Though sometimes maligned, “trolleyology” offers an effective means of opening and framing, not only classes in ethics, but indeed any introductory philosophy course taking a broadly “puzzle-based” approach. When properly sequenced, a subset of the thought experiments that are trolleyology’s stock-in-trade can generate a series of puzzles illustrating the shortcomings of our untutored moral intuitions, and which thus motivate the very enterprise of moral theorizing. Students can be engaged in the attempt to resolve said puzzles, inasmuch as they’re accessible and compelling, and their resolutions generally easy to achieve. Once thus engaged, students can be directed to the fact that (perhaps unbeknownst to them) they had already rolled up their sleeves and begun “doing philosophy.” In this way, engagement with trolleyological puzzles can serve as a “microcosm” for philosophy more broadly, illustrating the processes of critical thinking that are likewise the stock-in-trade of philosophers across many different domains of inquiry.

I argue that instructor-graded participation assessments, which are one of the most popular ways to incentivize classroom participation, either fail to satisfactorily assess student participation or are open to issues of unconscious instructor bias. I then argue that a better way to assess participation is to use student self-assessments. Student-self assessments not only avoid these issues, but also have other added benefits like cultivating student self-reflection which is associated with academic gains. However, self-assessments pose new worries about under confidence biases and cultural differences for some students from diverse backgrounds. This is particularly worrisome since many students in these situations are already vulnerable to systemic biases. If there is a possibility that self-assessments might reinforce inequalities, great care needs to be taken in how they are designed and implemented. I then present a way to approach student self-assessment surveys and ways to frame classroom participation to help lessen the chance that these self-assessments will reinforce inequalities.

In a group exam, students first do an exam individually and then redo the same exam in small groups. Studies have shown that group exams provide a number of benefits, including improvements in performance, learning, motivation, and preparation, as well as a reduction in anxiety. However, little has been written on whether group exams are fair. This paper aims to discuss and reject three fairness concerns that arise from (i) improved performance, (ii) improved learning, and (iii) accessibility. It also discusses in detail the benefits of improved learning, arguing that they are the most valuable benefit which makes group exams particularly suitable for philosophy education.

In this paper we argue that the approach for teaching non-Western, and specifically Chinese philosophy to undergraduate Western students, does not have to be significantly different than that for teaching philosophies from “Western” traditions. Four areas will be explored. Firstly, we look at debates on teaching non-Western philosophy from the perspective of themes or traditions, suggesting that, as an overarching guideline, it is mote discussion. Secondly, in terms of making generalizations, we argue that no more explanation of the “Chineseness” of Chinese philosophy be offered than the “Germanness” of German philosophy, or “Greekness” of Greek philosophy. Thirdly, that lines of philosophical coherences are not limited to regional or cultural bounds. Finally, that foreign language be used in a way that invites understanding and does not close ideas off to students. In sum, we suggest applying well proven methods of teaching “Western” philosophy to Chinese (and other “Non-Western”) philosophies. After all, value of Chinese and other “Non-Western” philosophies comes not from their being “Chinese” or “Non-Western,” but from being philosophical.

This article attempts to contribute to the literature on what has become known as “student relativism” by suggesting that in many cases it is a symptom of a broader and equally problematic pre-reflective epistemological framework that students often bring with them to the study of philosophy. It goes on to describe the notion of a “dialectical fact,” and to propose that this concept can be a useful pedagogical tool for helping students to progress beyond that framework.