In the Quran, the Muslim Holy book, many verses refer to the human being and in many ways issues regarding mankind are dealt with. In the Quran the possibility of doubting God’s existence is ruled out as man has a particular nature (“Fitrah” is a Quranic term). The aim of this paper is to disclose the very basic Quranic concept concerning human nature: Fitrah. According to the Quranic understanding, mankind has its origin in God; this understanding is based on the concept of Fitrah. Fitrah is considered a natural component of the human being in which God and another Truth can be perceived through man’s existential experience.

According to Plutarch, the theory of psychological disharmony relies on the Platonic music harmony. When Plato refers to music harmony, he means the kind of harmony where the concept of God is the source through which all beings emanate. The mental passions define the quality of human character and consequently develop the social man. As far as the Aristotelian ethical theory is concerned, morality does not condemn the passions, because it has a clear ontological and anthropological basis. The Stoics stress that a trait of the human soul is sociality, and that happens because all human beings are under the law of sympathy and constitute a whole. At medieval times, Boethius portrays the middle age social conditions which also resemble with our postmodern societies.

A democratic polis requires a citizenry that is capable of choice, that is, a decision informed by reason and facts. Tyranny requires obedient subjects. Democratic citizens normally pursue happiness, a life of virtuous activity, a way of living that requires family and friendship. Periclean Athens demonstrates the perils of democracy when the polis assumes the prerogatives of the family and friendship, substituting patriotism. The Funeral Oration illustrates how a seductive charismatic leader undermines Aristotelian conditions of ideal citizenship by subordinating the citizen to the polis.

The paper argues that the balanced relationship between freedom and justice enables man to achieve the social good ontologically speaking (agathon), i.e. the one that holds together everything that exists. Reflecting the ontological Good on a social level is made on zoon politikon translated by “being together with the others,” where freedom and justice coexist in equilibrium. Justice and thus lay contribute to the achievement of ontological Good by the fair sharing of the existing goods on a social level and by human equality before courts.

The main thesis I put forward in this article is that the democratic theory needs an anthropological perspective which defines the human in plurality and signifies the possibility of achieving a fully inclusive rational consensus. I argue that a model of democracy in terms of cosmopolitan anthropology can help us to better envision the main challenge facing universal norms and principles today. How to create democratic forms of living together? I think we can answer this question by interpreting Hannah Arendt’s theory of political action on a philosophical anthropological basis. It is common knowledge that Hannah Arendt is suspicious of ethics and warns that ethics and conscience alone cannot produce the conditions for peace. In the present paper, I examine Arendt’s philosophical project together with Kant’s philosophical anthropology and try to demonstrate its importance for plurality and living together in peace.

The paper attempts to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Spinoza’s ethics of virtue and responsibility—a non-deontic ethics whose foundation is not obligation and duty, not the normative laws which regulate the relations with the fellows, or the prescriptions, but an intuitive knowledge on the essence of things and on the choice of a proper way of life. The choice of the best way of life is equivalent with the responsibility to identify the opportunities to control the own life.

The Sophists were the first supporters of the values of knowledge, education and political self-determination. Their attitude and tactics demonstrated that human nature and especially every individual’s personality is of prior importance. The Sophists rejected the idea of the ontological stability of the laws and declared their confidence in the eternal values of the natural law and cosmopolitanism, in the individual ability of every human being and in the concurrent refusal of traditions and of any form of authenticity. In addition, the Sophists were the first innovative enlightenment philosophers, who tried to exert their influence on society by using their teachings.

This article deals with the concept of “great questions” in Hans Blumenberg’s philosophy. The “great questions” are fundamental elements of the German philosophy due to their role in explaining the core of the modern paradigm. Great questions are posed as resorts, and create references to them. They can be seen as atoms on the bottom of the modernity foundation, while some phenomena that could make them functional emerge as related to them. The law that enforces the atoms bond and the possibility of combinations resides in the so-called reoccupation theory that gains a good sight of what happens in immanent history. The way this work intends to clarify the great questions issue is by observing three assets of Blumenberg’s philosophy: a) the dialectical orientation of history (in particular, the modernity); b) the rule of historical change; c) Blumenberg’s holistic tendencies. This article aims to demonstrate that Blumenberg’s vision not only allows freedom to be explicit in modernity, but freedom is the main asset of this epoch.

According to the social contract theory, in order to achieve justice, people grouped themselves in societies. Historically speaking, judges appeared long before the legislator which means that justice was the first element of the social life. Therefore, it expresses the social ethics of a particular time and requires a minimum of credibility. Excessive pragmatism and utilitarianism have kidnapped more and more of what is humane, superior and sacred in the act of justice, and “secularized” it. As Eliade said in The Sacred and the Profane, the sacred is something which is totally different, a space of radical otherness which overshadows the physical territory. This shading manifests itself through limitation, sequencing, reiteration and keeping what is sacred there, even in a courtroom, through ritualization.

First I discuss the rights as unavoidable part of the human dignity. There are four possible relations: dignity has a wider extension, the volume of both is equivalent, dignity includes in itself a bundle of rights, or it is just a simple right. There are good reasons to support the last two, even the last position. Then I evaluate some of the challenging innovations in the medical technology, if they are acceptable in front of this close connection. The focus falls on three topics: PGD, cloning, and fusion of human-animal cells. Using moral principles such as non discrimination and non instrumentalization I look for some normative framing.

This paper presents human rights in connection with the dispute between legal positivism and legal non-positivism. The importance of this topic can be evaluated by the debate that took place between Hart and Dworkin. Indeed, much of Dworkin’s work can be considered a reaction to Hart’s positivism. The presented study argues for the defense of the thesis that in order to understand such a debate it is important to take a position between moral noncognitivism and moral cognitivism. The hypothesis is that legal positivism does depend on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism. Therefore, only based on strong moral cognitivism would it be consistent to sustain the typical non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Human rights are in the center of this debate because they constitute the core of the current morality, especially the most important core of justice.