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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Karl Schafer
Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism
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It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of "faultless disagreement" that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspectives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement present in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible (at least in some cases) than most philosophers believe today.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals
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Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such anapproach, in terms of the context-sensitive 'all cases', in the spirit of David Lewis's contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data,resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, necessary conditions on knowledge.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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M. Eddon
Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality
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The standard counterexamples to David Lewis's account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis's can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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James Van Cleve
Can Coherence Generate Warrant Ex Nihilo? Probability and the Logic of Concurring Witnesses
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Most foundationalists allow that relations of coherence among antecedently justified beliefs can enhance their overall level of justification or warrant. In light ofthis, some coherentists ask the following question: if coherence can elevate the epistemic status of a set of beliefs, what prevents it from generating warrant entirely on its own? Why do we need the foundationalist's basic beliefs? I address that question here, drawing lessons from an instructive series of attempts to reconstruct within the probability calculus the classical problem of independent witnesses who corroborate each other's testimony. Starred section headings indicate sections omitted here, but available on the author's USC website.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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John Martin Fischer, Neal A. Tognazzini
The Physiognomy of Responsibility
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael Devitt
Experimental Semantics
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special symposium |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Judith Jarvis Thomson
More On The Metaphysics of Harm
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Matthew Hanser
Still More on the Metaphysics of Harm
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book symposium |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Timothy Williamson
Précis of The Philosophy of Philosophy
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Christopher Peacocke
Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Timothy Williamson
Reply to Peacocke
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Paul Boghossian
Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Timothy Williamson
Reply to Boghossian
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Robert Stalnaker
The Metaphysical Conception of Analyticity
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Timothy Williamson
Reply to Stalnaker
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Paul Horwich
Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Timothy Williamson
Reply to Horwich
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review essay |
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Mark Van Roojen
Review of Joshua Gert, Brute Rationality:
Normativity and Human Action
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