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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Michael K. Shim
Leibniz on Concept and Substance
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A historically persistent way of reading Leibniz regards him as some kind of conceptualist. According to this interpretation, Leibniz was either an ontological conceptualist or an epistemological conceptualist. As an ontological conceptualist, Leibniz is taken to hold the view that there exist only concepts. As an epistemological conceptualist, he is seen as believing that we think only with concepts. I argue against both conceptualist renditions. I confront the ontological conceptualist view with Leibniz’s metaphysics of creation. If the ontological conceptualist interpretation were right, then Leibniz could not invoke compossibility as a criterion of creation. But since he does invoke compossibility as a criterion of creation, the ontological conceptualist approach cannot be right. I confront the epistemological conceptualist interpretation with Leibniz’s assertion of non-conceptual content. Since Leibniz acknowledges non-conceptual content at least when it comes to metaphysical knowledge, Leibniz could not have been an epistemological conceptualist either. So, Leibniz could not have been a conceptualist at all.
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Scott F. Aikin
Modest Evidentialism
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Evidentialism is the view that subjects should believe neither more than nor contrary to what their current evidence supports. I will critically present two arguments for the view. A common source of resistance to evidentialism is that there are intuitive cases where subjects should believe contrary to their evidence. I will present modest evidentialism as the view that subjects should believe in accord with what their evidence supports, but that this norm may be overridden under certain conditions. As such, a modest evidentialismaccommodates the intuitions behind a good deal of traditional anti-evidentialism.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Gary Atkinson
Potential Being and the Source of Cosmic Order
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This paper argues (a) that the concept of “potential being” is central to the theory and practice of contemporary cosmology and evolutionary science, and (b) that the reality of potential being points to the existence of an intelligent and purposive cause of the intelligible order among potential beings that existed from the first moments of the Big Bang. The paper introduces and explains the concept of “potential being” and then traces the existence of potential beings back to the beginnings of the cosmos at the instant of the Big Bang. This primeval existence of potential beings is shown to possess a character and order that points to a cause external to that order. The paper concludes with a consideration of the features that must be possessed by that external cause in order to make sense of what we know.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Michael Rohlf
Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism
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25.
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Fergus Kerr
The Big Typescript TS 213:
German-English Scholars’ Edition
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26.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Jeanine M. Grenberg
Kant and the Empiricists:
Understanding Understanding
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27.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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G. R. Evans
Medieval Education
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28.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Cathay Liu, Alan Nelson
Descartes Reinvented
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29.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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W. Matthews Grant
Scholastic Meditations:
Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy Series, Vol. 44
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30.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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H. E. Baber
Reflections on Meaning
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31.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Michael F. Wagner
Troubling Play:
Meaning and Entity in Plato’s Parmenides
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32.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Howard Robinson
The Primacy of the Subjective:
Foundations of a Unified Theory of Mind and Language
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33.
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Bruce Ellis Benson
Continental Philosophy:
A Contemporary Introduction
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34.
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Gregory T. Doolan
Philosophy, God and Motion
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35.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
The Chronicles of Narnia and Philosophy
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36.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Brendan Palla
Notices
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37.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Books Received
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38.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Issue: 2
Presenting Our Authors
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39.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Issue: 2
Michael Gorman
Independence and Substance
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The paper takes up a traditional view that has also been a part of some recent analytic metaphysics, namely, the view that substance is to be understood in terms of independence. Taking as my point of departure some recent remarks by Kit Fine, I propose reviving the Aristotelian-scholastic idea that the sense in which substances are independent is that they are non-inherent, and I do so by developing a broad notion of inherence that is more usable in the context of contemporary analytic metaphysics than the traditional notion is. I end by showing how non-inherence, while necessary for being a substance, cannot be taken as sufficient without some qualifying remarks.
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John R. Fortin
The Naming of Father and Son in Saint Anselm’s Monologion 38–42
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For Saint Anselm, the mystery of the Holy Trinity was not merely an object of intellectual speculation but, more importantly, the object of praise and worship. Even though he claims that there is nothing in his treatise that violates the teachings of the Fathers, especially that of Augustine, Anselm explores in Monologion the doctrine of the Trinity in his own unique style. One very interesting discussion that does not appear in Augustine’s De Trinitate or in any of the Augustinian corpus is found in chapter 42, in which Anselm argues for the propriety of naming the Supreme Spirit “Father” and His Word “Son.” This paper examines this chapter, first, in the context of the four immediately preceding chapters and, second, in the context of those writings of Augustine that might have influenced Anselm in his presentation. The paper then offers reasons why Anselm included this unique chapter in his discussion on the Trinity.
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