The paper provides a comparative analysis of the programs of reforms of philosophy developed by Christian Wolff and the members of the Eclecticist school. It reveals the critical foundations of the concepts of the system by both schools and assesses the prospects of their further development. Although Wolff is often inconsistent, he is nevertheless closer to Descartes and Leibniz, and therefore to the Platonic tradition. The Eclecticists, on the other hand, are closer to the Peripatetic tradition, and therefore to empiricism. From the point of view of the history of philosophical methodology, Wolff’s program combines Cartesianism and the German tradition of methodical thinking (J. Jung, E. Weigel and Leibniz), which both were oriented towards mathematics. The Eclecticists, on the other hand, used the dialectical model, which they modernized by introducing the principle of historicism and applying it to the history of philosophy. When the program of the Eclecticists was guided by the critical selection of knowledge by members of the "scientific community" and the concept of an open system, Wolff’s synthesis of knowledge is carried out on the basis of a rigorous method. He puts forward a fundamentally new idea of a universal system based on new normative requirements for the system-forming principle - it must be fundamental, generally valid and immanent in the system of knowledge. Wolff does not reject the critical program of the Eclecticists; he tries to prove that the successful implementation of their program is possible only if there is a basic system of truths and a reliable method. In his treatise On the Difference Between Systematic and Non-systematic Intellect, Wolff laid the foundation of “systematic eclecticism” and “speculative criticism”, which was substantiated in the works by "classics of German idealism", primarily by C. L. Reinhold and Hegel.

The author holds the view that Johann Gottlieb Fichte founded a new approach to the problems of subjectivity and self-consciousness. There are two basic models of the theory of selfconsciousness, namely the reflection theory of self-consciousness and Fichte’s approach. According to the reflection theory (Locke, Leibnitz, Kant) self-consciousness is the result of a reflection i.e., in order to ascribe self to oneself one must await its objectification by a subsequent reflection. This poses a difficulty, however. For what should enable the act of reflection (which according to this model is itself non-conscious) to realize that the first-order state belongs to the same subjectivity as itself? The author claims that Fichte noticed this difficulty and elaborated a theory, which provides an understanding of self-consciousness as selfknowledge that couldn’t be objectified by a reflection.

One of the central problems in philosophy after Kant is the meaning and systematic func-tion of self-consciousness. This essay explores the question of how Kant’s concept of self-consciousness and the thinking subject relates to Fichte’s “I”, and what the relevant grounds are possible for Fichte’s view that in his doctrine of “I think” Kant had already “pointed” at the highest principle of the Wissenschaftslehre “I am”. A comparison of Kant’s “I think” with the line of argument of § 1 of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre shows that Fichte follows Kant in the theoretical grounding of self-consciousness in judgmental functions, and in this way Fichte shared a position already presented by Kant that the concept of self-consciousness contains the thought of a groundless subject, spontaneously generating knowledge of its own existence.

The paper deals with Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s argument in § 1 of the «Foundations of the Science of Knowledge» (1794). Reconstructing the crucial argument of the § 1 of «Foundations…» step by step, the author shows how Fichte infers the proposition «I am» from the log-ical proposition of identity «A is A». In doing so, the author claims that proposition «I am», which expresses what Fichte calls «Tathandlung», has to be understood as a critical response to Carl Leonhard Reinhold’s methodological program which emphasizes the starting point of philosophy as a «fact of consciousness». Furthermore, the paper shows the difference between Fichte’s argument of the § 1 of «Foundations…» and his first attempt of its application in the «Private Meditations on Elementary Philosophy» (1793/94) which deals with the concept of an intellectual intuition of the «I» and which in turn can be understood as referring to a fact of consciousness. Therefore, Fichte’s argument leading to the proposition «I am» in the § 1 of «Foundations…», is the result of a self-critical revision of his very first conception of the «I».

 The paper deals with Fichte’s conception of substantiality formulated in «Foundations of the Science of Knowledge» (1794). The author claims that according to Fichte the self-ascription of an epistemic activity to the subject is possible only if we can think subject as the substance, to which we could ascribe all possible epistemic activities. Furthemore, the author shows the development of the concept of definability (Bestimmbarkeit), which is of the utmost importance for the understanding of Fichte’s concept of substantiality, by Wolff, Kant, and Maimon.

n this paper Fichte’s conception of a theory of consciousness and self-consciousness is ex-amined as it is presented in the «Foundations of Natural Right» (1796/7) and in «Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre» (1797). It is argued that Fichte develops a per-formative interpretation of self-consciousness. The main thesis of the paper is that Fichte provides a performative theoretical program, i.e. the history of performative self-consciousness.

National philosophy as a research topic in relation to Ukraine has its peculiar features. The national philosophy, in this case, cannot signify only Ukrainian philosophy, strictly ethnically limited (meeting either geographic or mental criteria). This entails an inevitable question of delimitation between Russian and Ukrainian philosophies. The only way to solve this unavoidable question is to recognize the duality of national consciousness as well as cultural parallelism, suggested by V. Zenkovsky for solving problems in relationships between Russia and Ukraine.

