1.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2020 >
Issue: 60
許瑞娟
Jui-Chuan Hsu
郭象注《莊》的詮釋意義─以「逍遙」為討論中心
An Interpretation of Guo Xiang’s Commentary on Zhuangzi
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
本文從兩方面重新思考郭象「逍遙」的意涵:首先,重新梳理、詮釋郭象《莊子注》;其次,試圖從高達美哲學詮釋學的重要概念分析郭象「逍遙」思想,挖掘郭象玄學的深層意蘊。郭象將自己的思想融入《莊子》中,提出一個人人皆有逍遙可能的理論,前提是人們必須忘掉性分之外者和慾念,接著要實現性分之內的部分,合此二者才是郭象所稱的逍遙。而聖王不將自己的慾念強加於民,因此能夠能引導眾人同獲逍遙。郭象玄學結合高深玄妙理論與現實應用,使得逍遙成為不論聖凡皆可奉行的境界,在這點上,郭象對道家思想盛行於魏晉功不可沒。
The article rethinks the meaning of “Xiaoyao” in Guo Xiang’s philosophy. First, I provide a novel interpretation of Guo Xiang’s Commentary on Zhuangzi. Then, I analyze his Commentary by applying key concepts in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Guo Xiang incorporated Zhuangzi’s philosophy into his own. He believes that every individual can achieve “Xiaoyao,” but only if each person forgets both what is beyond the reach of one’s nature and desires not belonging to oneself. The Sage King does not impose his own ideas on the people, and thus he guides the people to achieve the state of “Xiaoyao.” Guo Xiang’s philosophy, by demonstrating that everyone can achieve “Xiaoyao” in articulating how the abstract reasoning in Zhuangzi has practical application, greatly contributed to the popularity of Taoist Philosophy.
|
|
2.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2020 >
Issue: 60
黃崇修
Chung-Hsiu Huang
程伊川「義理」概念之實踐性展開─以「集義養氣」詮釋中的天人思想為視點
The Practical Significance of Cheng Yi’s Concept of “Yi and Li”: Interpreting “Cultivation of Qi and Accumulation of Yi” from the Perspective of the Heaven-Man Relationship
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
本文以朱子認同程伊川「不認義理為不仁」一段話作為問題意識開端,試圖透過對伊川義理的實踐性還原以鋪展伊川義理概念之深層意涵。因此筆者首先自問人為什麼不認義理就是不仁?此處所言義理是在什麼立場下與仁有關?如果與仁有關;義與理又是怎樣的邏輯關係而形成其道德實踐上的價值?針對以上諸問,本文一方面從縱貫面針對孔孟對「義」概念的解讀,從而釐清仁與義在孔孟思想中所具有之定位,另一方面在此基礎下,筆者橫向地就伊川理學背景,也就是周敦頤、張載、明道等師友言說中進行探究,繼而在這些宋代儒學建構過程線索中,找到伊川繼承先秦仁義思想特色與轉進軌跡。透過以上二階段之爬梳,本文聚焦伊川對孟子集義養氣之詮釋形式,試圖在其言說中看到伊川天人思想的特色。也就是說,即便伊川強調理一分殊而形成日後朱子理氣論之重要發展,但在宇宙論視野下,伊川思維結構中亦可能與周敦頤、張載一樣具有《管子》天仁地義思維模式之可能。因此筆者第四節中以「天仁地義」視野,試圖透視伊川義理概念在天仁之普遍性原則下,如何開展出一套地義之個體化原則。而此研究成果,將可回應韋政通先生質疑明道仁學消融主客關係從而學理上缺乏犧牲承擔、捨身取義之實踐問題。同時透過此次研究,我們發現到伊川所強調的義理概念的確能夠成為補充詮釋明道仁學道德實踐力之關鍵因素。此成果對於近年筆者探討「中正仁義」定止工夫之際,給予完整而厚實之系統連結。
Zhu Xi, remarkably, approved of Cheng Yi’s saying, “it is considered not benevolent (仁, “ren”) if one does not acknowledge justice (義, “yi”) and reason (理, “li”).” The purpose of this paper is to understand their agreement by explicating the deeper meaning of Cheng Yi’s concept of “yi and li” by reflecting on the practical aspects of this concept. Why is it not considered benevolent if one did not acknowledge yi and li? What sort of yi and li relates to ren? And finally, in their relation to ren, how do yi and li relate to one another to be morally significant?This paper will first interpret the notion of yi in Confucius and Mencius to clarify its relation to ren. Then, on this basis, it will examine the sayings of Cheng Yi’s neo-Confucian comtemporaries, in particular, the arguments of Zhou Dun-Yi, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao, and Cheng Yi’s other teachers and friends. The purpose is to clarify, in the larger