Both contextualist and relativist solutions to the faultless disagreement problem clash with our intuitions: contextualism, with the intuition that two people arguing about a matter oftaste are in fact disagreeing; and relativism, with the intuition that the truth of a proposition is independent of who is evaluating it. In this paper, I will outline a solution that explains our intuition of disagreement without clashing with our intuitions about truth. I will do this by proposing a definition of propositions as ideally clarified assertoric content, having one absolute truth-value that does not vary across any contexts. I will argue that this definition is plausible, that it best serves the purposes of philosophy, and that it best solves the problem of faultless disagreement.

David Lewis' thesis of Humean Supervenience combines the claims 1) that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences and 2) that truth supervenes on being. Contra Lewis, we should adopt a dispositional rather than a categorical theory of property individuation. Moreover, contra the conventional wisdom, such a theory is consistent with claim 1). However, it cannot be made consistent with claim 2) without abandoning the standard semantics for counterfactuals.

ln the Phaedrus, Socrates cnt1c1zes wntmg as non-living and deceptive. He later also claims that a good writer will write only for the sake of self-amusement. These apparent indictments of the written word seem to be at odds with the fact that the Phaedrus is itself a written text, to which Plato has presumably devoted some care and effort. I will show, however, that Plato uses these claims ultimately to suggest that the reader is responsible for transforming a written text into a dialogue with the text's author. I argue that Plato gets this message across via deliberate but not unsubtle flaws in Socrates' arguments and by highlighting the frivolity of written words, thereby directing the careful reader to recognize the significance of what Socrates leaves unsaid. For Plato, what is left unsaid is a more rel iable vehicle for conveying some understanding of reality and truth than mere written words.

Over the last half-century, Plato's Third Man Argument [TMA] has received a surge of attention. The challenge which numerous critics have undertaken is to provide a viable interpretation of Plato's puzzling passage at Parm. 132a1-b2. The exegetical part of this paper attempts to bring together some of the most plausible interpretations offered to date, distilling the good moves from the bad. The not-so-exegetical part of this paper draws out the consequences of these most plausible interpretations. In pa1ticular, it considers the possibility, inspired in the first instance by a stage-functional interpretation of Plato's one-over-many principle, that Plato held a recursive theory of knowledge. In Part I, I give a textual and logical analysis of the TMA I try to formulate the TMA such that it validly generates a regress from consistent premises, while remaining faithful to the text. In Part 11, I ask whether Plato is vulnerable to the TMA so conceived. I argue that some textual evidence suggests that he is not. In Part III, I assume for the sake of argument that Plato is vulnerable, and ask: (1) ls the conclusion of the TMA vicious - does it pose a problem for Plato? And (2), what are the consequences of the IMA (if it goes through) for Plato's claim that knowledge is possible?

Daniel Dennett is the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy and Codirector of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. His research has centered on philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, with particular interests in cognitive science and evolutionary biology. He is a steadfast and vocal atheist and secularist. His many books have been read widely both in and out of the academy. They include Consciousness Explained (1992), Darwin 's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life ( l 996), and Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (2006). We spoke with Professor Dennett in June 2010.

What can science say to moral philosophy? Not much, according to most moral philosophers. In a certain way, they are right – the is/ought divide cannot be crossed any more easily now than centuries ago. This paper argues, however, that a scientific investigation of our moral nature reveals the traditional scope of moral philosophy to be far too narrow. Modern moral theories like deontology and consequentialism typically focus entirely on influencing the process of moral reasoning, disregarding the emotional and motivational processing that determines moral output in most cases. Instead of relying on rational rules to guide us through every dilemma, this paper argues that we should turn to a scientifically informed virtue ethics in order to craft better people and more humane societies.

In grappling with the obscure nature of his writings, interpreters of the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus often tend towards one of two poles. Either they choose to echo the reception Heraclitus faced in antiquity, when his peers dismissed his work as a collection of absurd riddles, or they reiterate the contemporary interpretation that sees in his work a fundamental unity despite his numerous paradoxical statements. This essay will not side with either of these readings. Instead, it will simultaneously engage both polar interpretations of “absurdity” and “unity” to re-read the characteristic “obscurity” of the Heraclitean fragments as a rhetorical strategy underscoring the irreducible ambiguity inherent in ontological and epistemological claims. More specifically, I will investigate Heraclitus’ attempt to conceptualize “Logos,” the fundamental, ontological commonality of Being, the very “order” or “essence” unifying all reality. I will go on to claim that Heraclitus advances an inherently ambiguous and somewhat “paradoxical” conceptualization of Logos, conceiving of this “essence” or “order” not as a common ratio or static unity but as a fiery, continuously-becoming unity-in-flux. Particularly important for my argument will be the explication of the role that language plays in Heraclitus’ thought, language being the medium through which reality becomes (partially) intelligible, even as the flux of this reality invariably exceeds the limited nature of linguistic signifiers. The aim of this essay, then, is to revive and conceptualize the dimension of ambiguity in Heraclitean philosophy that polarizing readings tend to dismiss or disavow, an ambiguity that permeates both the ongoing dialogue between language and reality, and the subsequent conceptualizations of reality as they take form in the realm of language. It is precisely this play between language, reality and ambiguity that remains crucial, not only for the Heraclitean quest for wisdom, but also for contemporary attempts at ontology and epistemology alike.

