That experience requires a subject is all but uncontroversial. It is surprising, then, that contemporary philosophers of mind generally focus on experiences at the expense of subjects. Herein, I argue that beyond the qualitative character (or “what-it’s-like-ness”) of phenomenology, there is a discrete further fact—the subjective character (or “for-me-ness”) of phenomenology—that calls out for explanation. Similar views have recently been endorsed by both Zahavi and Kriegel, but a comparison of the ways they have framed the issue suggests there are two discrete questions afoot: (1) in virtue of what does subjective phenomenology exist whatsoever, and (2) in virtue of what might one’s subjective phenomenology differ from that of one’s perfect duplicate? The second question—that of individuative subjective phenomenology—is my primary concern, and its answer seems to me to require the invocation of haecceities: non-qualitative, non-duplicable properties that uniquely individuate objects (and, in this case, subjects). In other words, I suggest that the property of being the very subject that one is enters essentially into the phenomenological character of all one’s experiences.

There are many interpretations of what consciousness is. In the past decade materialist and reductionist theories have gained in popularity as many neurological correlates of consciousness have been identified experimentally. This article presents a neurogenetic account of the underpinnings of neuron-based consciousness. In this paradigm, human consciousness is supported by genes that are involved in three distinct neurogenetic phases: 1) the emergence of neuron-based consciousness, 2) the continuum of neuron-based consciousness, and 3) the neurodegeneration of human consciousness. The methodology implemented to establish these three neurogenetic phases was a systematic search and evaluation of genes that have been proven to support an active role in one or more of these three phases. This article demonstrates that there is a substructure of gene-based correlates that functions in the three neurogenetic phases. These phases work in tandem with the conscious experience. Consequently, it is established that explanations of human consciousness that rely solely on regions of the brain and neurons are deficient without taking into consideration the neurogenetic element of human consciousness. This presentation of the neurogenetic dimensions of human consciousness is the first of its kind.

Thinking about the representational qualities of maps and models allows one to offer a new perspective on the nature of mindreading. The recent critiques of our dominant paradigms for mindreading, theory theory and simulation theory, by enactivists such as Daniel Hutto reveal a flaw in the standard options for thinking about how we think about others. Views that rely on theorizing or simulation to account for the way in which we understand others often appear to over-intellectualize social interaction. In contrast, enactivists champion embodied, non-representational forms of engagement with others. I claim that one can improve on representational views of social cognition by moving away from talk of the mental manipulation of propositions in favor of the construction of maps and models of others. Furthermore, I claim that the current state of social neurobiology lends itself to such a view.

Causal realism is the view that causation is a structural feature of reality, a power inherent in the world to produce effects independently of the existence of minds or observers. This article suggests that certain problems in the philosophy of mind are artefacts of causal realism because they presuppose the existence or possibility of a real causal nexus between the ‘physical’ and the ‘mental’. These dilemmas include (but are not necessarily limited to) the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness and the problems of free will and mental causality. Since the ostensible causal nexus cannot be directly perceived, it is sublimated into obscure and elusive phenomena along the purported mental causal chain. The antithesis of causal realism, and the proposed solution to the problems above, is causal anti-realism: the view that causation is not a fundamental property of the world, but of how observers purposively interpret ‘the world’. Causal anti-realism is compatible with causal pragmatism, which allows for the practical use of causal terms. Causal anti-realism denies the possibility of ontological reduction and is therefore incompatible with materialism and with materialist assumptions about the atom. The article concludes that causal anti-realism is at least prima facie reconcilable with idealism.