The issue of safety, especially in the contemporary globalised world, requires an interdisciplinary approach, which takes into account insights offered by such disciplines as philosophy, sociology, economics, or political sciences, with a special consideration of international relationships. The aim of this paper is to introduce safety as a moral dilemma with regard to the safety-freedom dichotomy. In the first part, the humanistic aspect of safety will be depicted, especially in its axiological dimension. The analysis of safety will be carried out in the context of the intersubjective existence. The intersubjective existence of safety is formulated on two levels: the real and unreal intersubjective existence. In the second part of the paper, the institutional aspect of safety will be presented. Here, the discussion will proceed in the context of non-independence of the existence of structural safety. Among others, the following phenomena posing a threat to safety in a global world will undergo analyses in the context of the objectivity of existence (real and unreal objective existence) and non-independence of existence: terrorism, cyberterrorism, mass migration, various conflicts, development disparities between countries, and the protection of the natural environment.

Hobbes postulates a social contract to formalize our collective transition from the state of nature to civil society. The prisoner’s dilemma challenges both the mechanics and the outcome of that thought experiment. The incentives for reneging are supposedly strong enough to keep rational persons from cooperating. This paper argues that the prisoner’s dilemma undermines a position Hobbes does not hold. The context and parameters of the social contract steer it safely between the horns of the dilemma. Specifically, in a setting as hostile as the state of nature, Hobbes’s emphasis on self-interest places a premium on survival, and thereby on adaptability, which then promotes progressive concessions toward peaceful coexistence. This transforms the relevant model of rationality from utility maximization to utility satisficing, thus favoring the pursuit of a mutually satisfactory outcome over that of the best personal outcome. The difference not only obviates the prisoner’s dilemma but also better approximates the state of nature while leaving a viable way out.

As of 2017, 65.6 million individuals have been displaced from their homes, fleeing their homelands in search of refuge from the violence, oppression, and chaos of civil war. The mass movement of people across internal and external borders only proves that there are certain aspects of the human condition that cannot be confined within the strict idea of territories and nation-states, that the political and legal approach in organising the interaction and relationships between people is deficient. I argue that there is a need to recalibrate all existing ideologies in relation to the interactions and relationships between peoples coming from different parts of the world. In order to do this, I intend to examine the current legal norm and connect it to cosmopolitan ethics that are grounded on the idea of spatiality. Elucidating on the ideas presented by thinkers such as Seyla Benhabib, Anthony Kwame Appiah, Gloria Anzaldua, and Tetsuro Watsuji, I argue that to fully actualise cosmopolitan ethics we must investigate how space operates in the existence of man—a deterritorialised existence found in the borders.

This paper revisits the perennial crisis of African development. The authors, unoblivious of theories that have been put forward for ending this crisis, delimit their intervention to the political and economic aspects. They review the dominant approaches to African development, that is, capitalism and Marxism. Following this review and a critical reading of the reigning orthodoxies of economic mobilization and statecraft inherent in pre-colonial Africa, the authors propose a liberal-paternalistic theory of development rooted in the idea of African socialism/communalism. They argue that this idea provides a veritable basis for Africa’s development.

This article discusses the character of hegemonic subjectification as it is seen by Ernesto Laclau. By explaining the concepts of the constitutive features and form of a hegemonically acquired political identity, such as antagonism, undecidability, overdetermination and decision, I define the social fields and dynamics of subjectification. At the same time, I adopt that such subjectification occurs within the boundaries of the particular (demand)–universal, i.e., the ideologically assigned view of identity as totality. Besides, in contrast to Laclau, I juxtapose the dialectically conceived form of the particular–universal relation with its poststructuralist Laclau’s version, and I try to prove that—contrary to Laclau—the idea of hegemony enjoys its vitality thanks to Theodor W. Adorno’s concept of negative dialectics. To determine the points of similarity of the two methods of constructing and deconstructing identity and subjectivity, I reject Elmar Flatschart’s incomparability argument. Lastly, I point out the earlier mentioned points of convergence: on Adorno’s part—the concept of proper names and the concept of constellation; on Laclau’s part—the concept of undecidability and decision which keep discourse ontologically and epistemologically open.