This paper considers several philosophers’ efforts to explain the metaphysical orientations of historical narratives, ones which expose the lack of common ground in modes of establishing truth and documenting change. Although philosophers have been writing about history since before Plato’s time, this brief inquiry is primarily restricted to Hegel, Maritain, R. G. Collingwood, and W. H. Walsh. The relation between history and the concept of civilization reveals a major complication for establishing historical truth – the fact of multiple meanings for the concept of civilization.

This paper is in three parts. In the first part, I consider Maritain’s definition of freedom. He differentiates between two types of freedom: freedom of choice, which he also calls freedom from necessity, and freedom of autonomy or terminal freedom, also called freedom from constraint. The second part considers the three types of political philosophy of freedom identified by Maritain. They may respectively be called liberal individualism, statesponsored collectivism, and communal and personalist philosophy. The third political philosophy, communal and personalist, is advocated by Maritain. In the third part of this paper, I raise concerns about losses of freedom that have become more evident in the last few years during the COVID-19 pandemic, and I reflect upon how Maritain’s philosophy of freedom may apply in our contemporary situation.

In this paper I argue that Maritain rejects any attempt to reduce ethics to a set of moral rules that can be derived from natural law. Rather, in his work we find a nuanced account of the virtue of prudence, which applies the precepts of the natural law to particular situations. We also find him insisting that the appropriate animation of ethical action springs not from the law, but from love. Maritain’s metaphysical existentialism leads him to insist that the natural law is never sufficient to meet the exigencies of determining action. Accordingly, the authentically metaphysical basis of his ethics is thoroughly existential (in the Thomistic sense) and must include the prudential governance that guides human action, because an account of human nature and its ends only informs us of the range of possibilities for human goodness, without showing how to actually achieve them. In arguing for this claim I begin by situating Maritain’s ethical discussion in the context of his metaphysics. I then explore his understanding of natural law and its limitations when it comes to governing action. Finally, I explain the place of prudence as the virtue that applies the natural law to the particular. From this the role of existence and love as the interconnected basis for the foundations of ethics in Maritain’s thought is made clear.

In this paper I shall enquire how ethics fits into key ideas in the system of metaphysics of Leslie Armour: the metaphor of patterns, his views on the self,and the grounds of moral judgments.