As it has been pointed out in the literature (Kriegel 2009, Levine 2006), a Theory of Consciousness should satisfy two desiderata: i) account for the particular qualitative character of any particular conscious state, and ii) account for the fact that a conscious state is conscious ‘for the subject’.. Many have claimed that the RepresentationaI Theory of Consciousness (RTC) can satisfy the first desideratum. It obviously fails, however, to meet the second desideratum. Higher-Order Approaches to Consciouness (HOAC) satisfy the second desideratum straightforwardly, but it remains unclear whether they satisfy the first desideratum. In the first section, I underscore some problems indicating that RTC fails to satisfy the first desideratum. These problems suggest that qualitative character should be understood not as a non-mental represented feature of the world, as RTC suggests, but as a represented feature of the very conscious state itself. This suggests that HOAC are, after all, in a better position than RTC to satisfy the first desideratum, and hence both desiderata. I argue, however, that insofar as HOAC are supposed to satisfy the first desideratum, they are faced with an intolerable vicious regress. I propose that an alternative approach, the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness (SRTC) is in a better position than HOAC to satisfy both desiderata.

The paper argues that it is possible to discover causal laws that cover relations between electronic technology and the human mind. The general idea is based on the theory of the “extended mind” (Andy Clark: Natural-Born Cyborgs, 2003). Human mental activity, which essentially consists of the use of signs, does not only depend on internal processes (mental, or brain), but also on external artifacts (material vehicles of cultural symbols) and human practical actions. The first part of the paper presents several versions of the idea of the external and cultural organization of an individual’s mental processes. The second part of the paper presents an interpretation of Marshall McLuhan’s (1962/1997-The Gutenberg Galaxy) aphorism, which claims that electronic “technology has the power to numb human awareness during the period of its first interiorization”.

Theory-Theory (TT) and Mental Simulation Theory (ST) have been considered alternative and exclusive positions about mindreading. By the end of the year 2000 a variety of hybrid stances started to emerge. These views did not offer any exhaustive development that explain or respond to all the theoretical inconveniencies that have aroused from TT and ST combination. In the last years, it seems investigation about TT-ST controversy has vanished; despite the fact the problems they had initially settled remain unsolved. Currently, defenders of Mental Simulation have reestablished the debate by assuming that new empirical results presented arguments favoring them. However, another interpretation may be made: it is possible to elaborate a broader theory of the controversy so as to permit an autonomous notion of naturalistic empathy which would enable to resettle the TT-ST controversy. Thus, my suggestion is, firstly, that an interdisciplinary and unified notion of empathy may be appropriate as part of mindreading mechanisms if these theories require it. These ones may be an integral part both of Mental Simulation and of Theory-Theory as well, in any case neither makes a pure version of each one. Secondly, I maintain that new empirical research not only may be considered as a tool which determines one or another position of the TT-ST debate; but it may contribute to enlarge a theory of mental attribution and to strengthen an integral notion of empathy that hold them up. Thirdly, as a consequence of the second point, the empirical research will provide better tools to distinguish between empathy and simulation so that the relationship between them may be more plainly delimited.

Sensory modalities are different ways we have to perceive the world. Regarding to the question of what sensory modalities are, and how they differ from each other, there have been proposed, at least, four criteria intended to give a characterization of each of these: the representational criterion, the proximal-stimulus criterion, the sense-organ criterion and the phenomenal character criterion. I want to argue that, if it is possible for a theory of perception that explains to explain the characterization of sensory modalities, such theory must consider and give the same importance to the four criteria, taken together. Each criterion taken individually would be necessary but not sufficient to characterize a sensorial modality. The way we perceive and obtain information about the world (and, therefore, the characterization of sensory modalities that allow this) should be explained under a model in which causal relations are considered, and are only understood (the way we perceive and obtain information) in light of these four criteria. This will be based on John Heil’s argument presented in “The Senses, excerpt from Perception and Cognition” (2011), where this philosopher argues that the proximal criterion is best suited to characterize a sensorial modality.

Recently, some philosophers of mind have called the attention to the idea according to which we can perceive, in many cases, some mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals: the co-presence thesis (Smith, 2010) and the hybrid model (Overgaard and Krueger, 2012). We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections against both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts that allows us to avoid these objections. In a nutshell, our idea is that by perceiving other people’s behaviors we perceive their mental states because behaviors co-present some features of the latter that go beyond the former, and this perception of others’ minds is direct an immediate because behavior is a constitutive part of mental states.

In this work, we firstly resume philosophical and methodological analysis of three authors – Vygotsky, Piaget, and Wallon – who, in the early 20th century discussed the nature of psychological knowledge. We show that the core of the issue is the refusal of the breakup between Philosophy and Psychology, which aimed at sustaining a kind of experimental Psychology according to the positivistic scientific canons that did not admit subjectivity and consciousness and kept the classic dichotomies: body/mind; individual/collectivity; thought/language; reason/emotion. Then we present a consensual dialogue between these authors and those from the first decade of the 21st century who discuss, epistemologically, philosophically, and historically, the same issue and the course taken by Psychology to establish itself as a science. We proceed to show that the particular focus of that consensual dialogue is on the definition of the experimental method, on the discussion of the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity and in the study of consciousness. Finally, we point out the existence of a philosophical consensus between the history of Psychology in the early 20th century and that of the first decade of the 21st century: the demand for a critical and reflexive philosophical analysis on the production of psychological knowledge and the relationship of that production with research practice and professional practice.

