Philosophers have paid little attention to the distinction between conservation and preservation, apparently because they have accepted John Passmore’s suggestion that conservationism is an expression of anthropocentric motives and that “true” preservationism is an expression of nonanthropocentric motives. Philosophers have therefore concentrated their efforts on this distinction in motives. This reduction,however, is insensitive to important nuances of environmentalist objectives: there are a wide variety of human reasons for preserving natural ecosystems and wild species. Preservationist policies represent a concem to protect biological diversity from the simplifying effects of human management and are motivated by the full range of values (consumptive, aesthetic, scientific, and moral) attached to a diverse biota.Conservationists and preservationists differ mainly in their emphasis on resilience measures versus predictability measures of stability, respectively. The distinction between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric motives loses importance as emphasis is placed on the longest term values humans place on the proteetion of biological diversity.

Ecological rationality is a concept important to most environmental and natural resources policy and to much policy-relevant literature and research. Yet ecological rationality as a distinctive form of reason can only be understood and appreciated in the context of a larger body of work on the general concept of rationality. In particular, Herbert Simon’s differentiation between substantive and proceduralrationality and Paul Diesing’s specification of forms of practical reason are useful tools in mapping and defining ecological rationality. The significance and characteristics of ecological rationality suggest that it is a fundamental kind of reason, having precedence over others.

Environmental ethics would greatly benefit from an adequate metaphysical foundation. In an attempt to demonstrate the value of Whitehead’s metaphysical system as such a foundation, I first discuss five central tenets of his thought. I then compare aspects of his philosophy with Peter Singer’s utilitarianism, Tom Regan’s rights theory, Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, and Spinoza's system in order to indicate how aWhiteheadian approach can solve the difficulties of the other views as currently developed, and provide the basis for an environmental ethics which values individual entities in themselves and in their connectedness in a purposive natural order.

Deep ecology has been criticized for being anti-anthropocentric, ignorant of feminism, and utopian. Most of the arguments against deep ecology, however, are based on uncritical use of these terms. Deep ecology places anthropocentrism, feminism, and utopianism into a proper perspective--deep anthropology-which pennits understanding of the human relationships with other beings in nature, in a total-fieldmodel, without accepting unhealthy extremes. The principles of deep ecology are concerned with creating good places, rather than the “no places” of modem industrial cultures.