Kant’s theory of geometry is compatible with non-Euclidean, hyperbolic geometry. That is, on Kant’s theory, the a priori forms of space and time together with the categories of the understanding ground the possibility of hyperbolic constructions in pure intuition. To show this we first develop an interpretation of Kant’s theory of geometry to the extent that it concerns the construction of geometrical objects in pure intuition. Thus we show how the a priori forms and the categories make possible Euclidean constructions in pure intuition. We then proceed to the main result. The latter is independent from some of the details of the interpretation. Under minor assumptions the result can be strengthened to the following: if Kant’s theory is compatible with Euclidean geometry, it is compatible with hyperbolic geometry as well.

Quine’s advocacy of naturalized epistemology has left much debate and controversy in its wake. Now that the dust has settled a bit, many consider Jaegwon Kim’s polemic response to be the definitive refutation of Quine’s view. I think, however, that this issue at heart is significantly murkier than Kim seems to believe, and Kim’s treatment of Quine’s view of naturalized epistemology leaves much to be desired. In this paper, I lay out Quine’s position as explicitly as possible so as to weigh Kim’s critique in greater detail. I find that although Kim successfully touches upon the weak points of Quine’s mission, his conclusions are too strong.

Consequentialism is often criticized on the grounds that it justifies the gross violation of individual rights in order to bring about the best overall consequences. In this paper I argue that such criticism is mistaken and that consequentialism is able to accommodate respect for rights. Consequentialism does not necessarily demand the violation of rights, if rights are understood in a positive sense as capabilities and the ability to realize important goals, instead of merely the negative demand for noninterference from other moral agents. Moreover, consequentialists do not have to view rights as mere conduits to social utility; they can acknowledge the importance of preserving individual rights while taking into account thesocial context in which rights are to be protected.

Hilary Putnam is Cogan University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University. He has developed a reputation for excellence in many areas of philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind, science and language. A sampling of his books include Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings (1964), Philosophical Papers (1975 and 1983), Reason, Truth, and History (1981), Pragmatism: An Open Question (1995), The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (2002), Ethics without Ontology (2004), and Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life (2008). This interview was conducted at Harvard on June 15, 2009.

In this paper Matthew J. Knauff examines one of the four primary epistemic paradoxes set forth by Jonathan Kvanvig—the surprise examination paradox. He begins by offering a statement of the paradox, after which he considers a solution proposed by W.V.O. Quine. Knauff argues that Quine’s solution to the paradox must, for a number of reasons, be rejected. Finally, he offers aresolution to the paradox by means of his own approach.

In this paper Graham Rhys Griffiths discusses Catherine Wilson’s assertion that many contemporary moral philosophers, their professed aims notwithstanding, ultimately provide justifications for the affluent lifestyles of citizens of developed nations. Though Wilson believes that these theorists, of whom she cites Susan Wolf and Thomas Nagel as examples, raise important points regarding the value of our personal commitments and their role in enabling us to live good lives, she suggests that they diminish the real requirements of a more impartial morality. Griffiths argues that this claim, as Wilson applies it to Nagel, is unfair. First, Griffiths shows how Nagel’s relaxation of an impartial morality’s requirements constitutes not a justification of our current lifestyles, but a dispensation due to our weaknesses. Second, he argues that Nagel does not go as far as Wilson herself in accepting the centrality of personal commitments to our lives. Finally, Griffiths argues that Nagel’s emphasis on institutions that alleviate gross inequalities gives a practical approach to creating a world in which we can all live up to the demands morality makes on us.

As Wong relates, the cognitive impression was the Stoic criterion of truth. The Academic skeptics challenged this criterion in a series of arguments throughout the long history of debate between the Stoics and the Academics. In response to each Academic attack, the Stoics modified their criterion in an attempt to preserve for themselves the possibility of knowledge. In the end, the cognitive impression could not withstand the attack. The reason for this, Wong argues, is not due to the irresistibility of the Academics’ arguments, but rather due to the Stoics’ over-modification of their criterion. Wong argues that a version of the cognitive impression without these weakening modifications is a successful criterion of truth.

What happens to our notion of political obligation when right is divorced from moral considerations? When one says that an individual’s claim to her property is a right that ought not to be abridged, on what kind of nonmoral principle can one rely? According to Matthew Sean Pines, Fichte believes that he can ground such a normative prescription on a theory of natural right, deriving a set of strict political principles from a necessary metaphysical conception of a rational being. It is the main task of this paper to work through this difficult deduction, assess its validity, and discuss the general implications of its result. What is said here concerning Fichte’s specific proposal for an objective theory of natural—as opposed to moral—right bears broader significance for the fundamental problem of the nature and source of obligation in the political world.