, and the ultimate reality.
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