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1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Daniel M. Haybron Happiness and Pleasure
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This paper argues against hedonistic theories of happiness. First, hedonism is too inclusive: many pleasures cannot plausibly be construed as constitutive of happiness. Second, any credible theory must count either attitudes of life satisfaction, affective states such as mood, or both as constituents of happiness; yet neither sort of state reduces to pleasure. Hedonism errs in its attempt to reduce happiness, which is at least partly dispositional, to purely episodic experiential states. The dispositionality of happiness also undermines weakened nonreductive forms of hedonism, as some happiness-constitutive states are not pleasures in any sense. Moreover, these states can apparently fail to exhibit the usual hedonic properties; sadness, for instance, can sometimes be pleasant. Finally, the nonhedonistic accounts are adequate if not superior on grounds of practical and theoretical utility, quite apart from their superior conformity to the folk notion of happiness.
2. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Pamela Hieronymi Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness
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I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness (proposed by David Novitz in the June 1998 issue of this journal) which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge---but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the end, I sketch an alternative account of forgiveness, one that I think meets the challenge and avoids the missteps.
3. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Donald C. Ainslie Hume’s Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind
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The article presents a new interpretation of Hume’s treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Hume’s project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. The belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the “vulgar” who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think of their perceptions. The author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the “Appendix.” He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the “Appendix” must meet.
4. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
John Gibbons Knowledge in Action
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This paper argues that the role of knowledge in the explanation and production of intentional action is as indispensable as the roles of belief and desire. If we are interested in explaining intentional actions rather than intentions or attempts, we need to make reference to more than the agent’s beliefs and desires. It is easy to see how the truth of your beliefs, or perhaps, facts about a setting will be involved in the explanation of an action. If you believe you can stop your car by pressing a pedal, then, if your belief is true, you will stop. If it is false, you will not. By considering cases of unintentional actions, actions involving luck and cases of deviant causal chains, I show why knowledge is required. By looking at the notion of causal relevance, I argue that the connection between knowledge and action is causal and not merely conceptual.
discussions
5. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Sean D. Kelly The Non-conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain
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I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke’s claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the “fine-grainedness” of perceptual content -- a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on to describe two other features of perceptual experience that are more likely to be relevant to the claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual. These features are 1) the dependence of a perceived object on the perceptual context in which it is perceived and 2) the dependence of a perceived property on the object it is perceived to be a property of.
6. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Christopher Peacocke Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content
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This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, between content which is objective and content which is also conceived of by its subject as objective.
book symposium:
7. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Frank Jackson Précis of From Metaphysics to Ethics
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8. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Timothy Williamson Ethics, Supervenience and Ramsey Sentences
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9. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Robert Stalnaker Metaphysics Without Conceptual Analysis
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10. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Stephen Stich, Jonathan M. Weinberg Jackson’s Empirical Assumptions
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11. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Katalin Balog Commentary on Frank Jackson’s From Metaphysics to Ethics
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12. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Frank Jackson Responses
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goodman memorial symposium
13. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Israel Scheffler My Quarrels with Nelson Goodman
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14. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Catherine Z. Elgin The Legacy of Nelson Goodman
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15. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Geoffrey Hellman On Nominalism
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16. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Robert Schwartz Vision and Cognition in Picture Perception
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critical notices
17. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Mark Van Roojen Three Methods of Ethics
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18. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Thomas Hofweber A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics
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19. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
John Koethe Wittgenstein’s Thought in Transition
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20. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 62 > Issue: 3
Edward Erwin Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience
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