Is it possible to conceptualize universality in a way that does not exclude particularity, difference, and change? In his approach to universality, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between acquired universality, which is supposedly objective and non-temporal, and the lateral differentiation of universals, which is temporal and changing. My suggestion, in this article, is that he does not assert that there is a specific kind of unchanging universal norm to which all different styles of experience should be anchored; instead, there is a never-finished diversification through which universal dimensions are instituted. However, I will also present a critical examination of the concept of change as it can also mean oppressive transformation. Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty’s political view of colonial situation seems to contradict his concept of open universality.

In contemporary art, a growing number of artists experiment with non-humans in their actual artworks. This paper examines the issues related to such practices with reference to Jakob von Uexküll’s analyses of the configuration of meaningful worlds by non-human animals, as well as Merleau-Ponty’s and Deleuze-Guattari’s interpretations of Uexküll’s ideas. Uexküll maintained that every living being lives in a world with meaning; Merleau-Ponty understood this claim as situating the beginning of culture in the creativity of non-humans; Deleuze and Guattari emphasized the melodic and rhythmic dimension of this creativity, mainly interpreted as territorialization processes. These elements are paramount to understanding what is at stake with artworks featuring non-humans: considering projects proposals from Agnes Meyer-Brandis, Tomas Saraceno, Ana Maria Lopez Gomez and other contemporary artists, the conclusion is that an artwork featuring an encounter between two territorializing movements has the potential to transform the human range of perception.

The article proposes to sketch an analogy between, on the one hand, linguistic learning and sound dialogue in humanist music therapy and, on the other hand, certain reflections of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: in particular, the centrality of corporeality in the learning, treated in the Phenomenology of Perception and in the courses on the psychology and pedagogy of the child, and the status of inter-corporeality developed through reflections on passivity and the metaphor of flesh. We will trace an analysis of the music therapy of Giulia Cremaschi Trovesi, with reference to the linguistic and musical gesture, through the Merleau-Pontian notion of praktognosia, and of the sound dialogue with reference to institution and intercorporeity. Through an interpretation of music in the terms adopted by Stéphanie Ménasé and in reference to Merleau-Pontian passivity in artistic creation, our objective is to define the musical institution of the vibrating body in music therapy in terms analogous to the institution of the subject according to Merleau-Ponty and, consequently, to find, in the sound dialogue, the intercorporeity which anticipates the individuation of the subject, by describing the communicative authenticity of the musical-therapeutic encounter.

The essay intends to revisit certain phenomenological themes present in the theoretical work of Pierre Schaeffer, based on his most important and influential book: the Traité des objets musicaux. A French engineer and composer, Schaeffer was the initiator – from the point of view of its musical practice, and its theoretical analysis – of one of the most important musical avant-gardes of the 20th century, musique concrète. The objective of the article will be to consider Schaeffer’s main reference – the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl – and suggest that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology could be a prism that helps to understand and expand the heterogeneous and incomplete research project the French composer documented extensively in his writings.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) discusses the living body through the concept of intentionality. Later, Merleau-Ponty comes up with a theory of ontology based on the reversibility of the flesh. Zhuangzi (375-300 BCE) also speaks of the significant role played by our bodies in shaping our knowledge and experience. However, Zhuangzi relates the body to yi 意presented, referring to the creative coordination of bodily organs of perception and movement 眼-手-伸-通(such as eyes and hands), developed by constantly and persistently engaging with an object. The presence of yi dictates a manifestation of walking-where-all-things-have-been-walking which is Dao.

In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty dedicates many pages to the analysis of pathological cases, which seem to be assessed as merely negative phenomena that reinforce an extrinsic opposition with normal ones. This paper aims to clarify that Merleau-Ponty in effect challenges the able–disabled dichotomy by articulating an intentional analysis based on the perspective of being-in-the-world and proposing a differential understanding of embodiment. Such an analysis demonstrates that ability and disability exist as material and situational events and, simultaneously, form an existential continuum—one that rejects the identification of disability with a disruption (ontological claim) or a degradation (normative claim).

Gianluca De Fazio’s book Avversità e margini di gioco. Studio sulla soggettività in Merleau-Ponty presents precise and original research along several nodes of great importance in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical production, such as subjectivity, expression, passivity, nature, history. By focusing on, without limiting himself to, the 1950’s period, the author declares that he aims at a denaturalization of nature and a dehistoricization of history: an overcoming of dichotomies which, though faithfully following the Merleau-Pontian path, does not fail to have a Deleuzian overtones. The issues of the book are also, and above all, political, shown in the considerations of the task of philosophy.

The present paper is a review of Critical Studies on Heidegger: The Emerging Body of Understanding (SUNY, 2023), by David Michael Kleinberg-Levin, who argues we can find a phenomenology of perception in Heidegger ultimately no different than that of Merleau-Ponty. The concept of “the emerging body of understanding” means the growth or “perfection” of human capabilities in perception – touch, vision, and hearing – that are attentive to our interconnectedness with others and nature as presented by the Fourfold. The conclusion of the review offers some evaluations regarding questions of influence and recently available course notes by Merleau-Ponty about Heidegger’s philosophy.

Petri Berndtson’s Phenomenological Ontology of Breathing points to the largely unexplored dimension of our being breathing beings. Berndtson draws upon the ontology of the flesh, as well as several comments of Merleau-Ponty about breathing and Being. The primordial perceptual faith in the being of the world as a field of all fields (the “barbaric conviction”) is seen as a primordial sense of breathing in the world (“respiratory faith”). Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s reference to Claudel’s call to listen to the ear of Sigé, the Abyss, Berndtson relates silence in the encounter with Being to an encounter with silence of breath and its abyssal or chasmological (“yawning”) quality. He asserts that this level of breathing is a level of being-in-the-world deeper than the primacy of perception. At this point, the review questions the author’s assertion that this dimension is more primordial than perception, that Merleau-Ponty has a positivistic framing of perception, the author’s literal sense of silence and the lack of appreciation of the power of the poetic in flesh ontology, the role of reversibility and the import of the invisible of the visible. Rather than the ontological primacy of breath, the review suggests that breathing is a way of taking in the world and being open to an aerial dimension of inchoate sense that is equiprimordial with the other avenues of perceiving the world.

The two series of correspondence between Simone de Beauvoir with both Élisabeth Lacoin (Zaza) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty – published in the volume Lettres d’amitié (Gallimard, 2022) – represent an essential contribution for several reasons. First, these letters offer the possibility of considering the friendship between Beauvoir and Lacoin; then, they also allow us to understand the essential role of Zaza in the development of Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophical and literary project. Finally, these letters also let us know Beauvoir’s attitude during a particular moment in her life that is to say the period when, while she was taking philosophy courses at the Sorbonne, she began to feel the need to write literature, which she discusses with Merleau-Ponty.