The topic of science was one of the most significant topics in the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was not primarily a science methodologist; he could be considered a significant philosopher of science. Heidegger’s philosophy of science is often labeled supertemporal. Although Heidegger was interested in reflecting several stages of science, the present article only deals with his philosophical view of modern science. The article does not analyze how Heidegger reflects on particular sciences; it analyses how he reflects on science as a whole, specifically the individual stages of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The basic question of the research is whether his philosophy of science before the “Turn” is in any way different from his philosophy of science after the “Turn,” i.e., whether we can speak of two completely different approaches to science, or whether it is possible to find some continuity between them. Besides Heidegger’s published works, the paper also reflects on the discovery of an original, unpublished version of his text and looks critically at some interpreters of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. The study concludes that despite numerous differences in his reflection on science before and after the Turn, it can be stated that there is substantial continuity between the stages of Heidegger´s philosophy of science.

The moral debate about open borders needs to go beyond focusing on the interests of the migrant versus the interests of the hosting state and its original citizens to focusing more on the interests of the countries that migrants are leaving. I hint at the long-term insufficiency of so-called economic remittances to the development of migrant-sending states when compared to domiciled skilled labor. But most importantly, I identify the irrelevance of current empirical research on brain drain to an open borders scenario. I hint at the potential scale of brain drain in such a scenario, and I raise a moral question about the propriety of proposing open borders with a focus on the wellbeing of the individual migrant if such a focus is determined to be at the expense of the wellbeing of the migrant’s home country. I add that a preamble to opening borders would be to significantly address gross global economic disparities, world poverty, and political injustices.

Morality is a normative system of guidance that figures into practical reason by telling people what to do in various situations. The problem, however, is that morality has inherent gaps that often render it inefficacious. First, it may be indeterminate due to the high level of generality in which its principles are formulated. Second, moral terms such as ‘good’ and ‘right’ may be so vague that they fail to specify the requisite behavior. And third, its subjective aspect, which is a product of personal experience, generates moral disagreement and thereby creates coordination problems that frustrate society’s collective moral aims. The objective of this article is to advance the thesis that morality must sometimes depend on law as a supplementary source of practical reason, a dependence which can be explained in terms of three essential features of law: its institutional character, its claim to authority, and its status as a second-order exclusionary reason for action. It shall then be explained how these three features enable law to make difficult decisions on behalf of individuals, define objective standards of conduct, and solve coordination problems, respectively, and in doing so, manage to fill in the gaps of morality mentioned above. Hence, it will be argued that law is also a normative system that helps people achieve their moral aims, notwithstanding the fact that it guides human behavior through a different logic and mode of operation from those of morality.

I argue in this paper that every society has its own “libidinal drives” that may or may not paralyze the capacity of individuals towards freedom. Fromm calls this the social character. Social character is the unconscious canalization of individual libidinal drives for the attainment of social objectives instituted by the dominant figures of society. I theorize that the Freirian dyadic alliance persists because of a dominant characterology permeated by the ruling authorities. The dynamics of social character structure not only eludes the oppressed conscious awareness, but it also actually strengthens the domination and control through the institutionalization of structural policies enacted and implemented by the oppressors. Hence, what Freire laments in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed is equalized and smoothen by how the marginalized and the downtrodden cling incessantly towards the oppressors. By depending upon the dominant ruling authorities, the oppressed find fulfillment and satisfaction, upon which they fortify the dyadic-symbiotic relations. This happens because of the dynamics of their character structure that caters to the instinctual drive to survive. The social character gives rise to the inner satisfaction of oppressed libidinous desires and needs, thus equalizing their own emotional needs. Furthermore, the very nature of their submissiveness is a character trait that unknowingly recanalizes their elementary needs in life. Hence, by understanding how the Frommian social character influences social behaviors the symbiotic element that cements the Freirian dyadic relation is unlocked. Through unraveling the dynamics of social characterology, the Freirian dyadic symbiosis ungrounds itself and eventually grasps why the majority of the poor and marginalized are motivated and find fulfillment therein as a matter of survival from controlling authorities.

