Many Christians assume that there are only two possibilities for what a human person is: either Animalism (the view that we are fundamentally animals) or Immaterialism (the view that we are fundamentally immaterial souls). I set out a third possibility: the Constitution View (the view that we are material beings, constituted by bodies but not identical to the bodies that now constitute us.) After setting out and briefly defending the Constitution View, I apply it to the doctrine of resurrection. I conclude by giving reasons for Christians to prefer the Constitution View of human persons to both Animalism and Immaterialism.

Reformed epistemologists hold that belief in God can be rational and warranted apart from being based on any other propositions. The facts of religiousdiversity, however, are seen by many to pose a challenge to this view. In the first part of this paper I suggest some developments of Plantinga’s account of environment, proper function, and the kinds of faculties involved in the production of warranted belief. In the second part I develop a reformed response to “the Epistemological Challenge of Diversity,” with a particular focus on the “best explanation” aspect of the pluralistic challenge and the role of environment and character in a non-pluralist explanation of the facts of diversity. In the final section I address some objections.

This is a reply to a paper by Graham Oppy in the July, 1999 issue of this journal, “Koons’ Cosmological Argument.” Recent work in defeasible or nonmonotonic logic means that the cosmological argument can be cast in such a way that it does not presuppose that every contingent situation, without exception, has a cause. Instead, the burden of proof is shifted to the skeptic, who must produce positive reasons for thinking that the cosmos is an exception to the defeasible law of causality. I show how Oppy’s critique can be turned into a plausible rebuttal of my argument. However, this rebuttal can be set aside when the original argument is supplemented by a plausible account of the nature of causal priority. Several independent lines of argument in support of this account are outlined.

This essay explores the ways in which specific attention (or lack thereof) to creation can affect the manner in which we execute metaphysics or ethics. It argues that failing to attend to an adequate expression of “the distinction” of creator from creatures can unwittingly lead to a misrepresentation of divinity in philosophical argument. It also offers a suggestion for understanding “post-modern” from the more ample perspective of Creek and medieval forms of thought.

In arecent article, Michael Murray critiques several versions of universalism-that is, the doctrine that in the end all persons are saved. Of particular interest to Murray is Thomas Talbott’s version of universalism (called SU1 by Murray), which puts forward a strategy for ensuring universal salvation that purports to preserve the autonomy of the creatures saved. Murray argues that, on the contrary, the approach put forward in SU1 is not autonomy-preserving at all. I argue that this approach preserves the autonomy of the creature at least as well as the approach posited by the traditional doctrine of hell. Since SU1 clearly does more to preserve the well-being of the creature, it follows that, on the assumption that God loves all His creatures, SU1 is preferable to the doctrine of hell.

In this paper I discuss William Lane Craig’s response to problems faced by Molinists who hold that an eternal hell exists and that most people who fail to accept Christ during their earthly lives end up there. Craig suggests that it is plausible to suppose that most people who fail to accept Christ suffer from transworld damnation, and that the fact that they do ensures that it is fair that they end up in hell regardless of whether they hear the Gospel message. I argue that whether this suggestion-which I call ‘Craig’s contentious suggestion’-is true depends on how transworld damnation is understood. I present four interpretations of transworld damnation, and argue that on three of the interpretations Craig’s suggestion is clearly unacceptable, but that it may be acceptable on the fourth.

Alfred Mele and M.P. Smith have presented a puzzle about omnipotence which they call “the new paradox of the stone.” They have also proposed a solution to this puzzle. I briefly present their puzzle and their proposed solution and argue that their proposed solution is unsatisfactory. I further argue that if their suggested solution to the original paradox of the stone succeeds, a similar solution also solves the new paradox of the stone.