Continental philosophy of religion often takes place within the horizons of phenomenology. A central theme of this tradition is the correlation, in one form or another, of intentional act (noesis) and intentional object (noema), the “object” as given to or taken by the subject. But in dialectical tension with this theme is the notion of inverted intentionality in which the arrows of meaning bestowing intentionality come toward the self rather than emanating from the self. This theme is developed by Sartre, Levinas, and Derrida, among others. Since each of these is in some fashion an atheist, it is surprising but important that their reflections on what it means to be seen or to be addressed keep turning toward the question of God. This suggests that the basic concept is important for the philosophy of religion, at least in monotheistic contexts.

The penal substitution account of the Atonement fails for conceptual reasons: punishment is expressive action, condemning the party punished, and so is not transferable from a guilty to an innocent party. But there is a relative to the penal substitution view, the vicarious punishment account, that is neither conceptually nor morally objectionable. On this view, the guilty person’s punishment consists in the suffering of an innocent to whom he or she bears a special relationship. Sinful humanity is punished through the inglorious death of Jesus Christ; ill-desert is thus requited, and an obstacle to unity with God is overcome.

Recent interest among both philosophers and the wider public in the tradition of virtue ethics often takes its inspiration from Aristotle or from Thomas Aquinas. In this essay I briefly outline the ethical approaches of these two towering figures, and then describe more fully the virtue ethics of Meister Eckhart, a medieval thinker who admired, though critically, both Aristotle and Aquinas. His related but distinctively original approach to the virtuous life is marked by a striking and seemingly paradoxical injunction to “live without why.”

I rebut four claims made in a recent article by Katherin Rogers. En route I discuss how a timeless God might perceive all of “tensed” time at once.

Against my interpretation, Brian Leftow argues that Anselm of Canterbury held a presentist theory of time, and that presentism can be reconciled with Anselm’s commitments concerning divine omnipotence and omniscience. I respond, focusing mainly on two issues. First, it is difficult to understand the presentist theory which Leftow attributes to Anselm. I articulate my puzzlement in a way that I hope moves the discussion forward. Second, Leftow’s examples to demonstrate that presentism can be reconciled with Anselm’s understanding of the divine nature assume a mode of divine knowing which is different from what Anselm proposes. I stand by my interpretation.