The principle of overlap of classes holds that when two entities interface, the effect is a blurring of boundaries between conceptual territories. In this paper, this question is in order: Is Folk Catholicism an instance of overlap of classes? If Folk Catholicism is not construed as such, these fallacies – using Robin George Collingwood’s perspective in his An Essay on Philosophical Method (1933), may unfold: the fallacy of precarious margins, the fallacy of identified coincidents, and the fallacy of false disjunction. The first fallacy holds that the ‘Folk’ in Folk Catholicism has no contribution to how ‘Catholicism’ unfolds. The second fallacy maintains that the extensions of both ‘Folk’ and ‘Catholicism’ are clearly delineated. The third fallacy underscores that Folk and Catholicism are mutually exclusive terms. When such fallacies are accepted, this paper holds that Folk Catholicism as a construct may be a contradiction of terms on what it means to be Folk and Catholic. This is the illogical consequence given that the truth of what it means to be folk necessitates the falsity of what it means to be Catholic and vice-versa. However, when recognized from the lens of the overlap, Folk Catholicism is construed as a term that evolves and is historically conditioned.

The paper is a critique of Alvin Plantinga’s notion that belief in God is properly basic - evidence is not needed to justify such belief - in light of Thomas Aquinas’ religious epistemology. The latter’s epistemology proves that, while evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God based on his Summa Theologica (henceforth, ST) since such belief is evidence itself from his De Veritate (henceforth, Dv), there is sufficient evidence that justifies such belief. First, I argue that Plantinga’s total rejection of evidence as a justification for belief in God renders such belief purely subjective. To rationally ground this purely subjective belief, Plantinga introduces the notion of justification-conferring conditions. Second, following Thomas Aquinas’ thought, Plantinga’s justification negates his claim that belief in God is properly basic because the said justification-conferring conditions seem to function as an evidence for belief in God. I will conclude the work by claiming that although evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God, it is epistemically sufficient to justify the said belief.

The use of language in hate speech is understandably offensive. Though words do not kill, they convey an alarming message that can harm the victim. To understand how words can harm, it is necessary to understand the nature of the meaning of pejoratives or slurs that are used in hate speech. Pejoratives are undeniably offensive. However, they are puzzling as they can be used in two directions, namely, the offensive power preservation and the offensive power destruction. This paper proposes that the direct reference theory of pejoratives can solve the puzzle. A characterization of pejoratives is that it has the property of immediacy. They refer directly to the object of speech. Grounding on a shared context, any descriptions are unnecessary for understanding the offensive message of pejoratives. In this sense, pejoratives have indexical content as it is context-sensitive. The kind of indexical content that pertains to pejoratives is action-oriented. However, its object of reference is empty. In discussing pejoratives that are used in hate speech, some examples of Thai slurs are shown.

Whether all the Platonic dialogues are parts of an inconsistent or consistent body is a controversial subject of philosophy. Indeed, though in form all the texts are written dialogically, in content, one might recognize methodological alterations in Platonic thought from the 1st book of The Republic to later dialogues such as The Statesman and The Laws. However, how much this methodological alteration might affect the content of Plato’s political philosophy, the relation between the rupture in the method of contemplation on the one hand and the structure of the Platonic ideal Polis is still a subject not seriously explored yet. Exploring the characteristics of the three different methods used in Plato’s different dialogues, the present study attempts to show that in the light of the methodological alteration, one might realize how Platonic understanding of the good society has changed from The Republic to The Statesman and The Laws.

This paper aims to institute that the folk song Pamulinawen is essentially a work of art descriptive of Ilokano cultural self-understanding. Specifically, it wants to elucidate that Pamulinanen, per se, is capable of self-assertion; it can usher itself to engage in a dialogue with the Ilokano beholder, and through the mediation of a common pagsasao (language), it embodies the individual and/or Nakem, the Ilokano collective identity. More than a popular song of courtship among the Ilokanos, the song Pamulinawen then attempts to increase knowledge about Ilokano kananakem (cultural self-understanding) so that it serves not only as a piece of Ilokano cultural entertainment but as a medium to express “Ilokano-ness" (Ilokano beingness). Through the qualitative methodology, this study mainly employs maiyannatup a panagripirip, a hermeneutical approach to appropriately philosophize on the Ilokano metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. This approach consists of, among others, palpaliiw (observation) and the “Agcaoilon PAR” (“Punget-A-Ramut a balikas” or root-stem word).

