The theme of death is of great consequence in Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger because most of the existentialist views about death are encapsulated in the debate between them. While Heidegge4 carrying with a certain religious conviction, is of the view that death confers meaning on human existence, Sartre believes that death is a great evil which makes life meaningless. Sartre's position obviously sprouts from his atheistic persuasion which does not accommodate a presage of a future existence or embrace the ideals associated with the good life. For the Yoruba, however Sartre's position does not make sense and is preposterous; they believe strongly that the human personality survives death. In this paper I want to show that the Yoruba conception of human existence and death-as conveyed by the Iremore - reflects an extracosmic and a more comprehensive reading of existence that reinforces the values associated with an honorable lift.

A conference held in Manchester University in 2007 and a subsequent book containing papers presented therein (entitled Aesthetics and radical politics) attempt to legitimize certain radical political activities as art, that is, by confercing the status of art onthese protest activities. Inarguing that these works would probably fail to be accepted by the artworld, I have resorted to some form of essentialism, i.e., they will likely fail because they were never intended (by their organizers) as ant activities, and the activities themselves do not appear to have an aesthetic function, and the spectators do not expect to see an art performnnce when they encounter one of these protests. But the failure (or potentinlfoilure) of these activities to be accepted as art has broader implications, for it reveals that one of the most influential versions of the institutional theory of art ( George Dickie's ) has failed to describe the sufficient conditions of art.

In the Aristotelian corpus of writings as it has come down to us, there are four works specifically on ethics: the Nicomachean ethics, the Eudemian ethics, the Magna moralia ( or Great ethics) and the short On virtues and vices. Scholars are now agreed that the first two are genuinely by Aristotle and most also believe that the Nicomachean is the later and better of the two. About the Magna moralia, there is still a division of opinion, though probably most scholars hold that it is not genuine, Those who hold it is genuine suppose it to be an early work or a redaction of an early work made by a later Peripatetic. As for On virtues and vices almost everyone holds it to be a spurious work written some two centuries after Aristotle's death. However the arguments scholars give for these opinions are entirely unconvincing. In fact, they beg the question by assuming the conclusion in order to prove the conclusion. My own contention is that all the hard evidence we have compels us to conclude that all of these works are definitely by Aristotle but that they dffer not by time of writing, as scholars universally suppose, but by audience and purpose. In brief, the Nicormachean and Eudemian ethics are writings internal to Aristotle's School with the Nicomachen being directed to legislators and the Eudemian to philosophers. The Magna moralia ls an exoteric work meant for those outside the school. On virtues and vices is a collection of endoxa, or common and received opinions about virtues, perhaps meant as a handbook for young students but also for use in philosophical analysis. It is almost certainly referred to as such by a cryptic remark in the Eudemian ethics .

This paper explores the thoughts of Emerita Quito, Claro Ceniza, Florentino Timbreza, and Rolando Gripaldo as contributiors of De La Salle University to the development of Filipino philosophy in the cultural sense. These philosophy mentors ore selected based on their textual productivity and on the fact that they retired from DLSU as full professors. Filipino philosophy in this paper is limited to the following discourses: logical analysis, phenomenology/existentialism/hermeneutics, critical philosophy as an academic method; appropriation of foreign theories ; appropriation of folk philosophy, revisionist writing, interpretation of Filipino worldview, research on Filipino values and ethics, identification of the presuppositions and implications of the Filipino worldview and the study on Filipino philosophical luminaries. This exploration concludes with some assessments of the aforementioned philosophers' more specific impact on Filipino philosophy.

One of the aims of this study is to lay the ground for the possibility of intermingling Marxist ideas with organizational development. The paper explains the meaning of humanism in organization setting in the light of a labor-oriented paradigm. It also proposes steps on how this alternative frame and mindset will work on actual change practices in the organization by juxtaposing Richard Beckhard's organization development strategies with the Humanistic - Marxist paradigm.

