I argue that Theodor W. Adorno is best understood as a moral perfectionist thinker in the stripe of Stanley Cavell. This is significant because Adorno’s moral philosophy has not received serious interest from moral philosophers, and much of this has to do with difficulties in situating his thought. I argue that once Adorno is situated in this way, then, like Cavell, he offers an interesting moral perspective that will be of value to a variety of moral theorists. My argument proceeds in two broad steps: first, I show that Cavell and Adorno share a distinct epistemological orientation, one that centers around the impossibility of knowledge in certain situations, and trades on a Kantian and post-Kantian picture. Second, I show that their moral perfectionism fundamentally rests on such epistemology.

In order to understand the normative aspect of Adorno’s thinking, one must understand his conception of experience as it relates to both the bodily aversion to suffering and the history of concepts as deployed by the species. In order to understand experience in this way, I briefly explicate the concepts of Erfahrung and Erlebnis as both Benjamin and Adorno used them. Then, I connect these concepts to the immediacy of suffering. Arguing that the immediacy of suffering is not sufficient to understand Adorno’s concept of experience, I articulate notions of memory and imagination that characterize experience that goes beyond mere immediacy of feeling. But this concept of experience requires a connection between the individual and the species, which I attempt to demonstrate through a contemporary example. Finally, I conclude with some comments on the objective and subjective possibility of experience and thus for a practical orientation to the world.

This paper analyzes the role of the principle of causality in Cassirer’s account of the coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal objects. We shall see that, in contradistinction to Kantian schematism, Cassirer maintains that this coordination is not achieved by means of a third element (the schema), which albeit intellectual is nevertheless also sensible. Rather, in Cassirer’s view, the coordination will take place through a specification of the concepts that should be sought “within the domain of concepts itself.” We shall show that the principle of causality is the ultimate condition upon which the possibility of the coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal objects depends.

In this essay, I address the critical role of production (production) in Levinas’s Totality and Infinity. I argue that production functions as the terminological site of Levinas’s critique of onto-logic. Specifically, production overturns the most basic ontological presupposition, viz., that Something cannot come from Nothing. At stake in this inversion of Parmenides is a phenomenological re-thinking of the relation between the I and the Other, inaugurating what Levinas calls a “logic of interiority.” This logic, in its resistance to the Principle of Non-Contradiction, enacts a paradoxical running-together of activity and passivity, autonomy and dependence, being and nothingness. It is the fact that both the I and Other are produced rather deduced which makes this strange intertwining possible. In conclusion, I reflect on the ways in which production allows for an approach to the Other as both bound up with, while at the same time, excessive to the self.

The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of musical experience which takes the empirical research seriously without abandoning or neglecting music’s transcendental features. The tension between the recent empirical approach, as represented particularly by Huron’s ITPRA theory, and the transcendental fact that music as an instance of art is something one can understand and, moreover, can understand oneself through, should be overcome by elaborating on the concept of emotion and the role it can play in musical understanding. This will be done against the narrower background of the pragmatists’ theories of meaning, as represented by the semantic work of Meyer and Brandom, and their broader link to the philosophy of Hegel and the great (aesthetic) systems of German idealism.

In this article I present a comparative analysis of Schopenhauer’s concept of a human’s intelligible character and Sartre’s concept of a human’s fundamental project. My examination reveals that both Schopenhauer and Sartre posit a groundless, baseless choice of identity which unifies a human’s future conscious states into an integrated whole. I also identify the primary difference between the two accounts: Schopenhauer’s intelligible character is permanent, while Sartre’s theory of fundamental project is capable of being transformed or transcended. Last, I show that the divergence on this point can be explained by the position the two philosophers hold with respect to the relationship of existence to essence. For Schopenhauer’s account, I use The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, and his Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will. For the analysis of Sartre, I rely on Being and Nothingness and his biography of French writer Jean Genet, titled Saint Genet.

It has recently been suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s position in Phenomenology of Perception is a unique form of transcendental idealism. The general claim is that in spite of his critique of “Kantianism,” Merleau-Ponty’s position comes out as a form of transcendental idealism that takes the perceptual processes of the lived body as the transcendental constituting condition for the possibility of experience. In this article I critically appraise this claim. I argue that if the term “idealist” is intended in a sufficiently similar sense to Kant’s usage of the term in naming his position as a “transcendental idealism” then it is a misrepresentation to subsume Merleau-Ponty’s position under that term. This is because Merleau-Ponty rejects the transcendental metaphysics of the reflecting subject that underpins transcendental idealism. In its place he advocates a methodological transcendentalism that, whilst being anti-realist, is not idealist. Thus to call his position “a new kind of transcendental idealism,” as Sebastian Gardner has, is to misunderstand the significance of his existentialist break with what he sees as the “intellectualism” of this position.