What roles does Iwa [character in Yoruba belief] play in Yoruba philosophy of existence, and how can these roles help provide a solution to challenges of contemporary socio-political order, not only in Africa but also across the globe? Both are the daunting questions this paper sets out to examine. The foundation of Yoruba philosophy of existence is predicated mainly on the moral pivot called iwa. It is on iwa, which has both ontological and ethical etymologies that the meaning of life is based. Iwa regulates the social relations among people, and adherence to it within the Yoruba cultural matrix provides answers to complex questions of existence. It is submitted that the moral foundation of Yoruba philosophy of existence, as dictated by iwa, is a veritable basis for engendering normative principles for addressing problems in contemporary society as it harmonizes disparate interests for the common good, thereby reconciling the self with the other.

French philosopher Helene Cixous (1976) stressed the importance of feminine writing. She believes that women should take part in sharing their experiences from their own novel points-of-view. We discuss that while pregnancy is an experience unique to women, it has been misappropriated by patriarchal structures throughout the years. The pregnancy bump, which is more than just evidence of the uterus stretching to accommodate the fetus, is a symbol of a woman's triumphs and struggles all throughout conception, pregnancy, and childbirth. We show that women have already gone beyond the bump and challenged existing patriarchal systems through different means, as Cixous has enjoined women to do. With this, it is asserted that the philosophy of pregnancy be reconceived as well, in order to escape existing boundaries that constrict the discourse to ethical issues of rape, abortion, and medical interventions, making it face issues that surround women's experience of pregnancy, as well as deeper meanings the pregnant body itself represents.

Theories of persistence are often motivated on the grounds that they can account for or solve certain problems that accompany persistence as a metaphysical problem. These problems are what I will call the problems of persistence: change, cohabitation, and vagueness. In this paper, I claim that any theory of persistence should be able to account for these problems. Any theory of persistence which fails to do so should be rejected or, at the very least, be seen as unsatisfactory. Kristie Miller introduces a possible contender, terdurantism, which is a “non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism,” as she puts it. This view is attractive because it avoids the usual objections raised against its rivals: perdurantism and endurantism. Miller and I both ultimately argue against the plausibility of terdurantism as a theory of persistence, but our motivations differ. Miller’s argument is based on the presumption that any theory of persistence which is non-perdurantist ultimately fails. She argues that temporal parts are needed in any account of persistence. My argument is based on the “problem-solving” capacity or the ability of the theory to account for the persistence problems. I will argue that terdurantism is not a plausible theory of persistence since it fails to give a viable account of the three problems. By showing the importance of accounting for the three problems — and how a terdurantist position fails to accomplish this — I hope to have convinced the reader that not only is terdurantism an unattractive persistence theory, but any plausible theory of persistence ought to account for the problems.

It may be commonplace hearing people accuse the discipline of philosophy of irrelevance, especially when it comes to societal issues. Hannah Arendt, a contemporary political thinker, remarked that philosophy and political action are irreconcilable spheres of thought—that the space for contemplation is nowhere near the space for action. Granting Arendt’s observation, how can philosophy courses cross the chasm brought about by disciplinal borders? How can philosophy classes help produce active and more engaged citizens? In this paper, I dispute the former claim by way of undertaking two tasks. First, to lay down the groundwork, I provide a philosophical analysis that underlines Hannah Arendt’s political position and most important ideas, particularly those that surface in one of her greatest works, “The Human Condition.” Second, I point out how Arendt’s notions inspire some practices in education and pedagogy, thus paving the way for a genuine application of a philosophical theory to society. By drawing on experiences in teaching philosophy by employing social reconstructionist education and its corollary pedagogical tool, service-learning, this paper hopes to bring back some space to a reconsideration of philosophy as a relevant discipline in society, particularly in education. In the end, I conclude that philosophy and action, contrary to the claim of Arendt herself, are fully compatible. In doing philosophy, the germ of genuine action may be found.