context of the development of neo-Confucianism, what Cheng Yi inherited from Pre-Qin thought on ren and yi, and what he transformed and elaborated.After the above preparation, this paper will discuss Cheng Yi’s interpretation of Mencius’ “cultivation of qi ( 氣, “energy” ) and the accumulation of yi” because the peculiarity of Cheng Yi’s theory of the Heaven-Man relationship comes to light in that interpretation. In other words, although Cheng Yi emphasized one principle with many manifestations which influenced the development of Zhu Xi’s doctrine of li and qi, from the perspective of cosmology, Cheng Yi’s framework, like Zhou Dun-Yi and Zhang Zai, also contains the potential of thinking Heaven as benevolent and humans as having the character of yi (i.e. the idea in Guanzi). Section four thus entertains this possibility and explores how Cheng Yi’s concept of “yi and li” can be articulated in terms of actualizing an individual principle of yi on earth with the universal principle of ren in Heaven in the background.The results of this study can address Wei Zheng-Tong’s critique that Cheng Hao’s doctrine of benevolence, in cancelling the subject-object relationship, neglects the practical question of when to sacrifice one’s life for the sake of yi. At the same time, “yi and li” in Cheng Yi crucially supplements and strengthens the understanding of how Cheng Hao’s doctrine of ren is effective as moral practice. This result provides the pivotal link that shows the systematic coherence of the samadhi skills “zhong-zheng(中正, “moderation”), ren, and yi.”
|
|
3.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2020 >
Issue: 60
陳士誠
Shih-Chen Chen
陸象山以二心為一之自我論人之善惡
Lu Xiang-Shan on Human Good and Evil by the Self of Two Minds in One
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
本文乃處理象山二心為一之說,以發掘其倫理學意涵及其哲學史根源。二心即是道心與人心;而所謂為一,乃表二心間之統一。依唐君毅之詮釋,視之為同一心之或升或降即表此統一;其次乃依象山文本,筆者視這統一乃表示為決意於或順或逆其本心間的人自我之概念,因而所謂順逆本心即只是人自我之心意識中的兩端緒而已。合此,人自我若順其本心即是其心之上升;反之,若違逆之,則是同一心之下降;在這自我概念下,即能說明人之道德規範與歸責之可能性。此本心與人心之分別,乃是對其概念進行先驗分析而至者,以便能揭示本心概念之特質。但此本心概念並未涵蓋人道德意識之整全,而只這整全中的一部分,因這概念未蘊含犯惡之可能性,所以未能說明犯惡者自身及對其惡之可能歸責。而這人自我之概念所表者乃其心意識之兩端,這才表道德意識之整全:本心是我的本心,我亦是那犯惡者,由是,這自我乃是善惡之可能性之最高主體。以上之分析乃在象山所引用的孟子文本中所建立者,也即是,象山二心為一之說,不論其倫理學意涵抑或其哲學史根源,乃藉孟子學之連結中所達至者。
In this paper I discuss Xiangshan’s unity of two minds in order to explore its ethical implications and the roots of its philosophical history. The two minds mean Dao mind and human mind, and the so-called one mind is the unity of the two. And this unity in my paper is regarded as the one-mind’s rise or fall by the interpretation of Tang Junyi(唐君毅), and as a concept of self to combine two minds in according to Xiangshan’s text, the unity is a self who makes a decision for or against his original mind, thus it is two beginnings of the same mind. In a word, the mind rises when the self’s decision conforms with his original mind, and the same mind falls when his decision violates it. In according to the concept of self the possibility of human’s moral norm and responsibility can be explained. The distinction between the two minds is established by a transcendental analysis of their respective conceptual content, and the point is