This article was originally delivered as a lecture at the Library of Congress, February 17, 2011, to commemorate the installation of a letter from Whitehead to his student Henry Leonard in the collection of that institution. See the Appendices to Phipps for a copy of the letter and Leonard’s response. The present article summarizes the history, development, and importance of Whitehead’s work for the present and delineates perspectives for potential Whitehead research in the future.

This paper summarizes the main features of the microgenetic account of consciousness, of the transition from self to image, act and object, the epochal nature of this transition, and its relation to introspection, imagination, and agency. The affinities of microgenetic theory to many aspects of process thought should be evident to readers of this journal, but the theory, which was developed in pathological case study, rests on a wealth of clinical detail that is beyond the scope of this article. In brief, the micro-temporal transition from archaic to recent formations (distributed systems) in the phyletic history of forebrain constitutes the absolute mental state, with consciousness the relation of self to image and/or object. The discussion touches on the overlap of states, the continuity of the core over successive states, and subjective time experience.

This paper explores the topic of meaning and its relation to symbolism through a contrastive reading of Whitehead’s 1927 Barbour-Page Lectures alongside the contemporary anthropologist Roy Wagner’s Symbols that Stand for Themselves. Despite their adoption of different registers of inquiry, a complementary relation may be posited between the two approaches. In particular, Whitehead’s emphasis on the foundational nature of symbolic reference within experience and its extendedness beyond merely human contexts may be grafted productively onto Wagner’s discussion of the “orders of trope’”and “figure-ground reversal” within the formation of meaning in language. The argument is exemplified through reference to two contexts within Western culture where the play of symbol and meaning is strikingly evident—the Christian Eucharist and the contemporary sociological pervasiveness of motifs of screens and screening.

In this essay I defend two interrelated theses. The first is that Whiteheadian structured societies are best understood as open-ended systems akin to those currently being proposed in the natural and social sciences by Stuart Kauff­man, David Sloan Wilson, and Niklas Luhmann. The second is that an open-ended system is best understood in terms of an ongoing interplay of subjectivity and objectivity, which I derive from a modest rethinking of the workings of a Whiteheadian structured society.

This article is a critical exploration of compatibilities between Pentecostal-Charismatic theology and Process-Relational theology. The purpose of the investigation is to identify similarities that provide sufficient ground for mutual dialogue and transformation between the two traditions. Postmodernism is identified as a context in which such dialogue can occur, insofar as both the Pentecostal-Charismatic movements and Process-Relational theology are understood as reactions to modernism. The theological theme of “concursus,” the way in which God and humanity interact, is briefly explored as a point of contact. Several social and ecclesial implications of mutual transformation are identified. Ecclesial implications of mutual transformation include a renewal of Process-Relational spirituality, an intellectualization of Pentecostal-Charismatic experience, ecumenical dialogue between evangelical and mainline denominations, and tempered operation of the charismata for Pentecostals. Social implications of mutual transformation include the possibility for positive social change, concern for healing and justice, and an increased cosmic concern. Ultimately, inasmuch as Pentecostalism is identified as an “experience in search of a theology,” Process-Relational theism is identified as a “theology in search of an experience.” Through dialogue and engagement, both the Pentecostal-Charismatic and Process-Relational traditions may gain a stronger and more holistic sense of humanity, God, and reality.

In Process Studies 39.1 Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki draws renewed attention to one of the formative issues within early process theology—the question of whether God may best be understood as a single actual entity, as Whitehead had said, or as a serially ordered or personally ordered society of occasions. Suchocki’s support for Whitehead’s original thinking is a welcome event. Unfortunately, Suchocki employs the term “dynamic” to disguise an unresolved incompatibility between temporal and non-temporal process in God. This makes her overall position unstable, if not untentable. A second criticism is that methodologically Suchocki relies almost entirely on logical inferences drawn from previously accepted concepts, making her argument insufficiently empirical. Some brief suggestions are offered as hints for ways in which these problems might be resolved.

The main goal of Henri Bergson’s philosophy of nature is to offer a dynamic understanding of living phenomena. It is in this context that we main­tain that the author left us a “bio-philosophy,” that is, an interpretation which, by adopting a positive model of biology as a cognitive paradigm, describes the essential character of living activity as time or duration (durée). Bergson’s posi­tive metaphysics, which brings science to the metaphysical field and provides an inner perspective of the vital principle, consolidated itself in the study of evolutionary theories like Darwinism. However, the specificity of the perspective Bergson presents to us lies in the fact that he positions himself as a philosopher and not as a scientist: he does not seek a merely scientific explanation of reality, but an integral vision that allows us to give scientific evolution a metaphysical reading. Thus, when Bergson upholds the insufficiency of pure Darwinism, and proposes a true evolutionism, it is because he thinks that the only way to understand the evolutionary nature of life is by overcoming a strictly mechanistic perspective. For Bergson, such an interpretation results from the artificial way in which our intellectual functions deconstruct reality and lead to an incomplete and fragmented reading of the evolution of organisms. As a philosopher he seeks an explanatory level which, being scientifically based, is not restricted to the physico-chemical limits of reality. For that reason, Bergson claims that the inner cause of evolution is an activity where growth and division occur as a natural result of the divergence of life’s tendencies.

In his various lectures and writings, Whitehead articulates an evolving metaphysical vision in which process and relationship, rather than stasis and independent fixity, are primary. In so doing he performs a valuable philosophical service, pointing the way towards liberation from certain constraining assumptions and habits of thought. However, there are components of his vision that retain elements of fixity and separateness. I find these to be the aspects of his philosophy that are the most problematic, both in respect to internal con­ceptual coherency and in relation to my own philosophical and spiritual vision. My intention is to elucidate some of the ways in which these components of his philosophy are problematic, and to present an alternative vision in which these elements of fixity and ontological separateness dissolve into a dynamic openness of flux and interrelationship.