In this paper I outline and discuss the central claims and arguments of J. L. Mackie’s The Miracle of Theism. Mackie argues, in essence, that none of the traditional theistic arguments is successful taken either one at a time or in tandem, that the theist does nothave a satisfactory response to the problem of evil, and that on balance the theistic hypothesis is much less probable than is its denial. He then concludes that theism is unsatisfactory and rationally unacceptable. I argue that he is mistaken in nearly all of his major contentions.

Frederic Jameson’s The Political Unconscious attempts a comprehensive theory of hermeneutics based on Marxist principles. Through a three-stage process of interpretation, which moves from text to society to philosophy of history, Jameson investigates a paradigmatic model for textual analysis which will avoid relativistic ideological interpretations. The present article attempts to delineate the similarities and the critical differences between Jameson’s model and a Christian model for hermeneutics. The discussion focuses on concepts of contradiction, finitude, and “discovery” as well as on Jamesonian views of utopia, mode of production, ethics, and “the political unconscious.”

For many religious people there is a problem of doubting various credal statements contained in their religions. Often propositional beliefs are looked upon as necessary conditions for salvation. This causes great anxiety in doubters and raises the question of the importance of belief in religion and in life in general. It is a question that has been neglected in philosophy of religion and theology. In this paper I shall explore the question of the importance of belief as a religious attitude and suggest that there is at least one other attitude which may be adequate for religious faith even in the absence of belief.

This paper examines Küng’s procedure in justifying God at the bar of reason. He first counters nihilism by fundamental trust in reality, which affirms reality as coherent and meaningful. He then builds his case for theism upon trust in God, which is itself the condition of the possibility of fundamental trust in reality. Although claiming an intrinsic rationality for both these acts of trust, his position is ultimately reducible to the fideistic answer to the question of God and thus not justifiable at the bar of reason. A philosophical theology, however, should employ reason in favor of the decision for God.