Although he did not lengthily critique St. Thomas's philosophy, Richard Rorty tagged him along with Plato as a foundationalist thinker, i.e., someone who is preoccupied with underlying principles or ultimate standards of truth. It is unfortunate, however, that Rorty's sweeping critique is obviously based on superficial and inadequate reading of the Dominican saint. Marie- Dominique Chenu, a less known yet very serious Thomist scholar, has shown that the mode of argumentation in the thought of St. Thomas has an underlying conversational goal. In other words, St. Thomas's method of rational inquiry is not divisive but collaborative which is highlighted by the effort to reconcile initially opposing views by means of the intellectual tool of distinction, a tool which Rorty himself employed in dealing with criticisms hurled against his apparently nihilistic neopragmatic thought. St. Thomas consistently employed the tool of distinction in disputatio, or argumentation with the goal of pursuing collaboration with different thinkers whether they are Christians or Muslims, pagans or believers, in the pursuit of truth.

Civilization is now more than ever bombarded with the rapid innovation and technological development of all nations, which threatens to dislodge religious and moral traditions. Jürgen Habermas, a staunch defender of critical theory, has a very distinct philosophical position that theology is bound to come to grips with it. Theologians would argue that moral lift with its wide range of exclusions and virtues is of necessity grounded in a God, who is a transcendent entity. Failing such grounding, humanity is susceptible to secular relativism that, by its very nature, weakens the moral fabric of society. What is the role of religion in postmodernist society ? This article is a critical meta-analysis of what Habermas has to say on the matter This article thus provides a critique of Habermas's views on religion and the role of religion particularly in the public sphere. It is noticeable that Habermas has a different view with Immanuel Kant in that religion is not philosophical in nature, but rather involves a very unique and private matter off faith in a God.

Feminism has continued to advance and open new frontiers, maintaining a dominant status in the genre of issues in the political and academic arena over the last few decades. This growth in status has opened an array of perspectives from which the feminine condition can be more aptly appraised and improved. One such perspective is African feminism. In examining the idea of African feminism, this paper analyses the reasons advanced for its uniqueness. While it concedes that there are peculiar conditions in Africa which raise unique challenges for the feminine gender, it questions the basis for anchoring the idea of African feminism on them. The paper submits that if the peculiarity of experiences is the basis for demarcation, the heterogeneous nature of the continent renders such an idea a non-starter. lt further tries to show that the challenges that differentiate the African female from her counterparts elsewhere are not gender-engendered, but are rather products of the totality of the peculiar African experience, especially in the postcolonial era.

In this paper I examine five essential themes in Brand Blanshard's coherence theory of truth. Blanshard defines truth in terms of the rational or the interdependence of concepts, where concepts determine objects of experience rather than merely conform to them. On this view, truth is contextual and is the approximation of thought to reality or the systemization of the two ends - the immanent and transcendent. I raise some worries for this account of truth, foremost of which is the worry that it commits us to a deep-seated skepticism, both theoretical and practical. In order to be able to tell when the immanent end is achieved and if it is making progress towards the transcendent end (i.e., when the ultimate systematization is realized), we require an omniscient standpoint of cosmic order or overarching system of beliefs. While this seems possible in principle it is not so in practice.

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant invokes the moral law as an underived fact of reason. The aim of this article is to explore the highly debated role of the fact of reason and the nature of this fact, which apparently defies the senses of actuality commonly associated with empirical facts and objective entities. Following David Sussman's interpretation, I argue that the fact of reason not only marks the abandonment of deduction of the moral law but illustrates that the failure to ground the moral law does not undermine its unconditional authority. Therefore, I claim that rather than signifying a methodological maneuver to get out of the circle that Kant admits to be entrapped, it operates as immanent, dynamic and an aporetic facticity. This perspective allows seeing its heuristic function for keeping intact the aporia that structures morality and offers away of coming into the circle of morality.

Arguments against the plausibility of a scientific theory of consciousness are hinged on the ground that attached to mental consciousness are phenomenal properties, also known as qualia, which are not amenable to any scientific theory. This paper develops and defends a neuroidentity hypothesis that purports to show that qualia, which are identified as neuroqualia, are the same as some neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system. The neuroidentity hypothesis is offered as a possible way of moving closer to a probable scientific theory of consciousness.