One seldom-noted consequence of most recent arguments for “animal rights” or against “speciesism” is their inability to provide a justification for differential treatment on the basis of species membership, even in cases of rare or endangered species. I defend the claim that arguments about the moral status of individual animals inadequately deal with this issue, and go on, with the help of several test cases, to reject three traditional analyses of our alleged obligation to protect endangered species. I conclude (a) that these traditional analyses fail, (b) that there is an important conceptual confusion in any attempt to ascribe value to a species, and (c) that our obligation must ultimately rest on the value---often aesthetic-of individual members of certain species.

Nature is examined as a carrier of values. Despite problems of subjectivity and objectivity in value assignments, values are actualized in human relationships with nature, sometimes by (human) constructive activity depending on a natural support, sometimes by a sensitive, if an interpretive, appreciation of the characteristics of natural objects. Ten areas of values associated with nature are recognized: (1)economic value, (2) life support value, (3) recreational value, (4) scientific value, (5) aesthetic value, (6) life value, (7) diversity and unity values, (8) stability and spontaneity values, (9) dialectical value, and (10) sacramental value. Bach is analyzed and illustrated with particular reference to the objective precursors of value as these are described by natural science.

Although preservationists sometimes allege a right of wild areas to remain wild, their arguments do not warrant the ascription of such a right. It is hard to see how any argument to this conclusion could be persuasive, for (1) X having a right to Y requires that depriving X of Y injure X (other things being equal), and (2) the only X we have reason to think can be injured is an X which possesses consciousness. On the other hand, rights are problematic creatures, and the individualistic moral view they presuppose does not accord well with the holistic perspective of many preservationists. While it might be possible to develop this perspective into a moral theory that gives wildemess intrinsic value, there seems a greater need for clarifying the policy implications of accepted moral principles.

While Eastern and Western cultures agree that life is sacred, and that morality demands its protection, they differ sharply as to how the term life is to be interpreted, and therefore what prohibitions against killing should entail. l examine some of these conflicting perspectives, explore life as an ambiguous term, and suggest are interpretation of the concept, which permits moral ruIes against killing to be applied more rationally.

Although John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice does not deal specifically with the ethics of environmental concerns, it can generally be applied to give justification for the prudent and continent use of our natural resources. The argument takes two forms: one dealing with the immediate effects of environmental impact and the other, delayed effects. Immediate effects, which impact the present society, should besubject to environmental controls because they affect health and opportunity, social primary goods to be dispensed by society. Delayed environmental impacts, affecting future generations, are also subject to control because future generations have a just claim upon our natural resources-the generation to which a person belongs is an arbitrary contingency which should not exclude persons not yet born from consideration in the original contract of society.

Jan Narveson has suggested that rational egoism might provide a defensible moral perspective that would put animals out of the reach of morality without denying that they are capable of suffering. I argue that rational egoism provides a principled indifference to the fate of animals at high cost: the possibility of principled indifference to the fate of “marginal humans.”