to reveal the character of original mind. But the concept of original mind doesn’t demonstrate the whole but only a part of moral consciousness, because it doesn’t imply the possibility of evil and thus fails to explain the concept of evildoer and the possible responsibility for his evil. The concept of the self indicates the two beginnings of the human consciousness and as such constitute the whole of moral consciousness: the original mind is mine, and I am also the evildoer, thus the self is nothing but the ultimate subject for the possibility of good and evil. The above analysis is based on the Mencius text quoted by Xiangshan. That is, Xiangshan’s two minds in one, in both its ethical implications and philosophical history, is dependent on his interpretation of Mencius text.
|
|
4.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2020 >
Issue: 60
黃文宏
Wen-Hong Huang
論曾天從「理念的真理認識」的難題
On Zeng Tian-Zong’s “Aporia of the Knowledge of Ideal of Truth”
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
本文處理曾天從在其所謂的「理念的真理認識」或「哲學認識」中,所遭遇到的三個難題,並試著根據他所提供的解決線索與保證,來為這些難題給出一個可能的解答。在筆者看來,這三個難題並不真的是難題,但是透過對「理念的真理認識」的這三個難題的思考,可以讓我們更了解曾天從的理念的真理認識的型態,以及其真理論的哲學體系的內容與方向。
This article examines three aporias (difficult problems) encountered by Zeng Tian-Zong (1910-2007) in his notion “Knowledge of Ideal of Truth” or “Philosophical Knowledge”, and proposes a possible answer to these problems based on the clues and guarantees he provides. On the reading proposed here, while these problems turn out to not be genuine difficulties, examination of these aporias in his knowledge of the ideal of truth, better elucidates the nature of his “Knowledge of Ideal of Truth” as well as the content and direction of his philosophical system of Aletheiology.
|
|
5.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2020 >
Issue: 60
楊德立
Tak-lap Yeung
解讀及評價:
Rolf-Peter Horstmann《康德之想像力》
Interpretation and evaluation
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
Rolf-Peter Horstmann 近作《康德之想像力》(Kant’s Power of Imagination),是針對「想像力」在康德學統下備受忽視的情況而作。這部102 頁的著作,仔細分析了《純粹理性批判》和《判斷力批判》中與想像力相關的內容,意圖從內部理順康德的想像力理論,並論證想像力在建構認知對象過程裡的獨特貢獻。他提出了「建構認知對象的兩階段模式」,闡明想像力在認知過程中獨一無二的功能與位置,並在此基礎上論證想像力是一種獨立、自足的認知能力。由於想像力是一種獨立認知能力,因此至少在理論哲學和知識論脈絡下,康德學者沒有忽視想像力的理由。
Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s recent work, Kant's Power of Imagination, is a response to the neglect of “the power of imagination” in the Kantian circle. In this 102-page book, Horstmann analyzes passages relevant to imagination in Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment in detail, with the aim of making Kant’s theory of imagination coherent. He argues for the unique contribution of imagination in the context of the constitution of cognitive objects. Horstmann proposes a “two-stage model of constructing cognitive objects” in his examination of the irreplaceable function and special position of imagination in the cognitive process, and from this, he argues that imagination is an independent, self-standing cognitive faculty. Since imagination is an independent cognitive ability, at least in the context of theoretical philosophy and epistemology, Kant scholars have no reason to ignore it.
|
|