Claro R. Ceniza [1927-2001] is arguably one of the best philosophers that the Philippines has ever produced. However, it is quite unfortunate that some of his important contributions are not that well-known. This paper aims to rectify this by presenting an evaluation of his original insights on three outstanding problems in philosophy, viz., the paradoxes of material implication, the nature of probability, and the metaphysics of modality.

This paper attempts to provide a concise but systematic presentation of the discursive ontology of the social that underpins the thought of the Argentinian political theorist Ernesto Laclau. First articulated by Laclau and his collaborator Chantal Mouffe at the historical conjuncture of the late twentieth century that witnessed the disintegration of established leftist political visions and the rise of a plurality of new social movements, the post-structuralist discursive ontology on which Laclau bases his theorization of hegemony as the paradigm of politics is one that continues to exert a powerful influence on contemporary post-foundational political thought, discourse analysis, and “left populist” political movements. This paper traces the fundamental claims of that ontology, paying special attention to Laclau’s theses apropos the limits of universality and impossibility of “fullness.” In the final third of this paper, the French philosopher Alain Badiou’s approach to the conceptualization of social change is employed as a foil to draw some key implications of Laclau’s elevation of “hegemony” as the universal form of the political for political thought and practice.

Theoretically, this essay is a psycho-social reflection on the patrimonial character of Philippine political democracy. Many scholars attest that Philippine politics is marred by oligarchic rule composed of elite families, knitted by blood and marriage, who use state resources to perpetuate themselves into public office. These officials control and exploit the economic and political landscape to rule and govern the lives of the Filipino people. Hence, I argue that the patrimonial culture is a social pathology and has imbibed other names such as patron-client democracy, cacique democracy, predatory oligarchic state, and bossism. This type of social malady highlights the coercive forms of control in the Philippine political arena and, thus, expanding oligarchic power relations over and above the interest of the people. Money and power are the main causes why this social malady persists. However, more than that, I want to add that the persistence of patrimonial culture in the Philippines lies probably in what Freud calls the introjected father image, which unconsciously becomes the standard of authority. Further, I contend that, like the Oedipus rivalry, fear is a primordial element in the introjection of this authority figure which began at the nascent of the Spanish rule. Particularly, the abuses and atrocities of the colonizers over the natives created a deep-seated traumatic experience that would later fortify the immanence of a patrimonial power structure in the Philippines. Hence, a psycho-social approach could perhaps unearth these 'events' that perpetuate a patrimonial culture in our country. I believe that excavating our collective experiences could probably help us in our search for leaders who could usher us towards real liberation.

This paper argues that the educators' vocation, in the Arendtian sense, is to prepare and cultivate in students the love for the world – amor mundi. Educators are responsible for introducing the world to students through the conservation and preservation of human tradition and the 'realm of the past.' Thus, it requires a practice of truth-telling or parrhesia. However, this parrhesiastic activity is not explicit in Arendt. This paper also invokes Foucault's account of parrhesia to emphasize another main point of this paper, i.e., Arendt's conservationist view of education implies or presupposes the practice of truth-telling. If such an idea is correct, the positioning of education becomes ambiguous. For Arendt, education is located 'in between' the realms of the pre-political and political. However, suppose this implicitness of truth-telling is proven to be correct and affirmed. In such a case, we can say that education and its main motor – educators as intellectuals/scholars have a quasi-political role in society.

This paper provides a discussion of Jacques Rancière’s former teacher at École Normale Supérieure (ÉNS), then famous for fashioning Marxism with the philosophical gauge of structuralism, Louis Althusser (1918-1990). Perhaps a brief discussion on the relation between the two would render context to the origins of Rancière's philosophico-political praxis, specifically the humble beginnings of conceptualizing an egalitarian method out of his philosophical rupture with Althusserianism. Meanwhile, to reduce the philosophical enterprise of Althusser into its practical shortcomings and silence during the revolutionary events of May 1968 in France would do an injustice to the magnitude of his contribution to contemporary French political theory and his major revisions in the theoretical direction of the Parti communiste français (PCF). Thus, the following discussions focus on sketching Althusser's theoretical foundations, which possibly clarifies the political decision he has made during May '68: a demand for organization over spontaneous revolutionary activity based on the authority of theoretical practice over the ideological activities—a decision that became the point of departure for Rancière's subversion of both mastery and the structural inequality Althusserianism entail. The whole piece is guided by the following two-fold question—a question, perhaps, akin to Badiou's inquiry: What were the philosophico-political interventions of Louis Althusser, and why did Rancière move away from his direction?

The year 2020 began with the world being controlled by a then-unknown force. This unknown force would later be called a coronavirus or Covid-19. Not a single country would be free from infection by this virus. We are petrified with astonishment when confronted with this disease. Initially, after admitting the reality, we started struggling with and revolting against this virus. Time has led us to the consideration of our existence. This pandemic inclines us to revisit the major themes in existential philosophy discussed by Sartre in the Nausea and the philosophy of the absurd by Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus, The Plague, and The Stranger. The study addresses the concepts of anxiety, suffering, freedom, self-deception, absurdity, and choices. When confronted with the reality of the disease, we are shocked by an odd sensation like what Roquentin felt in his experience of nausea. This bizarre feeling brought an initial rejection, a self-deception followed by suffering, and a reflection of one's freedom. The concept of freedom leads us to certain decisions we make and the choices we are offered. The absurdity brought about by the pandemic is a reality that we must accept as it is. How would Sisyphus feel if he were living in the present? The struggle by Sisyphus can be our struggle now against a coronavirus. We feel condemned to roll a rock to the top of a mountain, a punishment that seems like 'futile and hopeless labor.' However, we are stronger than our rock. The paper presents a parallelism between our suffering during the pandemic and the sufferings of Sisyphus and Roquentin.

