"Testability and Meaning" is one of Carnap's best-known works. It has been usually seen as one of the main sources of the received view of the philosophy of science, and it is normally read in the hght of the tradition it originated. Nevertheless, this reading detaches the text from the philosophical project to which it belongs. This paper aims to situate Camap's article in its proper philosophical place, which is found in the programme initiated in the Logische Syntax, a programme which essentially remained alive throughout the rest of Camap's career. The paper shows how this view opens up a natural way of understanding Carnap's important article in a different light, more interesting and coherent.

Using the later works of Wittgenstein, this paper investigates the intricate ways in which the will is related to mental imagery. It examines how "seeing" is subject to the will in a different way from "forming an image". Although it is unwise to posit a model of images which maintains that images are directly willed inner objects - just like outer objects, only located in our heads - this model is often incorrectly embraced by philosophers and psychologists. A proper understanding of the relationship between seeing and imaging will also help solve the dilemma posed by a visual mental image that can be both intentional (i.e., subject to the will) and yet unintentional (i.e., forced upon one).

Im Paragraphen 206 seiner Philosophischen Untersuchungen sagt Ludwig Wittgenstein, daß „die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise das Bezugssystem (ist), mittels dessen wir uns eine fremde Sprache deuten". Unter ,,gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise" wurde in der Literatur ein Bündel an Gattungsmerkmalen des Menschen verstanden (Baker/Hacker; Haller). Diese Interpretation ist exegetisch nicht überzeugend. Auch die Lesart (v. Savigny), wonach es lediglich um Gemeinsamkeiten der Sprechergemeinschaft geht, ist nicht zwingend. Am plausibelsten ist die Interpretation (Schulte) im Sinne einer Sprecher- und Beobachtergemeinschaft gemeinsamen Handlungsweise.

The paper examines the reasons for which Camap's and Fodor's theory are considered inadequate by Hilary Putnam in his book Representation and Reality, Putnam deconstmcts his earlier functionalist position and finds himself able to say many things about what language is not and very few about what it is, and, metaphorically speaking, puts human society in an Augustinian position regarding language. As well, this paper investigates whether Putnam's "internal realism" encourages the possible appearence of a new breed of analytic philosophers who will be more sensitive to what was once called "continental metaphysics" and yet who still maintain the conceptual and methodological rigidness of the "old" analytic school.

The aim of this paper is an analysis of events in the framework of intensional logic. Events are constmed as special propositions, generalizing the ideas of Montague and D. Lewis, or equivalently as sets of world segments in which they occur. The main problem of such a propositional analysis is to account for coarse grained events as referred to by nominalizations like „the murder of Caesar". The idea is: This event is the set of all those world segments in which Caesar is murdered in the same way and under the same circumstances as in the real world. Sameness has to be restricted to a set of prcperties if occurences of this event in other worlds are to be possible. Since in natural language the reference of event nominalizations depends on the context, the proposal is to relativize coarse grained events on sets of contextually relevant properties.

C.Z. Elgins Argumente zur Unbrauchbarkeit des Wissensbegriffes für epistemologische Untersuchungen und die damit begründete Ersetzung des Wissensdurch den Verstehensbegriff werden anhand einer Analyse der Funktion von Begriffsexplikationen zur Bildung wahrer gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen zurückgewiesen. Die Verwendung grober Begriffskategorien, die mit einer Reduktion der Irrtumsmöglichkeit und somit einer leichten Bildung vieler gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen einhergeht, erweist sich nur vordergründig als epistemischer Vorteil für die Laien, da die so gewonnenen Uberzeugungen kognitiv weniger gehaltvoll sind, Experten aber neben den feineren gewöhnlich auch über die groben Begriffskategorien verfügen, und selbst bei eingestandener Irrtumsmöglichkeit und dem Verzicht auf definitive Überzeugungen der Art „Dieses x ist F" erheblich mehr und Gehaltvolleres wissen als Laien, da auch ,,x ist definitiv kein F" oder ,,x ist höchstwahrscheinlich F" Wissen ausdrücken.

Propositions - truths and falsehoods - are "eternal" objects of possible ("de dicto") belief and disbelief, potential points of agreement and disagreement. Accordingly the criterion of two sentence-tokens "expressing tiie same proposition" will be tiie logical impossibility of beheving (disbelieving) what one expresses without believing (disbelieving) what the other expresses. This involves an ultra-thight synonymity relation ("semantic equivalence") and a sharing of denotations as between corresponding Unguistic expressions in each. Only locutions containing names, indexicals, etc. which commit speakers to the same purported existents can "express the same proposition", but Stephen Schiffer is wrong to argue that saying one believes such a proposition necessarily imputes any metalinguistic conceptions to one. Propositions lack simplicity-or-complexity and hence structure (because sometimes a conjunction is one of its conjuncts). Each true (false) proposition has "its own" fact which it asserts (denies).

An account of the evaluation of fictional discourse in terms of counterfactuals is sketched which accommodates the insights of D. Lewis and G. Evans but is not committed to the existence of possibilia on the one hand and to taking counterfactuals as barely true on the other hand. By adopting a two-step theory of evaluation which does not evaluate expressions (sentences) across possible worlds modal realism is avoided. And the use of a modified incorporation principle saying that every singular reference made in the scope of a pretence is anaphoric and linked to a quantifier outside the scope allows to incorporate actual individuals within a game of make-believe.

While "A needs X" often calls for supplementation by the Y X is needed for, Thomson, Wiggins and Braybrooke have argued that there is a sense of "need" for which this is unnecessary. But Gricean conventions for conversation allow us to use ellipsis in a unified account of "need" while explaining the data Thomson and Wiggins appeal to: nondetatchment of bare needs from more fully specified ones, avoidance of serious harm as a default filling of the Y-slot, and the apparent normativeness of some need-statements. Their detailed discussions also undermine the utility of demarcating a sense of "fundamental" need.