Traditionally it has been presumed that the knowledge of God’s triune nature could be derived only from positive Biblical revelation. However, the Second Vatican Council’s teaching on the universal possibility of true salvific faith implies that supernatural revelation also occurs outside Christianity. Karl Rahner’s explanation of the meaning of the Trinity as “concrete monotheism” raises the possibility of an implicit knowledge of God’s self-revelation as “Word” and “Spirit” in the experience of grace and its formulation in the categories of the other world religions.

This essay suggests the possible form of an orthodox historicism. The essay begins by examining the historicism of Heidegger and Gadamer. It then proposes how a theology might appear which places the faith in conversation with this historicism.

This paper highlights Max Scheler’s contribution to developing a ‘phenomenological’ account of religious transcendence in a way which remains unique among other proponents of that tradition of continental thought. It is argued that even in formulating his own concept of ‘world-openness’ (as precursory to Hussurl’s and Heidegger’s view of the self’s ‘worldliness’) Scheler continues to foster a vision of the human person’s eternality and kinship with the Divine.

This paper examines the phenomena of falling in love and of love using Baudelaire’s poem, “Which is the Real One,” as impetus. The author asks why love is often focused toward an individual and why an individual often makes such a monumental difference when love should be a more universal experience. The focus of the Romantic poets on the individual is criticized, and Taoist and anti-romantic conceptions of love are considered.

I provide a narrative analysis of the Apostles’ Creed as a suggested alternative to the traditional referential reading. The focus of temporal intentionality offers an analysis of the Creed which is radically dirferent from the apocalypticism of the traditional interpretations.

The principal object of Ihis essay is to elucidate some of the story of how a theory that was so entrenched in the minds of intellectuals, namely, natural rights theory, fell so out of favor. This is the story of how the terror, fear, and destruction that became part of the French Revolution was laid at the feet of natural rights theory by three powerful figures: Burke, Bentham, and Hegel. It was these three figures, more than any others, who were responsible for the demise of natural rights theory in the nineteenth century; and their respective criticisms of natural rights theory were made under the omnipresent shadow of, and in response to, the French Revolulion.

Classical Iiberalism has at least two distinct strains. Its natural rights version requires extensive use of moral concepts. Some denigrate this tradition on grounds that it has been made obsolete by empiricist epistemology and materialist metaphysics. Since that tradition requires knowledge of moral truth and since empiricism precludes this, the tradition is hopeless. Since it also requires a teleological explanation of human action, and since mechanism precludes this, the hopelessness of the tradition is compounded. I argue that neither the empiricist nor the mechanistic view may be taken for granted - indeed, if anything, they are obsolete, and the road is open to a philosophy which makes the natural rights tradition even more credible than it was when developed by John Locke.

The tension ia liberal political theory between religious commitment and poIitical citizenship is examined first within the framework or Rousseau’s political theory, and secondly within the context of Hegel’s account of the stale. I conclude with some reflections upon the tension as it occurs among contemporary political theorists.

This paper is a contribution toward the clarification of the meaning and evolution of liberalism. Liberal values are distinguished from liberal social philosophy. Liberal values, specifically individuality, government by consent of the governed, and private property in a capitalist economy are modern despite their clear classical and medieval origins. Liberal social philosophy consists of ontological realism, epistemological individualism, and axiological teleology. Liberal social philosophy is classical, and it reflects an attempt to rationalize modern values with a classical philosophy. I argue that liberal social philosophy is seriously flawed, and when it is modified for modern contexts it is inimical to liberal values. Liberal values are better understood and more defensible, as well as more compatible with nonliberal values, when divorced from liberal social philosophy.

Theorists increasingly tum to autonomy (rather than liberty per se) as a grounding value for liberalism. This is, I argue, an iII-advised strategy. If autonomy is understood to differ from (negative) liberty insofar as it demands from agents significantly greater feats of self-determination, then it is not clear that autonomy is worth having. And, irrespective of whether autonomy is judged to be valuable, autonomy-based liberalisms eilher prescribe essentially the same constraints as classical liberalism - and thus are poIitically innocuous - or else require that the stale act non-neutrally with respect to its citizens - and thus are illiberal.

The paper seeks to establish a kinship between the philosophy of Levinas and the theology of liberation. In their separate domains, these two enterprises reveal to us a portrait of late, twentieth-century intellectual work which refuses to abandon eschatological urgency. Philosophy and theology may meet, outside of both of their own homes, on a journey toward the other, in ethics.

Emmanuel Levinas argued for the priority of the ethical - over the theoretical-Other, vis à vis the prevailing modern, ideatistic philosophies of totality. This essay argues that too facile a turn from epistemology to ethics, however, risks eviscerating the very role that theory - as “critical” - plays in the sustenance of the valuation of the Other. An altemative understanding of theory, the essay proposes, hinges on the negative dialectics of Adorno.

The subject is under siege. In many disciplines the self that modem thought established and fortified has fallen to critique. But while many explore the implications for epistemology, for literary theory, for psychology, or for history and social thought, few writers have pondered the question in terms of ethics. After all, ethics must rest on a subject, a person who makes choices and decides for various reasons to commit acts in one’s own name. l suggest that ethics can survive the fracturing, de-centering, deconstructing of the self? A selection of passages from Marcel and Levinas is offered, with commentary.

I aim here to confront texts of Levinas and Sartre in an attempt to rethink the relation of the poIitical to the ethical in the early eighties in France. The method is essentially to try to think a passage from one domain into the other without privileging poIitics over ethics or vice versa while uncovering their organic and dialectical interaction, a subject that an only be touched upon via the bridging metaphor of a Visage that can liberate oneself from the totalization of egoity. My purpose, thus, is not to confront Levinas and Sartre but to allow them to embark on a dialogue constructed around the paradigm of the question of the Other.

I argue that Spinoza’s ethical theory may be viewed as a transformation of Aristotle’s teleological account which has been corrected of several fundamental flaws which Spinoza found in Aristotle. The result of Spinoza’s redefinition of ethical activity is a developmental account of ethics which has close kinship with the views of process theoreticians.

Are the divine attributes intrinsic or relational properties of God? That is, can we ascribe the attributes to God, without relation to the things which God produces;or can we ascribe them to God only in relation to those things? In discussing the various aspects of this very old question, I argue that both views find strong support in the Ethics and other works. Spinoza’s “pantheism” removes the apparent contradiction between the two conceptions.