The question of excusing in law has been the subject of different philosophical theories of responsibility. These theories attempt to shed light on the nature and function of legal excuses and to justify their role in the criminal justice system. This paper examines the issue of excusing in law from two theoretical standpoints: the character theory and the choice theory of responsibility. The two theories differ on the kinds of causes of action they each find to provide the basis for holding people responsible. The character theory focuses on character, the choice theory on choice and the capacity to choose. Following a brief introduction in which the fundamental distinction between justification and excuse is outlined, the character theory of responsibility is explained with special attention being paid to the work of George Fletcher, which has made a significant impact on the field of criminal law philosophy in recent years. Then follows a critical discussion of the choice theory as elaborated by H.L.A. Hart, one of the most influential legal theorists of our times. The paper concludes that the character theory of responsibility, by drawing attention to what lies behind and motivates actual choices, offers a better basis for interpreting the moral significance of human actions and for explaining our actual blaming judgements regarding those actions.

Due to the increased cases of sexual impurity among the contemporary Filipino teens I felt the dire need to search for an appropriate approach in formulating a content of sexual ethic that is relevant for them. Three approaches were the subject of investigation namely: positive church norms; various cultural norms; and philosophically-oriented conception of the person. I realized that to generate a more comprehensive one, the approach should be based on the socio-cultural influences that affect their everyday life. This is where I suggest Ferdinand Dagmang’s solidarity ethics of malasakit at damay which essentially embodied this quality. However, this ethic needs to be reconstructed in order to be more contextualized and non-discriminatory for these teens. Thus, a new ethic called free and creative communal compassion is presented. This proposed ethic revolves around the concepts of caring community, purified intimacy, and free and creative show of compassion.

In his earlier work on the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), which combined Naturphilosophie and transcendental philosophy, Schelling argued that it is only by becoming-art that philosophy can complete itself as a discipline. He proposed this formulation in response to Kant’s critical inventory of reason offering to reclaim philosophy from its entanglement in pre-critical or dogmatic traditions. But Kant avoided to ground reason in the notion of externality, the in-itself, which, owing to its pre-critical derivation, must give way to the a prioris and categories of the understanding. Meanwhile, by renewing the problem of the in-itself via the self-positing ego, Fichte was the first to challenge the Kantian legacy. But the emphasis on subjectivity through its power of self-positing gave way to what in principle negates nature as the true ground of the initself; in Schelling’s description, the equivalent of the annihilation of nature. Comparatively, Schelling proposed to demonstrate the reverse, which is the extinction of the subject that has continued to nourish the reflexive standpoint of reason. To accomplish this end, Schelling invoked in his Philosophy of Art, one of the places in which he extended his discussion of the so-called identity-system, the concept of the ideal type, or rather, the destroyer of known world established by critical reason.

In this paper, I endeavor to provide a critical examination of a recent pioneering work that engages Jean-Paul Sartre’s insights in analyzing social media interactions – Michael Lopato’s “Social media, love, and Sartre’s look of the other: Why online communication is not fulfilling?”. I shall show that in so far as Sartrean insights are concerned in Being and Nothingness, Lopato misconstrued what Sartre really meant with the Look of the Other and love, and is mistaken in appropriating such insights in arguing that online interactions are not fulfilling. I shall proceed by first discussing Sartre’s third region of being which is being-for-others which will comprise of the Look of the Other and the two attitudes to retrieve one’s freedom. Second, I shall flesh out the arguments of Lopato. Lastly, I shall present my critique of Lopato’s arguments which constitutes my reply to his work.

In an effort to address the image of the nude as a concern of both feminist aesthetics and existentialism, this paper shall provide a critique on the male gaze in visual art by means of Jean-Paul Sartre’s analysis of the image and the imagining consciousness. This paper aims to reassess not only the aspects surrounding the male gaze but the nature of its image. In this sense, while objectification is part of the nature of the nude, both the representation and the imagining consciousness of its spectator play a part in the objectification of the nude as image. This paper argues that through Sartre’s account of the nature of images, the male gaze misconstrues the represented nude through her image in most works of art. I will show that (1) as an act of the imagination, the male gaze elicits the sexually objectified representations of the nude and that (2) the reality of the nude is conflated with its image (analogon) thereby producing irreal, objectified and prejudiced representations of women.

Philosophy is not all about parroting Western ideas and categorizations. There are esoteric philosophies, normally labelled as grassroot or indigenous, that are gaining recognition within formal academic circles. The Ilokano philosophy is alive at the margin, nonetheless implicit because its philosophical underpinnings are embedded in the way of life or cultural life (kannawidan) of the Ilokanos. But through Maiyannatup a Panagripirip, the tacit Ilokano philosophy becomes outspoken and proves itself to be a rich source of humanistic principles. Dynamically translated as “Appropriate Philosophizing” or “Philosophizing Cultural Life with Prudence”, Maiyannatup A Panagripirip is a methodological paradigm that employs suitable approaches and analyses to generate the Ilokano ontology, epistemology and ethics. It is this paradigm that ushers the Ilokanos to become wisdom-bearers and creators of value rather than mere passive consumers of culture. It unwraps as well the character of the Ilokano language and the discursive potentials of Ilokano philosophy at the arena of cultural pluralism.

Kwasi Wiredu proposed a democracy by consensus, inspired by the consensual practices of the traditional Akan of Africa. But his presentation of the traditional consensual practices has been criticized for inaccurateness. Helen Lauer embarks on what she sees as cleaning the debate of the misreading of Wiredu’s presentation of traditional consensual practices by his critics. This is commendable. However, we claim that she does not succeed in the task that she set out to do. We argue that her failure partly has to do with her subscribing to a one-sided assessment of such a history, which influenced the manner she evaluated the debate and some of the fallacies that crept into analysis.