Feminism has continued to advance and open new frontiers, maintaining a dominant status in the genre of issues in the political and academic arena over the last few decades. This growth in status has opened an array of perspectives from which the feminine condition can be more aptly appraised and improved. One such perspective is African feminism. In examining the idea of African feminism, this paper analyses the reasons advanced for its uniqueness. While it concedes that there are peculiar conditions in Africa which raise unique challenges for the feminine gender, it questions the basis for anchoring the idea of African feminism on them. The paper submits that if the peculiarity of experiences is the basis for demarcation, the heterogeneous nature of the continent renders such an idea a non-starter. lt further tries to show that the challenges that differentiate the African female from her counterparts elsewhere are not gender-engendered, but are rather products of the totality of the peculiar African experience, especially in the postcolonial era.

In this paper I examine five essential themes in Brand Blanshard's coherence theory of truth. Blanshard defines truth in terms of the rational or the interdependence of concepts, where concepts determine objects of experience rather than merely conform to them. On this view, truth is contextual and is the approximation of thought to reality or the systemization of the two ends - the immanent and transcendent. I raise some worries for this account of truth, foremost of which is the worry that it commits us to a deep-seated skepticism, both theoretical and practical. In order to be able to tell when the immanent end is achieved and if it is making progress towards the transcendent end (i.e., when the ultimate systematization is realized), we require an omniscient standpoint of cosmic order or overarching system of beliefs. While this seems possible in principle it is not so in practice.

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant invokes the moral law as an underived fact of reason. The aim of this article is to explore the highly debated role of the fact of reason and the nature of this fact, which apparently defies the senses of actuality commonly associated with empirical facts and objective entities. Following David Sussman's interpretation, I argue that the fact of reason not only marks the abandonment of deduction of the moral law but illustrates that the failure to ground the moral law does not undermine its unconditional authority. Therefore, I claim that rather than signifying a methodological maneuver to get out of the circle that Kant admits to be entrapped, it operates as immanent, dynamic and an aporetic facticity. This perspective allows seeing its heuristic function for keeping intact the aporia that structures morality and offers away of coming into the circle of morality.

Arguments against the plausibility of a scientific theory of consciousness are hinged on the ground that attached to mental consciousness are phenomenal properties, also known as qualia, which are not amenable to any scientific theory. This paper develops and defends a neuroidentity hypothesis that purports to show that qualia, which are identified as neuroqualia, are the same as some neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system. The neuroidentity hypothesis is offered as a possible way of moving closer to a probable scientific theory of consciousness.

Alan Turing supposedly subscribed to the theory of mind that has been greatly inspired by the power of the said technology and which has become the dominant framework for current researches in artificial intelligence and cognitive science, namely, computationalism or the computational theory of mind. In this essay, I challenge this supposition. In particular; I will try to show that there is no evidence in Turing's two seminal works that supports such a supposition. His 1936 paper is all about the notion o/computation or computability as it applies to mathematical functions and not to the nature or workings of intelligence. While his 1950 work is about intelligence, it is particularly concerned with the problem of whether intelligence can be attributed to computing machines and not of whether computationality can be attributed to human intelligence or to intelligence in general.

This paper explores the political thought of Michel Foucault, which is anchored on his philosophy of subjectivation or the transformation of individuals into subjects. It presents his ideas of the State from the point of view of specific strategies and practices of power used in the transformation of individuals into subjects. It also presents his analysis of government as an organization that looks after the achievement of individual's goals and interests. The goal of government is not to achieve the common good but to realize the suitable end of each individual.

The theory practiced as resistance must come to grips with the state and with revolution. To evade, explain away, or assume the state is fatal. And to think of revolution only as anti-state is as dangerous. After all, the revolution's aftermath is revealed by history to be just another state. I argue that the danger posed by both state and revolution can be countered by the multiple in society that becomes contentious - or a contentious multiplicity. The multiple and the contentious are practices that pervade society. The state's objective is to control multiplicity and sublimate contentiousness. The revolutionary strategy is to sublimate multiplicity and direct contentiousness. But multiplicity is dangerous when it is independently contentious. And contentiousness indicates a dialectical process of challenging state power wherein the process itself is privileged over any synthesis. Contentious multiplicity is a practice of freedom.

This paper will show that attempts to control the body in late capitalism are replete with symbolic violence. Filipinos have not succeeded in confining the body, thereby validating Foucault's (1980) critique of the repressive hypothesis. Ordinary narratives about the body in the Philippines exist not in the context of a settled template of silenced debates and repressed desires, but in the explosion of discourse and contestations, and of an intricate articulation between popular knowledge and truth on one hand, and the ordinary and everyday experience of pleasure and desire on the other.