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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume 77
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41.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Samuel C. Rickless
Is Locke’s Theory of Knowledge Inconsistent?
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42.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Laura Schroeter
Why Be an Anti-Individualist?
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Anti-individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject’s environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that anti-individualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology. Our commitment to anti-individualism, I argue, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent’s commitment to refining her own representational practices in the light of new and surprising information about her environment. Since anti-individualism is an implicit part of responsible epistemic practices, we cannot abandon it without compromising our own epistemic agency. The story I tell about the regulation of one’s own representational practices yields a new account of the identity conditions for anti-individualistic concepts.
discussion
43.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael McKenna
A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument
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44.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Derk Pereboom
A Hard-line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument
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45.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael Strevens
Comments on Woodward, Making Things Happen
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46.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jim Woodward
Response to Strevens
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book symposium
47.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Richard Joyce
Preçis of The Evolution of Morality
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48.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jesse Prinz
Acquired Moral Truths
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49.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Stephen Stich
Some Questions About The Evolution ofMorality
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50.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Peter Carruthers, Scott M. James
Evolution and the Possibility of Moral Realism
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51.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Richard Joyce
Replies
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review essay
52.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Richard Schantz
Review Essay on Sami Pihlström’s Solipsism: History, Critique, and Relevance
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critical notices
53.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jonathan Kvanvig
Epistemic Luck
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54.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Robert Pippin
The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche On Overcoming Nihilism
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55.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Tomoji Shogenji
Against Coherence
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contents
56.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Recent Publications
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