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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
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Issue: Supplement
Richmond Campbell, Bruce Hunter
Introduction
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moral naturalism and normativity |
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
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Issue: Supplement
David Copp
Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism:
Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective
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3.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
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Issue: Supplement
Margaret Urban Walker
Naturalizing, Normativity, and Using What ‘We’ Know in Ethics
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4.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
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Issue: Supplement
Louise Antony
Naturalized Epistemology, Morality, and the Real World
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5.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
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Issue: Supplement
Susan Babbitt
Moral Naturalism and the Normative Question
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6.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
Volume >
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Issue: Supplement
Lorraine Code
Statements of Fact:
Whose? Where? When?
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biology and moral discourse |
7.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
Volume >
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Issue: Supplement
Catherine Wilson
The Biological Basis and Ideational Superstructure of Morality
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8.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
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Issue: Supplement
Michael Stingl
All the Monkeys Aren’t in the Zoo:
Evolutionary Ethics and the Possibility of Moral Knowledge
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9.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
Volume >
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Issue: Supplement
Andy Clark
Word and Action:
Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition
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Recent work in cognitive science highlights the importance of exemplar-based know-how in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, certain accounts of moral knowledge now stress exemplar-based, non-sentential know-how at the expense of rule-and-principle based accounts. I shall argue, however, that moral thought and reason cannot be understood by reference to either of these roles alone. Moral cognition -- like other forms of ‘advanced’ cognition -- depends crucially on the subtle interplay and interaction of multiple factors and forces and especially (or so I argue) between the use of linguistic tools and formulations and more biologically basic forms of thought and reason.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
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Issue: Supplement
Paul Churchland
Rules, Know-How, and the Future of Moral Cognition
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11.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
Volume >
30 >
Issue: Supplement
Andy Clark
Making Moral Space:
A Reply to Churchland
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12.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
Volume >
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Issue: Supplement
Notes on Contributors
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13.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy:
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Issue: Supplement
Index
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