This article shows that Hegel was a pioneer in the rediscovery of Neoplatonism, and that this rediscovery was an important influence on his thought. The importance of Neoplatonism in the early period of Hegel’s thought is addressed, when the Neoplatonic influence is apparent in themes such as the absolute as an original unity, the oppositions produced by the reflective thought, love as synthesis of the finite and the infinite, the importance of the first two hypotheses of Plato’s Parmenides, the concept of a “trinitarian” process of separation and return from the finite into the absolute, and the need of a via negationis for the thought of the absolute. The interpretations of Plotinus and Proclus in Hegel’s Lessons on the History of Philosophy are thereupon studied. Proclus is understood as the culmination of ancient philosophy, as he both anticipates and influences Hegel on issues such as the relationship between the negative-rational and the positive-rational or speculative moment of the Hegelian method, the categories as an expression of the absolute or the nous as a third moment that develops the determinations of the absolute and prepares the return to it. Finally, Hegel emphasizes that other main philosophical elements for the understanding of Modernity, which were inaccessible to Neoplatonism, are a contribution of Christianism.

Henri Bergson’s statements on Plotinus are an interesting case-study for his readers, contrasting between an avowed sympathy (in the Courses at the Collège de France) and an almost absence of references (in his writings). While Bergson-the-professor is interested in the study of Plotinus’ work for its own sake, Bergson-the-philosopher identifies the Neoplatonist with the matrix of an entire metaphysical body of knowledge: the Ancient Greek philosophy. The article seeks to highlight the articulation between the professor and the philosopher, exploring the scope of Plotinian influences in the construction and consolidation (albeit implicit) of Bergson’s thought - whether by adherence or demarcation -, focusing on three essential concepts: soul, sympathy, and causality.

In Heidegger’s extensive work, the presence of mentions and analyzes dedicated to recognizably Neoplatonic authors is minimal. It is proposed, then, to investigate the reception of Neoplatonism by Heidegger from a metaphysical perspective, confronting a part of Neoplatonism - medieval Christian - to the criticism carried out by Heidegger about the history of metaphysics, characterized by the forgetfulness of being and by its onto-theological constitution, taking as a hypothesis that it is possible to discern a certain primacy of a negativity in Neoplatonic metaphysics that allows evading Heidegger’s critique. As the world, god and the human being are thought of from a perspective that goes beyond traditional ontology and theology, based on a notion of thought and language, it is expected to highlight the proximity between Neoplatonic and Heideggerian metaphysics. From this hypothesis, an attempt is made to present the thoughts of three significant representatives of medieval and Christian Neoplatonism, namely, John Scottus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa.

The Neoplatonic reference nuclearly condenses a historically consolidated proposal for the intelligibility of Philosophy. Characterizing the philosophical meaning inherent in the original formation of Neoplatonism, Pierre Hadot develops a perspective according to which Philosophy is equivalent to the existential configuration of texts produced in classical antiquity. In the present study, there are three moments of reflection: 1. the relationship of mutual determination between philosophy and philosophical discourse; 2. Neoplatonism as an articulation and proclamation of the “age of the text”, (exegesis), being formed according to a “textual” teaching method; 3. The fundamental concepts of Neoplatonism, which emphasizes and notes the Porphyry perspective between being as «infinitive» and being as «participle», becoming a historical moment that clearly operates the distinction between being and entity, it is, being as “subject first” and being “without subject”.

The paper advances two hypotheses concerning Thomas Reid’s reading of George Berkeley’s immaterialist system. First, it is argued that, on Reid’s view, Berkeley is skeptic about the existence of the objects of the material world, not in virtue of a doubt about the senses but for his adoption of the principle that ideas are the immediate objects of the operations of mind. On Reid’s view, that principle is a skeptical principle by its own nature. Secondly, it is argued that Berkeley really accepts in his system the notion of ‘idea’ such as Reid understands it, namely, as an entity distinct from mind and its operations.

This article focuses on Kant’s central belief that an individual’s humanity, her rational personhood, ought never be treated merely as a means. I focus on two paradigmatic cases of such treatment, for Kant, namely suicide and prostitution. In the case of suicide, the individual treats his own humanity merely as a means in completely eliminating it to escape from his miserable life. The case of prostitution is more complicated. It is not obvious how the prostitute’s rational personhood is compromised. An analysis of Kant’s views on prostitution and sexuality enables us to understand Kant’s concern that the prostitute is treated merely as a means. However, his more extreme position that the prostitute is reduced to the status of a thing for use is not supported by arguments. A woman’s use (or, rather, misuse) as a mere means, I explain, is insufficient to define her status as an object.

O presente trabalho se debruça sobre a noção de crítica em filosofia, tendo por base alguns dos modelos chave erigidos pela chamada “Escola de Frankfurt”, a saber, o texto fundador de Max Horkheimer, “Teoria tradicional e teoria crítica”, e uma perspectiva contemporânea de sua terceira geração, com a concepção de Axel Honneth sobre o reconhecimento hegeliano, bem como seu comentário acerca de tal tradição. Além das descrições das referidas concepções, aposta-se na ideia de crítica como uma historicidade aberta, engendrada por uma dialética entre continuidade e ruptura, cuja norma exige o exame imanente caso a caso. Para tanto, mobilizam-se os conceitos modais de Hegel – necessidade, possibilidade, efetividade – guiados pela contingência, ao lado de uma noção de determinação presente.

The second part of the 20th century has been dominated by a nominalist, anti-realistic and post-metaphysical trend, focused on the performativity of languages, texts, discourses, power structures, economic relationships, etc., and involved in any kind of sociolinguistic, hermeneutical, structural and deconstructive analysis. By contrast, the first part of the 21st century seems to emerge from the exhaustion of that nominalist paradigm, and the drive of a new realistic impulse defined by the irreducibility of the real to mere cultural discourses or power’s relationships. In this new speculative context, several materialisms and realisms spread out their strands, with the certainty of grasping the real in and by the real itself. The following lines aim at looking over the main authors and ideas of the newest philosophical stream.

It is argued that some of Beauvoir’s short, journalistic pieces shed new light on her overall philosophical positions. Special analysis is made of “Existentialism and Popular Wisdom”, with its advertence to our standard take on human affairs. Part of the argument is that Beauvoir expands on notions taken from the common culture, and that she does so in a way that sheds new light on existentialist concepts. Taking into consideration the extent of her work with Sartre, we can assume that Beauvoir is making powerful statements with her analysis. It is also important to note that this work represents a level of publication intended for the average French reader, and that much of her writing in this vein has received very little comment.