The twenty-first century world has radically been defined by multiple crises, including wars and grandiose exploitation of the poor by those with political and economic power. To address these crises, one must turn to virtuous life notions. In doing this, society has to learn from different religious and cultural wisdom. Consequently, a case is being made in this work that African ethical thoughts can enrich Christian notions of the virtuous life. African philosophical and cultural notions of community are relevant to understanding the virtuous life in Christian theology as a constitutive aspect of what it means to be human.

The Igbo knowledge system articulated by Amaechi Udefi is insufficient to ensure knowledge progress as opposed to the system found in fallibilism theory. The reason is that there is a level of intellectual openness fallibilism theory guarantees that is not found in Udefi’s thought. This paper aims to do a comparative study of fallibilism theory (using Karl Popper’s falsifiability theory) and Udefi’s account of the Igbo knowledge system. The study also investigates to what extent each knowledge system can ensure knowledge growth and development. The significance of this study is to highlight the importance of knowledge progress in the overall development of society. This paper argues that even though Udefi and Popper were reasoning from different cultural environments, Popper’s falsifiability theory is more open to knowledge progress than Udefi’s Igbo knowledge system. The expository, historical, comparative and evaluative methods were used.

Philosophy premises itself on the ideals of openness and continuous self-renewal. And yet, the story of philosophy has been an endless struggle against the violence of systematic exclusion and erasure. This article deploys the principle of openness as an analytic category to reflect on the broader question of epistemic decolonisation and the imperative this imposes on the practice of philosophy. There are important ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions to the principle of openness with a bearing on the enterprise and how to conceptualise its future. Whether at the global level or within a specific individual tradition, the principle of openness is about the reconfiguration of philosophy itself and restoring its richness and diversity. For the African philosopher, this entails assuming responsibility for the ongoing task of articulating ‘what philosophy is and what it can be’ within the context of Africa’s own history, its problematics, and priority questions.

Humanity is under siege with Covid-19. Whilst the crisis aggravates, the world is also grappling with yet another challenge - a global misinformation conundrum. This arises from the spread of contagious conspiracy theories that obfuscate understanding the pandemic at best. Incidentally, the conspiracy theories have gone as viral as Covid-19 itself, spreading just as swiftly digitally as the virus does physically. The outcome has been a spectrum of attitudinal patterns, ranging from cynicism and skepticism to outright denialism and fatalism. Using a conversational analysis that is predicated on extant literature and personal insights, the paper examines the import of conspiracy theories as a major complication of the Covid-19 challenge. The paper posits that the theories have produced narratives and attitudinal outcomes that not only misrepresent the pandemic but also complicate its mitigation.

This paper examines the metaphysical status of Ezumezu logic in the direction of logical realism. While presenting Ezumezu logic as a prototype of African logic, Chimakonam makes statements that somewhat entail logical monism. Using the method of critical analysis of related literature, the paper argues that presenting Ezumezu logic as one of the prototypes of African logic while at the same time making claims that elevate it to a hegemonic status, gives rise to what is regarded in the paper as the monist-pluralist paradox. Drawing lessons from Abakedi’s ID paradox, the paper argues that a monist logical foundation for African logic cannot be consistently defended without paradoxes. The paper proposes that different African philosophies should be grounded by different African logics such that one need not be trained in one particular prototype such as Ezumezu logic or argue in conformity to it to qualify as an African professional or scholar.

Epistemic decolonization has taken centre stage in academia and everyday life. Epistemic decolonization is a call to dismantle the Western way of thinking and its self-arrogated hegemonic authority. It is also a call to re-centre the knowledge enterprise in Africa from a western-centric orientation to an African-centric one to accommodate African epistemic formations. In this paper, I intend to contribute to the discussions of epistemic decolonization by showing that engaging in African epistemology is a form of epistemic decolonization. My argument is that we are recalibrating the knowledge enterprise when we go outside of the western episteme to engage with knowledge in other traditions, such as African epistemology.

In this paper, I argue that the cause of morally self-defeating acts at the collective level is greed and, at the individual level, an unrestrained impulse for pleasure beyond Innocent Asouzu’s primordial instinct for self-preservation and ignorance. In investigating why humans act in self-defeating ways, Asouzu came up with two possible factors responsible for self-defeating acts: The primordial instinct for self-preservation and ignorance. Besides Asouzu’s explanation, I here argue that the problem of self-defeating acts goes beyond the primordial instinct for self-preservation and ignorance to reveal a flaw characteristic of the human condition. At the collective level, the flaw responsible for self-defeating acts is greed and the unrestrained impulse for pleasure at the individual level. I employ the conversational method to interrogate the different views on self-defeating acts from Socrates to Asouzu and show why my explanation offers a better understanding of the problem.

In 2003, almost a decade after South Africa’s 1994 first democratic elections, an academic debate emerged about the need to include the indigenous African philosophy of education in teacher education. Subsequently, Ubuntu philosophy has been given attention in philosophy for teacher education. However, ancient Egyptian philosophy of education, an indigenous African tradition, is absent. On their part, European and Asian philosophies of education are centred, leaving space for some philosophers of education to falsely attribute the genesis of philosophy, in general, and philosophy of education, in particular, to Europe and Asia since the two are dated. In contrast, Ubuntu philosophy of education is not dated. In this article, I argue that ancient Egyptian philosophy of education must be reclaimed and centred on teacher education not only in South Africa but wherever Africans are. Such an approach will not only expose Africans to their rich philosophical heritage but will also help to reclaim African philosophy’s space as a leader of humankind in the history of philosophy.

Ovett Nwosimiri argues in a paper he published in 2021 that affirmative action and preferential hiring policies are no longer appropriate for South Africa because of the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The case he makes is that since COVID-19 has impacted people of all races, there should no longer be any consideration of race in hiring policies and practices. He claims that continued preferential hiring practices unfairly discriminate against non-designated groups. I argue that this claim presumes that the pandemic has been a devastating but equalizing force in economic opportunity and participation for people in South Africa. I show that this claim is simply false and that the falsity of his claim undermines Nwosimiri’s case. Nwosimiri does not take account of the false premise his case is founded on because of his inappropriate methodological choice to ignore empirical evidence that has bearing on his argument.