Moral intuitionism, which claims that some moral seemings confer justification, has become an increasingly popular account in moral epistemology. Defenses of the position have largely focused on the standard account, according to which the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming is determined by its phenomenal credentials alone. Unfortunately, the standard account is less plausible than other versions of moral intuitionism because it does not take etiology seriously. In this paper, I provide an outline and defense of a non-standard account of moral intuitionism that I dub the “Prudent Conscience View.” According to this view, phenomenal credentials only partially determine the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming, for the power of a seeming to confer justification is also determined by its etiology. In brief, a moral seeming confers justification to the degree that the conscience that gave rise to it is functioning properly, and a person’s conscience functions properly to the degree that the person is prudent.

In this paper I look at the connection between willing and believing for Kant’s and Kantian ethics. I argue that the two main formulations of the categorical imperative are relativized to agents according to their beliefs. I then point out three different ways in which Kant or a present-day Kantian might defend this position. I conclude with some remarks about the contrast between Kant’s legal theory and his ethical theory.

This paper understands mental attitudes such as emotions and desires to be dispositions to behavior. It also acknowledges that people are often ambivalent, i.e., that they may hold opposed attitudes towards something or someone. Yet the first position seems to entail that ambivalence is either tantamount to paralysis or a contradictory notion. I identify the problem as based on a reductive interpretation of the dispositional character of attitudes and of ambivalence. The paper instead defends a post-Davidsonian view of the basic rationality of human life. By focussing on desire and emotion we can see that the mutually exclusive ways of life involved in ambivalence are manifested in the person’s conduct.

Most philosophers do not read Kant’s philosophy of religion as providing a foundation for Christianity, or even as in line with it. Recently, however, a number of so-called “affirmative Kantians” have argued that Kant’s philosophy of religion explicitly aims at recovering the spirit of Christianity. In this article I scrutinize this claim with regard to Kant’s conceptualization of “grace” as a supplement to his moral theory. Contrary to these “affirmative Kantians,” I argue that Kant’s account of grace stems from Kant’s moral pessimism, not from any sense of the shortcomings of human beings in fulfilling their duties or the religious need for supernatural cooperation. Kant’s concept of grace tries to moderate this pessimism by providing what is needed for the possibility of moral progress. But simply by the way in which Kant regards grace as a rational concept needed for his moral theory, it seems to me that his philosophy of religion runs counter to certain central convictions of Christianity.

This essay offers a re-assessment of William James’s methodological approach to religion and his theory of religion. It argues that, despite certain shortcomings, James’s views on these matters are both more complex and more credible than many of his critics allow. It also aims to shed new light on some neglected or poorly understood features of his views on religion.

This paper situates Husserl’s phenomenology and Carnap’s logical empiricism within a common project—the pursuit of structural objectivity. The rise of empirical psychology and physiology in the late nineteenth century contributed to a view of the self that both thinkers find threatening to the possibility of communication and thus knowledge. With subjectivity presenting the danger of incommunicability, objectivity becomes oriented around communicability. To overcome this threat and to secure an understanding of the possibility of knowledge, each thinker appeals to the formal structures of constitution and logical grammar. In doing so, they help to establish a view of objectivity that responds to contemporary science and is consistent with it. This places Husserl much closer to the birth of modern scientific objectivity than he seems to have realized. Even so, whatever credibility he may have lost in the eyes of historiographers of science should be regained in his stature as philosopher of science.

This paper considers recent arguments from Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor that argue that even secular societies ought to tolerate religion for its practical benefits. Then, taking inspiration from Thomas Aquinas, I critique their positions as misconstruing the nature of religion in two fundamental ways. First, we must distinguish generic religion as a natural virtue from diverse species of faith that go beyond the duty to render homage to the First Cause. It will be seen that, generically, religion is integral to the common good inasmuch as it is essential to the perfection of the intellect’s search for truth. Second, from this it follows that religion ought not be justified in utilitarian terms of extrinsic benefit; rather, the good of religion is the intrinsic realization of the activity itself. In light of these correctives, I conclude that even secular societies ought to encourage religious belief, while remaining open to a variety of faiths.

The early work of Alasdair MacIntyre aims to provide resources to “fragmented” modern selves for adjudicating “incommensurable” claims of rival moral traditions and for committing to one with full allegiance. But MacIntyre seems to undermine rational choice through his thesis of Rational Particularism, namely, that there is no tradition-independent, universally acceptable rational standpoint from which to evaluate competing claims of rival traditions. In this paper I combat a prevalent argument that his Particularism thesis (and his exclusion of the moral relativist) render the choice of tradition allegiance by fragmented selves wholly arbitrary, hence committing MacIntyre to relativism about practical rationality and moral theory. This argument founders on a false analogy between the self-avowed relativist and MacIntyre’s target reader. Thus, MacIntyre can retain strong particularism without yielding to relativism. I also show how MacIntyre can consistently offer rational, historical, imaginative, and personal narrative resources to fragmented selves who seek a coherent moral tradition.

In this article I explore Bernard Lonergan’s characteristic view that there is an isomorphism between intellect and reality such that the set of relations embedded in the cognitional process (experience–understanding–judgment) are replicated by the elements of metaphysics (potency–form–act). My exploration is with a view to the Gilsonian objection to the critical realist project as a whole, to the effect that one cannot begin with idealism and end with realism. In this article I argue that, despite my broad sympathy for Lonergan’s epistemological thought, his notion of isomorphism between intellect and reality distances him somewhat from Thomistic metaphysics.