The literature has shown that the theory of mental models is able to describe human inductive processes. That theory has been related to the structure of inductive inferences, such as Gautama’s Syllogism indicates. On the other hand, the theory of mental models has also been linked to modal system K. This paper argues that there can be a connection between Gautama’s Syllogism and system K, not in rigorous logical deductions but in describing how the human mind can work. They can refer to two different moments of inductive reasoning; the rule of necessitation of K can be a key element in the second of those moments.

If we are to periodize the intellectual biography of Rolando Gripaldo into his Mindanaoan, Lasallian, and retirement periods, his Lasallian period would be a very significant one because this is the period where he produced the most important works that earned him a niche as one of the important Filipino philosophers. This paper exposed and analyzed the works of Gripaldo in this very significant period of his intellectual biography. This paper was able to identify four clusters of themes that recur in Gripaldo’s Lasallian period writings: 1) his reflective thoughts on Filipino philosophy, 2) his studies of Filipino philosophical luminaries, 3) his critical Filipino philosophy, and 3) his efforts towards revisionist writing. This paper contributes towards the discourse of Filipino philosophy that studies Filipino philosophical luminaries, a discourse in which Gripaldo was a leading advocate. Contributions in this specific discourse can make Filipino philosophy more mainstream and easier to study, especially for beginners and undergraduate students.

In Words and Battlefields: A Theoria on the Poem, Cirilo Bautista advances the thesis that there is such a thing as a Filipino epic and that it is key to nation-building.1 Well known for his long-form poetry, Bautista can be said to be taking a position on one of the main issues in the philosophy of poetry, namely the ontology or being of poems. I argue that his theory of the poem has three cornerstones, which I critique and evaluate through a close reading of the epic poem “The Cave.”

The objective of this work is to investigate the philosophical anthropology that underpins the anthropology of the Early Christians. It is curious to know why Christian anthropology is intellectually and practically inclined towards the philosophical anthropology of the Platonic tradition rather than the theological-philosophical tradition of the biblical Hebrew people in the Old Testament. Today the emphasis on Christian anthropology is that the human person is an integration of body and soul. Contrary to this position, the writer maintains that the Christian anthropology, especially during the period of the early Christians (here understood as the period within the first five centuries C.E.), fundamentally conceives the human person as a composite of soul and body, which is a conscious employment of Platonic anthropology. This article observes that, as regards the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, there is a dichotomy between theological coherency and the actual Christian practice on the Christian conception of the human person. Hence, this work argues that the Platonic influence on the philosophical anthropology of the Early Christian was a deliberate act to give a more rational foundation to the theological problematic on the resurrection of the dead and on the resurrected body. It explains why Aquinas’s theological cum philosophical thinking, though overwhelmingly an Aristotelian ground, could not “Aristotelize” his philosophical anthropology.

Christian apologetics has recently gained a new impetus from authors such as Alister McGrath, who advocates a new, Trinitarian approach to natural theology, the main purpose of which is to confirm a resonance between scientific discoveries and Christian doctrine, thus confirming its credibility. In this article, we use Trinitarian natural theology, which has many advantages over classical natural theology, on the example of the surprising phenomenon of true love. This is manifested in the material world in The Principle of Insufficient Reason, observable through observations of deeds of love, which lack reciprocity and, in the lifeworld in the essence of ratio-sui or selfexplicability of true love, experienceable through experiences of explanation of the reasons for love with love itself. The analysis of different layers of reality and its scientific methods, together with the postpositivistic recognition of the plurality of methods, has shown that the method of inference to the best explanation, which is used in the article, is a legitimate scientific method. The Christian doctrine of the Triune God of Love and the doctrine of perichoresis make perfect sense of the empirical observations and lifeworld experiences of true love. However, the question remains unanswered: which of the worldviews best explains the curious and surprising phenomenon of true love?

Contemporary philosophy of mind is generally characterized by its project to naturalize the mind. Utilizing the findings of the different sciences involved in cognitive science, especially those of artificial intelligence and neuroscience, it continues to explore ways to explain the workings of the mind in purely scientific terms. But despite the rigor and sophistication of its methods, certain questions critical to its success have remained unanswered, such as how consciousness emerges from the brain’s physical processes and how the phenomenal properties of our conscious experiences arise from the physical properties of our bodily experiences. This has led some scholars to seek alternative perspectives. One such perspective that is widely explored today is Buddhist thought. The centrality of the mind in Buddhist thought and its perceived compatibility with the findings of modern science make it an attractive alternative framework to carry out the naturalization project. In this paper, I aim to examine the plausibility of this strategy. In particular, I shall evaluate whether Buddhist thought provides the needed insights to overcome the challenges facing the said project.

Immanuel Kant has indeed initiated a new era in philosophy with his new ideas on epistemology and ethics with his works Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason. However, prior to these works, Kant underwent certain development in his philosophical thinking— initially as a rationalist, then eventually maturing to the philosopher that he is known for. In line with this development of Kant’s philosophical thought, the researcher’s particular interest is in his ideas on God and metaphysics. By reviewing Kant’s philosophical works especially in the Universal Natural History and the Theory of the Heavens [1755], A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition [1755], and The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God [1763], we find out that his initial idea of God reflects his rationalist convictions as thought by his mentors from the Leibniz- Wolffian school. However, his critical project that attempted to put metaphysics on solid ground resulted in more doubt of its certainty. This affected especially his ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, which he believes can no longer be supported with the transcendent metaphysics he used to adhere to. This led Kant to concede that in the realm of pure reason, the idea of God cannot be satisfactorily justified. He eventually found a new ground where the idea of God can stand in his investigations on practical reason and morality.