In everyday life we experience ourselves as living conscious creatures. We feel intuitively that our intentions play an important role in action and behaviour. The aim of my presentation is twofold. Firstly, I intend to point out a profound asymetry between inner experience and a theoretical explanation of the nature of felt inner states. This claim will be supported by experimental research and clinical practise on normal and impaired states of consciousness (Wegner, Damasio). Based on novel research findings philosophers tend to emphasize the natural – physical nature of conscious experience (Blackmore, Humphrey). However, third person – reductionist approach has been criticized for not taking „phenomenology seriously“ (Chalmers) or neglecting the „irreducibility of the first person story“ (Velmans). The second aim of my presentation is to argue against the claim according to which physicalist approaches consider conscious experience as a nonexistent phenomenon – an illusion. I claim that it is a category mistake to identify that what is illusionary with that what does not exist. In order to unfold misunderstandings in the study of consciousness it is necessary both to outline in what sense conscious experience is and is not an illusion. Untill then - search for a science of consciousness is futile.

The author briefly discusses the importance of the explanatory gap (the apparent impossibility of explaining the characteristics of subjective experience, or even its existence, in the context of physicalist ontology) in philosophy of mind. He claims that, if science cannot explain the existence of other people’s subjective experiences, at least what cannot be described is something that cannot be observed. On the other hand, if non-reductionist physicalists, who defend the causal efficacy of the mental are right, it would not be possible to explain the human behaviour only by physical laws (that is what we call the second explanatory gap), because human behaviour could be described as series of events in physical space, science would not be able to explain physical events describable in third person perspective, and therefore the second explanatory gap would be the most harmful to physicalism. The author briefly comments that these conclusions are compatible with Jaegwon Kim’s defence of epiphenomenalism, but disagrees with this author when he affirms that the importance of the mental could be minimized.

In this paper, I aim to reveal and examine the ideology behind functionalism. To this aim, first I will shortly describe the features of a Platonic metaphysics. Then I will attempt to show that there is a hidden Platonic ideology behind functionalism. This ideology is often manifested with the “software-hardware” dichotomy. In the end of this paper, I will argue for the claim that the software-hardware dichotomy is only a pragmatic distinction, and it should not be taken to imply metaphysically exclusive categories.

Conscious experiences are those that have a special feel, or in Thomas Nagel’s words: ‘It is something it is like to have them’. One version of the mind-body problem is to explain how physical-functional states can generate conscious experiences. In this paper, I present a type of theory called ‘Russellian physicalism’ that proposes that we cannot solve the mind-body problem (bridge the explanatory gap between mental and physical states) because natural science cannot tell us about the categorical properties of physical entities which are necessary to know in order to explain qualia. I will argue that in order to avoid epiphenomenalism Russellian physicalism should adopt the Heil-Martin theory of dispositions. This theory claims that every disposition is identical to a categorical property. However, our conception of a property as a disposition does not describe it as it is in itself, that is, as a categorical property. Since we cannot know the dispositions considered as categorical properties, we cannot explain consciousness.

In his article “The refutation of idealism” (1903) G.E. Moore (1873-1958) makes a distinction between mental act and its object (Moore, 1993, 35). My aim is to introduce his conception of consciousness in “The refutation of idealism”. In addition, I argue that scientific psychology had an impact on Moore’s view about consciousness. Moore introduces the distinction between a mental act and its object in his theory about judgment, which he presents in the second version of his fellowship dissertation The metaphysical basis of ethics (1898). For him, the object of a mental act is independent of the act (Moore, 2011, 161–162, 168). In his article “The refutation of idealism”, Moore defends the same distinction (Moore, 1993, 35). First, I introduce Moore conception of consciousness in “The refutation of idealism”. Van der Schaar, Hanna, Preti and Baldwin refer to the connection between scientific psychology and Moore’s early philosophy (Van der Schaar, 1996, 296; Hanna 2006, 56; Preti 2008, 176; Baldwin & Preti 2011, xxix). However, no one has studied the impact that scientific psychology had on Moore’s early philosophy (1894-1904). Second, I argue that scientific psychology had an impact on his view about consciousness because no one has earlier done this.

In this paper, I challenge a specific claim by Tyler Burge that perception delineates the lower border of representational mind and exhibits the most basic form of objectivity (2010). According to this claim, perception is the most primitive type of representation that, when veridical, accurately attributes properties to non-perspective, mind-independent subject-matters. I argue that perception of the external world, especially vision, is not the most primitive type of objective representation. My approach will be interdisciplinary. After presenting Burge’s theory of perception, I show that the current best empirical accounts strongly suggest that how perceivers represent their bodily conditions plays a key role in the biological functions of perception. Then, I argue that the lower border of objective representation is not given by (visual) perception, but by body representation. Objective representation does not begin with perception.

