Recently several philosophers have argued that environmental reform movements cannot halt humankind’s destruction of the biosphere because they still operate within the anthropocentric humanism that forms the root of the ecological crisis. According to “radical” environmentalists, disaster can be averted only if we adopt a nonanthropocentric understanding of reality that teaches us to live harmoniouslyon the Earth. Martin Heidegger agrees that humanism leads human beings beyond their proper limits while forcing other beings beyond their limits as weIl. The doctrine of the “rights of man” justifies human exploitation of nonhuman beings. Paradoxically, however, the doctrine of rights for nonhuman beings does not escape the orbit of humanism. According to Heidegger, a nonanthropocentric conception of humanity and its relation to nature must go beyond the doctrine of rights. We can dweIl harmoniously on Earth only by submitting to our primary obligation: to be open for the Being of beings. We need a new way of understanding Being, a new ethos, that lets beings manifest themselves not merely as objects for human ends, but as intrinsically important. Heidegger calls this ethos the “fourfold” of earth and sky, gods and mortals. Humanists argue that Heidegger is wrong to abandon the principle of human rights in favor of the notion that we are obligated to “let beings be,” while some radical environmentalists accuse hirn of being a humanist because he supposedly overestimates the importance of humankind’s ability to speak. Heidegger insists, however, that language makes possible culture, without which thereis no human experience of nature. An environmentally sound ethos. can arise, according to Heidegger, only from a shift within the cultural heritage of the West. Richard Rorty agrees that we must become open for a new “conversation” with the West, even if this requires abandoning traditionally important fields such as epistemology. The need to develop a new understanding of Being is so great that thinkers from the analytic and continental traditions of philosophy are finally initiating a long-overdue dialogue.

Most philosophical discussion of the moral status of animals takes place within a context of traditional ethics. I argue that the conceptual apparatus of utilitarianism and rights theory is historically and logically tied to an individualistic, atomistic concept of society. The liberal-democratic tradition is thus an unsuitable framework for understanding, analyzing, and solving environmental problems, including themoral status of animals. Concepts such as stewardship or trusteeship are more appropriate for the development of an environmental ethic.

Underlying solar energy development is a fundamental issue of values and individual choices. Where solar energy comes to include such ideas as appropriate decentralized technology, self-sufficiency and autonomy, and a responsibility to conserve and preserve the environment, solar energy can become a channel for exploring alternative values. The requirement here is to view solar energy not as just anotherenergy source maintaining an ever increasing fiow of consumption goods. Rather, solar energy should be viewed as an opportunity for the development of values which expand individual choices through the creative process of the community paradigm.

The recent controversy over whether Marxism is an ecologically viable theory or can justify astate of harmony between man and nature has a serious flaw because none of the participants in the discussion seems to think that technology is intrinsic to the reconciliation of man with nature. While it is correct that the writings of the early Marx offer some basis for the reconciliation, the later Marx was preoccupiedwith the question of nature’s instrumentality or the human significance of nature, and he saw technology as the human mode of dealing with nature. Marx and Marxists have contributed to making us aware of man’s exploitation of and alienation from other men, but not man’s exploitation of and alienation from nature. To eradicate the second requires a radical deconstruction of modern technomorphic culture and its metaphysical foundations.

The occurrence of earthquakes is usually ignored or discounted as an environmental issue, but the environmental relevance of the science of earthquake prediction is demonstrable. The social consequences of such predictions, when they are accurate, and even (once a general pattern of accuracy has been achieved) when they fail, have implications of such varied environmental issues as land-use control, building codes, social and economic costs (for predictions made when no earthquake occurs or for failures to predict earthquakes which do occur). Lay members of the public are more directly involved in programs of earthquake prediction than in almost all other instances of scientific prediction, if only because the scientific findings require public participation in order to have any effect at all. Attention must be paid, accordingly, to the effect of specific public and social values on the practice of earthquake prediction-ranging from such broadly based ones as conceptions of the general relation between man and nature to narrower ones like the cost-benefit analysis of a program of earthquake prediction itself. Because of the close connection between the efficacy of earthquake prediction and public attitudes, moreover, certain questions concerning the social character of “normal” science and the deprofessionalization of scientific institutions are highlighted in this context.

Environmental philosophers often assurne that we lack metaethical concepts and normative criteria for environmental decisions, but that we have all the facts we need from the environmental sciences. This is contested in the case of our obligation to future generations as affected by current decisions regarding increased fossil fuel use, decisions which affect both the inlmediate and long-range future, and whichmust be made deliberately or by default before we know the long-term effects of increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Some suggestions are offered about decision making in the absence of sufficient factual information.

Current facts about soil erosion, groundwater “mining,” and impact of toxic substances suggest a resource crisis in our farming system. Yet traditional checks on the exploitation of farmland, capsulized in the “stewardship ethic,” proceed from too limited a viewpoint to adequately address the root of the exploitation and proffer an alternative. After briefly examining the stewardship ethic, I consider the developmentof a “partnership ethic” to guide the use of land for farming which builds its essential elements out of the reflections of feminist thinkers on the relationship between humankind and nature. Instead of using “rights” language to express the ethic, I develop a theory of appropriate use analogous to the appropriate use of another person’s capabilities-i.e., that such moral use should respect and not destroy the other and that it should return something of value to the other in exchange for the use. Finally, those principles are examined for their practical implications for farmland use and national farm policy.