Cover of International Journal of Applied Philosophy
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Displaying: 21-23 of 23 documents


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21. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Francisco Javier Lopez Frias, Cesar R. Torres The Ethics of Cloning Horses in Polo
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The ethics of using genetic engineering to enhance athletic performance has been a recurring topic in the sport philosophy and bioethics literature. In this article, we analyze the ethics of cloning horses for polo competition. In doing so, we critically examine the arguments most commonly advanced to justify this practice. In the process, we raise concerns about cloning horses for polo competition, centering on normative aspects pertaining to sport ethics usually neglected by defenders of cloning. In particular, we focus on (1) how this practice could have a detrimental impact on the central skills of polo, and (2) how it unjustly creates an uneven playing field. We suggest that the polo community would benefit from critically considering the ethical quandaries posed by the practice of cloning horses for polo competition.
22. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
Marius A. Pascale Art Horror, Reactive Attitudes, and Compassionate Slashers: A Response to Di Muzio’s “The Immorality of Horror Films”
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In “The Immorality of Horror Films,” philosopher and film scholar Gianluca Di Muzio proposes an analytic argument that aims to prove horror narratives, particularly slashers, unethical. His Argument from Reactive Attitudes contests slashers encourage pleasurable responses towards depictions of torture and death, which is possible only by suspending compassionate reactions. Doing so degrades sympathy and empathy, causing desensitization. This article will argue Di Muzio’s ARA, while valuable to discussion of art horror and morbidity, fails to meet its intended aim. The ARA contains structural flaws in its logic, compounded by reliance on insufficient evidence. Additionally, Di Muzio does not adequately consider or rebut prominent aesthetic concerns, including ontological and moral distance of representations. Lastly, the argument utilizes a flawed classificatory schema that undermines its primary goal. Even narrowly confined to slashers, the ARA cannot explain alternative reasons for engaging with horror, nor does it account for those nuanced slasher works designed to foster compassion. The project concludes by offering a modified ARA with greater potential to accurately analyze the interrelation between art horror and morality.
23. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 1
About the Contributors
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