It has become common, following Stephen Darwall’s “Two Kinds of Respect” (1977), to distinguish between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect.” I propose, rather, to distinguish between hierarchical and egalitarian respect. The way the two meanings interact and the way they either support or contrast with each other have yet to be made clear. The meanings gathered under the broad rubric of respect can be highlighted by a genealogy that convincingly shows that the hierarchical notion is fundamental and that the definition of an egalitarian meaning is a decisive shift made mainly by the Enlightenment movement, particularly by Kant. Furthermore, the notion of respect is currently being extended beyond persons—to animals, other living beings, and the environment. I argue that we can justifiably do so on the basis of the interaction between the hierarchical and egalitarian notions of respect.

Merleau-Ponty’s writings on the philosophy of painting, though widely influential and much discussed, remain enigmatic. In this paper I compare his views on painting with those of his older contemporary, Jacques Maritain, who also holds that painting can give us a non-conceptual insight into deep truths about things that are inaccessible to discursive thought. I argue that some ideas that are obscure and undeveloped in Merleau-Ponty are developed more clearly and fully in Maritain. Even where there are significant differences between them, these are not as great as it might at first seem. This comparison can help us to see the ways in which both philosophers’ theories of art are important for understanding their philosophies as a whole. Furthermore, the views they hold in common can continue to suggest a plausible and fruitful way to think about art today.

Traditionally, analogical ontologies—ontologies that are hierarchically structured with beings participating in a primary being—have been defended by those who criticize secularism. Secularism, it is said, depends on the leveling out of being, the elimination of hierarchies in favor of ontologies in which beings differ only according to intensity. John Milbank, for example, argues that secularism became a possibility only once medieval analogical ontologies were supplanted by univocal accounts of being. In this paper, however, I argue that an endorsement of an analogical ontology is not restricted to pre-moderns and those critical of secularism. It is possible, I argue, to conceive of a secular version of analogical ontology. Martin Heidegger’s mid-career account of being offers us an example of such an ontology. In what follows, I attempt to reconstruct Heidegger’s mid-career ontology as analogically and secularly organized. In doing so, I challenge Milbank’s claim that secular ontologies are necessarily non-analogical.

In this paper I argue that Confucianism provides a foundation for human rights. First, I will survey the current debates on the issue of whether Confucianism can embrace the idea of human rights. Second, I will focus on a “thin concept” of human rights and point out some historical developments pertinent to this idea and various aspects of the concept. Third, I will explain the type of interpretation of Confucianism on which I want to focus. Fourth, I will argue that Confucianism is not only compatible with human rights but also provides a foundation for human dignity, which is a basis for human rights. I argue that the Confucian virtue-based approach can overcome certain challenges that thwart an autonomy-based approach to human dignity and human rights. Finally, I will address some objections to this view.

In this paper I discuss the problem of the Kantian line. The problem arises because the locus of value in Kantian ethics is rationality, which (counter-intuitively) seems to entail that there are no duties to groups of beings like children. I argue that recent attempts to solve this problem by Wood and O’Neill overlook an important aspect of it before posing my own solution.

Standard interpretations of Kant’s moral philosophy portray him as affording agents very little, if any, latitude to exercise practical judgment for determining the proper course of action. It is typically thought that Kant holds that because all moral duties are determinable a priori and in advance of particular circumstances this leaves little to no room for agents to exercise practical judgment. In this paper I discuss two senses in which Kant does allow for the practical judgment of agents. The first is an interpretation of Kant’s view of practical judgment developed by Onora O’Neill and others. The second is an underappreciated dimension of practical judgment contained in Kant’s texts. It is to a defense and examination of the importance of the second sense of practical judgment that the majority of this paper is dedicated.

In this paper I explore modal metaphysics in regard to Francisco Suárez’s idea of real being (ens inquantum ens reale), in order to track down an early model of the relationship between synchronical alternative states of affairs and the temporal frequency paradigm. In doing so this article will offer an interpretation of Suárez’s doctrine of eternal truths as found in Disputationes Metaphysicae d. 31, c. 12, § 38–§ 47. I argue that Suárez’s modal theory of real possibilities and logical (im)possibilities should be regarded as an actualist and essentialist form of modalism.

Proponents of natural normativity maintain that the moral evaluation of human beings shares a certain common conceptual pattern with the evaluation of other living things. The adequacy of this analogy has been challenged, with opponents arguing that because humans are rational, there is a gap between what is natural and what is normative for humans. Rational creatures, the argument goes, are importantly different from non-rational living things in that reason includes the ability to step back from what is natural and ask whether it is good that our nature is constituted as it is. Micah Lott has attempted a response to this challenge. After evaluating his proposal, I offer a reply that attempts to resolve an important dilemma, namely, that the naturalist either lacks a satisfying response to the authority-of-nature challenge or is forced to abandon naturalism.