The author holds the view that Johann Gottlieb Fichte founded a new approach to the problems of subjectivity and self-consciousness. There are two basic models of the theory of selfconsciousness, namely the reflection theory of self-consciousness and Fichte’s approach. According to the reflection theory (Locke, Leibnitz, Kant) self-consciousness is the result of a reflection i.e., in order to ascribe self to oneself one must await its objectification by a subsequent reflection. This poses a difficulty, however. For what should enable the act of reflection (which according to this model is itself non-conscious) to realize that the first-order state belongs to the same subjectivity as itself? The author claims that Fichte noticed this difficulty and elaborated a theory, which provides an understanding of self-consciousness as selfknowledge that couldn’t be objectified by a reflection.

One of the central problems in philosophy after Kant is the meaning and systematic func-tion of self-consciousness. This essay explores the question of how Kant’s concept of self-consciousness and the thinking subject relates to Fichte’s “I”, and what the relevant grounds are possible for Fichte’s view that in his doctrine of “I think” Kant had already “pointed” at the highest principle of the Wissenschaftslehre “I am”. A comparison of Kant’s “I think” with the line of argument of § 1 of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre shows that Fichte follows Kant in the theoretical grounding of self-consciousness in judgmental functions, and in this way Fichte shared a position already presented by Kant that the concept of self-consciousness contains the thought of a groundless subject, spontaneously generating knowledge of its own existence.

The paper deals with Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s argument in § 1 of the «Foundations of the Science of Knowledge» (1794). Reconstructing the crucial argument of the § 1 of «Foundations…» step by step, the author shows how Fichte infers the proposition «I am» from the log-ical proposition of identity «A is A». In doing so, the author claims that proposition «I am», which expresses what Fichte calls «Tathandlung», has to be understood as a critical response to Carl Leonhard Reinhold’s methodological program which emphasizes the starting point of philosophy as a «fact of consciousness». Furthermore, the paper shows the difference between Fichte’s argument of the § 1 of «Foundations…» and his first attempt of its application in the «Private Meditations on Elementary Philosophy» (1793/94) which deals with the concept of an intellectual intuition of the «I» and which in turn can be understood as referring to a fact of consciousness. Therefore, Fichte’s argument leading to the proposition «I am» in the § 1 of «Foundations…», is the result of a self-critical revision of his very first conception of the «I».

 The paper deals with Fichte’s conception of substantiality formulated in «Foundations of the Science of Knowledge» (1794). The author claims that according to Fichte the self-ascription of an epistemic activity to the subject is possible only if we can think subject as the substance, to which we could ascribe all possible epistemic activities. Furthemore, the author shows the development of the concept of definability (Bestimmbarkeit), which is of the utmost importance for the understanding of Fichte’s concept of substantiality, by Wolff, Kant, and Maimon.

n this paper Fichte’s conception of a theory of consciousness and self-consciousness is ex-amined as it is presented in the «Foundations of Natural Right» (1796/7) and in «Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre» (1797). It is argued that Fichte develops a per-formative interpretation of self-consciousness. The main thesis of the paper is that Fichte provides a performative theoretical program, i.e. the history of performative self-consciousness.