Aldo Leopold’s land ethic calls for an extension of ethical consideration to nonhuman components of the complex system he called “the land.” Although the basis for this extension was holistic, interpretations of Leopold’s holism leave one baffled at how he could see his land ethic as an extension of a system which recognizes individual human rights. Leopold’s critics and exponents alike have focused on the holism expressed in his definition of right and wrong. Both regard it as a working criterion of morality to be applied directly to conduct, act by act. Both are mistaken. Leopold was an indirect holist, not a direct one. That is, he applied his holistic definition of right and wrong not as a role for judging conduct directly, case by case, but as a principle for judging conduct only indirectly by judging the roles, tastes, predilections, practices, and attitudes which influence it.

Surplus-not simply scarcity-provides a reason to preserve the natural environment. Although advances in biotechnology have made it possible to manipulate, alter, and replace ecological and evolutionary processes in order vastly to increase the production of economically valuable commodities, e.g., seafood in estuaries, the huge surpluses likely to result threaten fishing communities with the same economicdepression and social dislocation that farming communities have already experienced. In this context, protecting the biological status quo not only expresses an admirable affection and respect for nature, but also makes economic sense by taking unneeded resources out of production.

Gur general vision of the world will undoubtedly affect our environmental ethics. Scientific materialism is the “general vision” that undergirds many scholarly and popular presentations of science today. It is questionable whether this materialist metaphysics can consistently sustain an environmental concern. If scientists influenced by the materialistic outlook, nonetheless, happen to be environmentalists, itis in spite of and not because of their materialist philosophies of nature. What we need, therefore, is a cosmological vision that is nlore consistently supportive of an environmental ethic. Religious visions are often ambiguous in their attitude toward the natural environment. Alfred North Whitehead and his followers weave modem science, philosophical sophistication and religious cosmology into a metaphysical vision fully and consistently supportive of a vigorous environmental ethic.

In this paper I challenge the reader to witness the environmental and feminist aegis as an epicine confrontation with nature whose main goal is to reconcile a lost partnership with the archetype I have labeled Sophia. Sophia, whose providential origins lie somewhere amid the great pre-Hellenic gnostic cults, can only bring salvation if she is liberated by humanity through the resacralization of nature. It is this change in consciousness that points toward a radical environnlental ethic and a total reconceptualization of the becoming process.

William Ophuls has argued that the sources of and solutions for present scarcity conditions are to be found in Western political philosophy. I clarify various theoretical issues raised by Ophuls’ work and offer conceptual alternatives regarding some of the more basic issues. Specifically, I critique the Lockean and Hobbesian elements in Ophuls’ treatment of the role of liberal democracy, with special attention to abundance assumptions and Lockean individualism. I also argue that he fails to deal adequately with resource distribution in his treatment of resource scarcity, that he improperly removes man from nature, that he misunderstands the relationship of technology and politics, and that he encounters other difficulties in terms of the public/private distinction and in integrating micro and macro issues. Ironically, Ophuls’ admirable attempt to shed light on the critical relationship between scarcity conditions and political philosophy may have created a new and disorienting set of shadows.

In developing theologies and spiritualities of ecology, Christians can learn from the Nobel laureate Barbara McClintock and from process theology. That “feeling for the organism” of which McClintock speaks can be understood within a process context as a distinctive mode of spirituality. The feeling is an intuitive and sympathetic apprehension of another creature in a way which mirrors God’s own way of perceiving. It involves feeling the other creature as a fellow subject with intrinsic value. A subjective capacity of this sort is by no means sufficient for a spirituality of ecology, but by all means necessary.

In this paper I discuss what triage is and how it might be applied to the preservation of endangered species. I compare the suggested application oftriage to endangered species with its application to wartime military practice, distribution of food aid, and human population control to show that the situation of endangered species is not analogous to these other suggested uses. I argue that, as far as species preservation is concemed, triage starts with the wrong norms and values: it is “human chauvinistic,” giving primacy to economic, political, and sociocultural aspects that emphasize human interests without recognizing the connection between the survival of other species and the survival of humans.

A large part of environmental policy is based upon scientific studies ofthe likely health, safety, and ecological consequences of human actions and practices. These studies, however, are frequently vulnerable to epistemological and methodological criticisms which challenge their validity. Epistemological criticisms can be used in ethical and political philosophy arguments to challenge the applicability of scientific knowledge to environmental policy, and, in turn, to challenge the democratic basis of specific environmental policies themselves. Uncertainty arguments thus draw upon philosophy of science, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy to establish conclusions of practical relevance to environmental quality. A theory of how and when uncertainty arguments ought to be given credence in environmental decision making requires an account of how scientific research ought to be integrated into environmental policy generally , plus an account of how public environmental policy is to be set in a democracy.