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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Ram Neta Contextualism and the Problem of the External World
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A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support the claim that we lack evidence for our beliefs about the external world. These considerations do not threaten the truth of our ordinary attributions of evidence, however, for such attributions are context-sensitive in their semantics.It is argued that this solution to the problem of the external world enjoys all of the benefits, and suffers none of the problems, of other solutions to the problem of the external world.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
James Lenman Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism
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Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntacticist, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I here address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntacticist must either adopt a more modest version of his theory, friendlier to Expressivism, or substantially modify it, abandoning one of its central conditions on truth-aptness. One natural and promising such modification, the Pure Discipline View, is described and its implications for an understanding of Expressivism briefly discussed.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Catherine Legg “This is Simply What I Do”
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Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called “the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date”. But does it? This paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirce’s distinctive scientific hierarchy. Peirce identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this context, pertains to general predication.Rule-following scepticism, the paper suggests, results from running together two questions: “How is it that I can project rules?”, and, “What is it for a given usage of a rule to be right?”. In Peircean terms the former question, concerning the irreducibility of general predication (to singular reference), must be answered in phenomenology, while the latter, concerning the difference between true and false predication, is answered in logic. A failure to appreciate this distinction, it is argued, has led philosophers to focus exclusively on Wittgenstein’s famous public account of rule-following rightness, thus overlooking a private, phenomenological dimension to Wittgenstein’s remarks on following a rule which gives the lie to Kripke’s reading of him as a sceptic.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Judith Jarvis Thomson Causation: Omissions
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5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Linda Zagzebski Emotion and Moral Judgment
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This paper argues that an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its intentional object as falling under a “thick affective concept” A, a concept that combines cognitive and affective aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart. For example, in a state of pity an object is seen as pitiful, where to see something as pitiful is to be in a state that is both cognitive and affective. One way of expressing an emotion is to assert that the intentional object of the emotion falls under the thick affective concept distinctive of the emotion. I argue that the most basic kind of moral judgment is in this category. It has the form “That is A” (pitiful, contemptible, rude, etc.). Such judgments combine the features of cognitivism and motivational judgment internalism, an advantage that explains why we find moral weakness problematic in spite of its ubiquity. I then outline a process I call “thinning” the judgment, which explains how moral strength, weakness, and apathy arise. I argue that this process is necessary for moral reasoning and communication, in spite of its disadvantage in disengaging the agent’s motivating emotion from the judgment.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Jonathan Schaffer The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster?
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Properties come in clusters. It seems impossible, for instance, that a mass could float free, unattached to any other property. David Armstrong takes this as a reductio of the bundle theory and an argument for substrata. while Peter Simons and Arda Denkel reply by supplementing the bundle theory with accounts of property interdependencies. I argue against both views. Virtually all plausible ontologies tum out to be committed to the existence of free masses. I develop and defend the view that the clustering of properties is a mere contingent truth, on grounds that properties can be subtracted one-by-one. This opens the door not just to the (unsupplemented) bundle theory, but also to any plausible account of the relation between objects and properties.
discussions
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Theodore Sider Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience
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A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical supervenience by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that consciousness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic.
8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Trenton Merricks Maximality and Consciousness
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book symposium:
9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
T. M. Scanlon Précis of What We Owe to Each Other
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
David Gauthier Are We Moral Debtors?
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Allan Gibbard Reasons to Reject Allowing
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
T. M. Scanlon Reply to Gauthier and Gibbard
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13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
James Van Cleve Précis of Problems from Kant
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Karl Ameriks Problems from Van Cleve’s Kant: Experience and Objects
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Rolf George Van Cleve and Kant’s Analogies
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Rae Langton Problems from Kant by James Van Cleve
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17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
James Van Cleve Replies
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review essay
18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
John Bishop Prospects for a Naturalist Libertarianism: O’Connor’s Persons and Causes
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critical notices
19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Anjan Chakravartty The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science
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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 66 > Issue: 1
Scott Austin Plato’s Reception of Parmenides
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