The argument rests on earlier work questioning the Russellian separation of levels and arguing that Russellian levels should be taken to include the levels of particle and aggregate, and generality and detail. That earlier work argues from the non-separation of particle and aggregate that predictability is limited and that physics cannot come to an end. This leads to a view of the world as flux. Identifiable objects demanding explanation can only be temporary entities emerging from flux and explanation can only be local and historical. This precludes explanation of totality and leads us to reject Leibniz’s question. Baldwin’s argument from possible worlds theory that a null world is possible is examined and questioned. Koon’s combination of the kalam argument with the grim reaper paradox is not queried but a way is found of circumventing it. It is noted in passing that the argument does not have the anti-theistic implications which may appear.

In this paper, I focus my attention on I and Thou as an important text in the philosophy of religion which goes beyond the traditional opposition of theism and atheism by proposing a different way of thinking about God and the nature of religious belief. I begin with a basic account of Buber’s position in Part One of I and Thou, and then I move on to the philosophy of God in Part Three which is built upon this initial discussion. In the rest of the paper, I examine some of the implications of Buber’s perspective for the meaning of “belief in God” and how this affects traditional theism and atheism. My sense is that I and Thou has been very influential, but in recent years it has been unfairly neglected. One of the goals of this paper is to show that I and Thou is still important, for as a singular text that transcends the ordinary boundaries of philosophy, theology, and literature it remains compelling and appeals to many who have different religious beliefs, as well as those who have none.

In a recent paper, Chunghyoung Lee argues that, because zygotes are developmentally plastic, they cannot be numerically identical to the singletons into which they develop, thereby undermining conceptionism. In this short paper, I respond to Lee. I argue, first, that, on the most popular theories of personal identity, zygotic plasticity does not undermine conceptionism, and, second, that, even overlooking this first issue, Lee’s plasticity argument is problematic. My goal in all of this is not to take a stand in the abortion debate, which I remain silent on here, but, rather, to push for the conclusion that transitivity fails when we are talking about numerical identity of non-abstract objects.

Thomists do not have an account of how modern mathematics relates to classical mathematics or more generally fits into the Aristotelian hierarchy of sciences. Rather than treat primarily of Aquinas’s theses on mathematical abstraction, I turn to considering what modern mathematics is in itself, seen from a broadly classical perspective. I argue that many modern quantities can be considered to be, not quantities as such or in themselves, but derived quantities, i.e., quantities that can be defined wholly in terms of the principles of number or magnitude. I also interpret the parts of modern mathematics that study quantitative change as being properly-speaking parts of natural philosophy, for example, probability theory, statistics, calculus, etc. In conclusion, I consider the place that quantity as such has in the order of the world and why we should expect the world to be highly mathematical, as we have found it to be.

Creationism is an important feature of Christianity but seems very foreign to Chinese philosophy. This paper examines an early attempt at introducing a metaphysical account of creationism in Huanyou quan (1628) by the Portuguese Jesuit, Francisco Furtado, and the Chinese scholar, Li Zhizao. It investigates the sources drawn from the works of Thomas Aquinas and reconstructs the choices made by the two authors in their translation. Finally, it suggests that Thomistic creationism bears similarities with Chinese philosophy.

Those who occupy positions of authority such as public officials and corporate executives frequently find themselves in contexts in which their choices can be expected to have consequences regarding the distribution of benefits and burdens among various stakeholders. How should such people reason in such contexts so as not to be biased? Herein I set forth and critically examine two answers to this question. The first is based on the work of John Rawls and is intuitively attractive. Nevertheless, I argue that there is reason to question its plausibility. The second is based on the work of John Finnis and is initially not intuitively attractive. Nevertheless, I develop a defense of it. If my defense of the second answer is plausible, what those who occupy positions of authority should do so as not to be biased when making choices in contexts of distributive choice is quite different than what is commonly supposed.

The aim of this paper is to show how systematic Charles Taylor’s philosophy is. It rejects two opposite readings: one claiming that Taylor’s thought is too diverse to have real unity; the other, that it is the product of a “monomaniac” (Taylor’s own word). I claim that his thought has a very distinct structure, comprising two levels. On the first, “meta-hermeneutic” level, Taylor defends a thesis about hermeneutics (namely, that it cannot be dispensed with): this unifies his anthropology, epistemology, moral philosophy, philosophy of language and political philosophy. On the second, “hermeneutic” level, Taylor builds an impressive historic construal of modern identity and its dilemmas. More importantly, while these two levels are irreducibly distinct, they relate to each other in interesting ways, giving Taylor’s philosophy its systematicity. I finally confront this view with other readings, and argue that it is the best way to understand Taylor’s work.

For a given decision, when an undemocratic procedure would result in a good outcome, and a democratic procedure would result in a bad outcome, which decision procedure ought we to use? Epistemic democrats, such as Joseph Schumpeter, argue that all else being equal, we should prefer the procedure with the good outcome. Schumpeter’s argument for this position is that we must reject the view that only democratic procedures matter when evaluating government institutions (pure proceduralism), and the only alternative to pure proceduralism that can coherently describe the relationship between democracy and the public interest is pure instrumentalism. I argue that Schumpeter’s argument for epistemic democracy does not succeed. In this paper, I outline three alternative ways of conceiving of the relationship between democracy and the public interest, which I call evaluative dualism, impure instrumentalism, and impure proceduralism. I explain how, with any of these three alternative views, we can evaluate government institutions without rejecting the intrinsic value of democratic procedures or the public interest.