Rationalist models of divine agency typically ascribe perfect freedom to God, where this is understood as a freedom from external causal influences and non-rational influences, including desires or preferences not derived from reason alone. Paul Draper has recently developed a rationalist model of God’s agency on which God faces “hard choices” between options differing in moral and non-moral value. He argues that this model is preferable to rival rationalist models because it is compatible with God’s having significant freedom and being maximally worthy of praise and gratitude. I argue that on an alternative model of divine agency, which rejects perfect freedom and holds that God makes hard choices on the basis of brute preferences, God would be more worthy of praise and gratitude. However, a probabilistic problem for theism which Draper identifies for his model also applies to the brute preference model.

Can faith be valuable and, if so, under what conditions? We know of no theory-neutral way to address this question. So, we offer a theory of relational faith, and we supplement it with a complementary theory of relational faithfulness. We then turn to relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness with an eye toward exhibiting some of the ways in which, on our theory, faith and faithfulness can be valuable and disvaluable. We then extend the theory to other manifestations of faith and faithfulness, we propose a way to unify them under a theory of faith and faithfulness simpliciter, and we explain how they can be neo-Aristotelian virtues and vices. We close with our solution to the value problem and avenues for further research.

While Anselm’s famous ontological argument from the Proslogion receives the great bulk of attention from philosophers of religion and historians of philosophy, the case for theism that he begins to develop in the opening three chapters of the Monologion is also of considerable interest. Like the ontological argument, the opening arguments of the Monologion have also received substantial criticism. Here I suggest that one important line of critique (namely that supplied by Visser and Williams (2009)) can be deflected if those arguments are read (or rather, creatively re-read) using the distinctive interpretive lens and theological resources of Palamism.

We argue that the good of a meaningful life has a role in theodicy by serving as a contributory reason for an all-good, all-powerful God to allow the existence of evil. If a meaningful life is a more valuable good than competing goods such as pleasure, power, etc., then the good of a meaningful life could have some theodical value for explaining a world where personal pleasure and power are often threatened and undermined. Thus, a world including deeply meaningful personal lives along with the existence of evils like pain and suffering, could be superior to a world without pain and evil but with less meaningful lives. This view is especially plausible if our argument successfully demonstrates that certain kinds of evils are necessary conditions for certain kinds of more valuable, more meaningful lives.

This article aims to provide an explication of the Christian doctrine of eternal generation. A model of the doctrine is formulated within the ground-theoretic framework of Jonathan Schaffer and E. Jonathan Lowe, which enables it to be explicated clearly and consistently, and two often raised objections against the doctrine can be successfully answered.

Kenneth Einar Himma (2009, 2016) argues that the existence of Hell renders procreation impermissible. Jason Marsh (2015) contends that problems of evil motivate anti-natalism. Anti-natalism is principally rejected for its perceived conflict with reproductive rights. I propose a theistic solution to the latter problem. Universalism says that all persons will, postmortem, eventually be eternally housed in Heaven, a superbly good place wherein harm is fully absent. The acceptance of universalism is now widespread, but I offer further reason to embrace one variant of it. If universalism is true and there are opportunities to procreate in Heaven, then reproductive autonomy is largely preserved for everyone. Assuming Heaven is a harm-free place, there are no risks to children born in Heaven, unlike Earth or Hell. While this requires human persons to accept temporary restrictions on procreation during our premortem lives, the bulk of reproductive autonomy is preserved since one will have infinite opportunities to reproduce in Heaven.

The coherence objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation maintains that it is impossible for one individual to have both the attributes of God and the attributes of a human being. This article examines Thomas Aquinas’s answer to this objection. I challenge the dominant, mereological interpretation of Aquinas’s position and, in light of this challenge, develop and defend a new alternative interpretation of Aquinas’s response to this important objection to Christian doctrine.