This paper argues that in Augustine rationality in religion depends in important respects on religious social practice. This point is developed in reference to the questions of the reasonableness of a commitment to a particular religion, the meaningfulness of religious terms and concepts, and the truth and falsity of religious claims. In a concluding section, I contend that Augustine, while giving rationality in religion a basis in religious practice. succeeds in avoiding the tendency, found in some otherwise similar contemporary positions. to sever rationality in religion from rationality in other domains of inquiry.

Capitalizing on the constructivist approach developed by philosophers and psychologists, Steven Katz argues that mystical experience is in part constructed, shaped and colored by the concepts and beliefs which the mystic brings to it. Merits and problems of this constructivist account of mysticism are discussed. The approach is seen to be ill-suited to explain the novelties and surprises for which mysticism is renowned. A new model is suggested: that mysticism is produced by a process similar to forgetting. Two forms of forgetting are described: a massive and complete forgetting of concepts in the “pure consciousness event” and de automatization in the more permanent unitive experiences.

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Herman Dooyeweerd’s New Critique of Theoretical Thought in 1985 and the 10th anniversary of his death in 1987, I explore his theory of theory. Dooyeweerd distinguished theory as conceptual knowledge of abstracted functions from everyday knowing as integrated knowledge of wholes. He tried to show that critical theorizing requires philosophical integration, self-awareness, and religious knowledge of the origin of ourselves and creation. In the course of developing his view Dooyeweerd touched on many issues that are still current for us today, in particular issues around foundationalism. A brief evaluation in the context of our contemporary philosophical scene closes the essay.

The traditional paradox of the stone may be interpreted as posing a competition between a pair of omnipotent beings, represented by God at two different times. The new paradox poses a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. We make use of an attractive Thomistic response to the former paradox in arguing that the latter situation is logically possible.

This paper is a reflection on two ontological analogies that have played a role in discussion about the Trinity---the Modalist and Social analogies. I argue that the Modal analogy commits one to a view of the divine persons that comports poorly with Scripture. I then consider two arguments to the effect that the doctrine of the Trinity commits one to tritheism. I argue that the Social analogy contains better resources for handling these arguments than the more traditional position, which involves denying that the divine persons are substances.