This paper challenges the standard view that Kant ignored the role of prudence in moral life by arguing that there are two notions of prudence at work in his moral and political thought. First, prudence is ordinarily understood as a technical imperative of skill that consists in reasoning about the means to achieve a particular conditional end. Second, prudence functions as a secondary form of practical thought that plays a significant role in the development of applied moral and political judgment. The political judgment of citizens and politicians is prudence regulatively guided by right and virtue. As informed by regulative ideas, prudential judgment negotiates the demands of these ideas in relation to the cultural, political, and social realities of a particular form of life. This sense of prudence is empirically informed and involves a context-sensitive application of morality as well as conceptions of individual and general welfare.

Leibniz’s philosophy of time stands at the center not only of his metaphysics but also of his overall philosophy. For this reason, it has attracted the interest of Leibniz scholars and of philosophers of science alike. This concern notwithstanding, scant attention has been paid to what Leibniz himself takes to be a principal philosophical and theological issue in his philosophy of time: the world’s eternity. This article aims to redress this imbalance by ascertaining Leibniz’s views on the beginning, or beginninglessness, of the world. Situating Leibniz’s views against the backdrop of ancient and medieval philosophy, I argue that he rejects traditional arguments seeking to prove the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress. At the same time, Leibniz equally eschews efforts to show that the world cannot have a beginning. Thus, Leibniz denies that the extent of the world’s duration can be decided on purely philosophical grounds.

Three contemporary acts—corporate theft, sexual abuse of minors, and abortion—when done by generally moral people whose consciences at times seems to be inoperative, all share the same dynamic of harming an innocent person entrusted to them. Drawingupon philosophical anthropology, I argue that these acts reveal a mislocation of conscience in the emotions, imagination, memory, theoretical intellect, or will as defended by Hume, James, Freud, Kant, Nietzsche, or Hegel. In this article Aquinas and certain contemporary Catholic philosophers engage these erroneous views about conscience. They defend the position that conscience is found in a person’s exercise of the practical intellect as integrated with, but not supplanted by, these other operations. Throughout the analysis Christine Gudorf’s existential reflection on the relation of her conscience to abortion is analyzed. I argue that many generallymoral people today have in one area either disengaged, locked tight, or transferred their conscience by what Robert Lifton calls “The Faustian Bargain of Doubling.”

Contemporary materialist theories purporting to account for experience are seriously flawed, for they fail to accommodate the full range of human experience, especially paranormal experience. Substance Dualism (SD) is re-examined in light of this experience,including telepathy and clairvoyance, mediumship, the near-death experience, and reincarnation cases involving children’s memories. A different kind of materialism postulating degrees of fi neness and vibration—one prefigured by the ancient Stoics and developed hereunder the heading Transcendental Materialism (TM)—is also explored. The inadequacies of both reductive and non-reductive materialism are shown. McGinn, Chalmers, and Searle are given special attention.

According to Thomas Aquinas, the ideas in the mind of God serve two distinct although interrelated roles: (1) as epistemological principles accounting for God’s knowledge of things other than himself, and (2) as ontological or causal principles involved in God’s creative activity. This article examines the causal role of the divine ideas by focusing on their relation to natural agents. Given Thomas’s observation that from God’s intellect “forms flow forth (effluunt) into all creatures,” the article considers whether the causality of the divine ideas excludes that of natural agents, or whether both modes of causality can somehow produce one and the same effect.

With the advent of new technology and imaging techniques that measure brain activity and with the development of the computer as a model for human thinking, it is not surprising to find many authors currently addressing issues regarding brain function and themind/body problem. What is perhaps surprising, given the absence of these techniques at the time, is that Merleau-Ponty addresses these same issues with a rigor and insight that equals, and perhaps even exceeds, most current philosophical studies. Merleau-Ponty’s frequently ignored early work, The Structure of Behavior, contains a wealth of analysis still relevant to current biological and neurophysiological studies and to the philosophical consequences frequently drawn from them. Merleau-Ponty critically addresses not only theories that attempt to understand human behavior as the linear calculation of discrete physiological events but also theories that would explain human behavior simply by appealing to abstract conceptual analysis. His theory of emergent materialism focuses on the human body as a concrete organic whole that can be reduced neither to linear physical events nor to abstract conceptual relations. Understanding the human being requires a theory that recognizes the human body as an original whole, that is, that recognizes a body that intimately integrates mind and matter. It is this theory that Merleau-Ponty first articulates in The Structure of Behavior. It is the main themes of this theory that I will attempt to reveal here.