The idea of national philosophy is often expanded to ancient doctrines and problems. This is inappropriate but possible due to a number of clichés in contemporary understanding of philosophy, such as the reduction of philosophy to life experience and identification of philosophy with journalism and ideology. The author presents several arguments against these positions basing on various texts of early Ionian thinkers, Aristotle, Isocrates, Gorgias. Philosophy in Ancient Greece was understood as a critical practice of reasonable debates that implied a commitment to specific school or position and conscientious civil position of the philosopher. It was classic Greece where this understanding of philosophy formed as a combination of three conditions: citizen’s virtue → rhetorician’s persuasiveness → philosopher’s best knowledge (i.e., truth), that accompanied philosophy for the last 25 centuries. On that ground any discussion of national philosophy (Russian, Nenets, Bantu etc.) will be correct only if all of these conditions would be realized in any discourse, and this discourse would correspond to specific disciplinary features mentioned above.

In order to speak seriously about the emergence of national philosophy, it is necessary to consider not only the content of available texts that belong to a certain period, but also the ability of society to create and adequately perceive them. The article shows how in the Russian mediaeval national consciousness certain themes were elaborated, in particular the themes of "pravda" and "volya", which later in the XIX century determined not only the main direction of the national philosophizing, but also its genre diversity.

The article analyses the use of the idea and notion of national philosophy in the studies of the history of Ukrainian philosophy. Particularly, studying the writings of Dmytro Chyzhevskyi and Vilen Horskyi, there were analysed problems of applying the descriptive strategy in this field. The strategy consists in finding phenomena in the history of philosophy which could correspond to the notion of national philosophy. The institutional approach is put forward as an approach which can unite various phenomena, making up the contemporary canon of the history of philosophy of Ukraine. The proposed approach supplements and deepens a cultural approach, suggested by Vilen Horskyi, with the application of methods of social philosophy. It consists in study into national philosophical traditions as institutions which allow forming and interconnection between different modes of philosophizing within a national culture.

The word and idea of a «national philosophy» come up against a seemingly insurmountable aporia between the demand for a universal wisdom (philosophia perennis) and the need to incarnate this pursuit in the manifold and varied cultures.This aporia is mythically revealed in the conflict between the unified, solid, senseless language of Babel and its redemption in the shared understanding by different peoples and idioms (Pentecost).This myth finds its effective incarnation in the multiplicity of human cultures along human history. But this history is marked by a double conflict:- a symbolic one in the competition between a «vertical» order (the rule of languages considered to be sacred) and a «horizontal» order challenged by the outcome of new secular idioms (Volgare in Italy of Renaissance);- a polemical one in the recurrence of the tension between the building of a «lingua universalis» (a logical one) and the fertility of «natural» idioms. (at the epicenter of this tension radiates thought of Leibniz).What emerges from these oppositions is the part played by language, in the diversity of its expressions. This diversity enables the emergence of a «nationalization» of philosophy. From then on, it seeks and coins itself in the midst of fundamentally peculiar cultures (nations) competing in an inventive, contrasting and vulnerable quest for meaning.

The article is dedicated to the ideas of Eros and Femininity of poet Alexander Blok. The central place in the work is given to the problem of ontological status of Blok’s Fair Lady. The authors show that the poet has been looking for ontological place of Femininity in nature, society and universe on the whole for a long period of time. As a result, Blok finds the true kingdom of Fair Lady in time and in history.

In this article the main theme of Dostoevsky – the freedom is analyzed. Researchers, who study the legacy of Dostoevsky, try to consider one or another aspect of his work as a more or less constant, complete system. Following the Russian tradition, they seek to record a "positive" Dostoevsky. The author believes that there is no such Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky put "cursed questions" not to get a final answer to them but merely for the process of questioning what actually means "living" them through. The author believes that the antinomy of freedom for Dostoevsky leaves open the problem of choosing between the Boholyudyna and Lyudyno-boh. The content of his works is studying their opposition within the human soul, which lasts throughout life. The process of choice, the arguments in favor of one or the other are more important for Dostoevsky than the final answer.

The article is devoted to the ideological evolution of Pushkin : from skepticism (bordering with atheism) – to religiosity. In this regard, the pagan antiquity as a whole (and skepticism generated by it, in particular), as well as the Christian culture are the two equal important sources of Pushkin's creative work. In this research the author proves the following theses: 1) the mature Pushkin `s works are deeply akin to Goethe's ones, his position in the history of Russian literature is isomorphic to that of Goethe in the history of German literature 2) the position of the majority of Pushkin scholars who argued that the poet despised " German me-taphysics", is based on selective quotations and therefore wrong 3) towards the end of his life Pushkin inclined to German idealism, and some of his works of the 1830`s have sonata (dialec-tical in nature) form; some of them are built as a dialogue of opposites 4) the commonplaces of the modern Pushkin`s myths (Pushkin Voltairean, monarchist, an Orthodox-Christian) are the consequence of a unilateral approach 5) only holistic reconstruction of his philosophical and religious beliefs makes it possible to interpret his masterpieces adequately.

The object of the paper is to consider the potential of Kant’s transcendental argument in re-lation to Ernst Tugendhat’s “symmetry argument”. The point of Tugendhat’s argument is the hypothesis that the relevant epistemic use of the first person singular pronoun in the sentence with the structure like “I know that I φ” (where φ stands for various states of mind) makes sense only when someone else can use this sentence by replacing “I φ” with “he φ”, meaning “me” from the first person perspective. Tugendhat calls this basic principle “veritative sym-metry”. Hence, Tugendhat assumes that self-consciousness can be described in terms of ob-ject-knowledge. At this juncture several problems loom large. For one thing, an immediate consequence of such assumption is reification of self-knowledge due to the demand to assign it to some object (state of mind). Also we cannot explain both a meaningful usage of the first-person pronoun and the link between object knowledge and second level (higher-order) self-knowledge, which we have to reach observing some mental states.