I argue that eliminative materialism, with its aim of jettisoning folk psychology, cannot account for the possibility of historical knowledge. Eliminative materialism destroys the disciplinary distinctions between history and science in such a way as to eclipse the former. I argue that (1) ‘historical consciousness’ cannot be reduced to the discoveries of neuroscience; (2) Paul Churchland’s charge of folk psychology’s explanatory impotence is undercut by the possibility, indeed, the actuality of historical knowledge, and (3) one of Churchland’s main arguments for eliminative materialism is dependent upon historical knowledge-claims that themselves must contradictorily utilize the propositional attitudes of folk psychology.

The paper suggests new premises, which prove untenable the “faculty” model of the mind that was until recently used in cognitive and social sciences and educational systems. The unique concept of phenomenon of desire, proposed by the author, enables us to present cognition as a result of personal and existential efforts of man and the function of the complete process of life.

Moods are sometimes thought to be counter-examples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state’s phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods on which moods represent intentional objects as having sui generis affective properties that are not bound to any objects.

The mind–body problem has certainly been one of the most discussed philosophical issues for years. To this problem has been added a long series of so-called solutions as well as debates about its nature and scope. It is also a problem exacerbated by modal and explanatory considerations. In this paper, I begin by reviewing the problem, in order to estimate the severity of these modal and explanatory considerations. Finally, I present an alternative way of approaching the issue that allows us to resize the mind–body problem.

In the situation of limited resources and social structures, the search for being-in-the-world stimulates the person to explore inner space of consciousness. Today the Internet acts as a means of exploring the inner space of consciousness via network communication. This is the new mental support of the person. Autopoietic attitude to the body limits the abilities of the consciousness for interaction. The Network gives the individual new information, quasi-material pivot existing outside the body and created with computer technologies. The Network is a terra incognita of the modern person’s consciousness and a tool of its development. Contacting other consciousnesses, the individual’s consciousness gets “an outsider’s viewpoint”, which is extremely necessary for forming contextual-judicious view of a task. It happens with forming “common sense”, the basis of mind, thus bringing back the value of the mind. The states of consciousness expressed at the level of “first-person ontology” due to “network consciousness” today easily move to the level of the entire society. If network society due to individuals’ efforts will be able to focus on the creative state of the consciousness that excludes violence and destruction, network consciousness will turn these states into a pivot of the modern person.

It is often said that we have an immediate knowledge of ourselves on a basic level that is captured in statements like ‘I am writing this paper’ or that ‘I am talking to you right now’. This certainty is largely attributed to an ‘inner’ faculty of perception that contrasts with the external sensory apparatus that receives inputs from the external world of objects. This paper discusses some of the significant parameters of this framework that separates the inner and the outer world on the epistemological basis of access and certainty. The paradigmatic cogito argument is considered and the grounds that establish the self and the world are discussed to understand the nature of internal and external perception and its implication for the mind –body problem. Perception is our direct mode of access to the world around us, but redirecting the paradigm of perception to understand the mind reinforces the false analogy of treating minds as inner objects and has played a significant part in the continuation of the mind-body problem.

There are two main ideas that inform the current reflection in the philosophy of mind, namely that the content of mental states is constitutively dependent on worldly, environmental facts (content externalism) and that phenomenology depends only on the intrinsic features of a subject (phenomenological internalism). The question I shall address is whether it is possible to preserve both ideas within a strong intentionalist account. In other words, as the title goes: Can phenomenology be narrow if content is wide and phenomenology is claimed to depend on intentionality? The paper has the following structure: I shall start by presenting a triad which seems to rule out the possibility of preserving both content externalism and phenomenological internalism. Then, after having claimed that the only way in which a strong intentionalist (SI) could stick to those two ideas is to make the phenomenal character of a mental state independent for its individuation on the mental state’s content, I shall present what I take to be the only possible variety of (SI) which is compatible with such a move.

Millikan’s (1984, 2004) and Papineau’s (1993) teleological accounts of mental content are among theories aimed to give a naturalistic semantics of mental content. It is said that those theories are faced with several problems, one of which emerges in explaining the link between having true mental representations and the success of behaviors based on the representations. As Godfrey-Smith (1996) pointed out, their teleological theories, which define mental representation’s content in terms of the success of behaviors directed by those representations, may not able to give a substantial account of why having true representation leads to organism’s success. I will discuss this problem and a solution suggested by Shea (2007), which seems unsatisfactory to me. Next, I will point out another problem similar to this one: explaining behavior. Finally, I reconsider the theoretical status of teleo-semantics and draw a conclusion that although Millikan insists that teleo-semantics is not conceptual analysis, but a theoretical definition, the difference is not so big in this case.