This is a 1,039-item updating and extension of Henri Bergson: A Bibliography, published by the Philosophy Documentation Center in 1974. While it concentrates on bibliographic items that have appeared in the 1970s, this bibliography contains items both by and about Bergson which were published prior to the 1970s. The present work is admittedly incomplete; but it attempts a more complete annotation than was available in the 1974 bibliography.

This paper examines problems and inconsistencies in the Plotinian conception of evil. A review of all the pertinent passages in the Enneads concludes that evil is non-existent in the metaphysical realm and that the absolute evil of the moral realm is subservient to a universal order and functions to produce a harmony in accord with the intellectual realm (Nous) of which it is but an image. [Most of the difficulties are seen as eliminated by adopting an interpretive view of evil as the result of the soul’s misdirected orientation toward its own completeness in matter.]

Ten chapters of Locke's 1685 draft are given here, with an introduction, an index of correlating passages in the Essay and the draft, and an interpretive essay, "Locke on Active Power and the Idea of Active Power from Bodies." The passages discuss various aspects of Locke's views on power and causation, including his distinction between active and passive powers, the relation between active power and minds, passive power and bodies, the origin of the idea of power, the definition of qualities as powers, the distinction between actual and potential qualities, our ignorance of the causal basis of properties, and the nature of the causal relation between inner constitutions and sensible qualities of bodies.

William James's essay, "The Will to Believe," is interpreted as a philosophical argument for two conclusions: (l) Some over-beliefs—i.e., beliefs going beyond the available evidence—are rationally justified under certain conditions; and (2) "The Religious Hypothesis" is justified for some people under these conditions. Section I defends viewing James as presenting arguments, Sections II-III try to formulate the dual conclusions more precisely, and Section IT defends this reading against alternative interpretations. Section 7, the heart of the paper, elaborates five logically distinct arguments (or approaches) implicit in "The Will to Believe" with regard to non-evidential justification. Section VI examines "The Religious Hypothesis," and Section VII concludes by noting that while James's particular arguments are largely unsuccessful nevertheless the project of finding non- evidential or "practical" rational warrants for religious over-beliefs seems promising. Two appendices supplement the body of the text. The first considers some formal aspects of the so-called "ethics of belief" in order to clarify James's desired conclusions) in "The Will to Believe," and the second shows that and how James's own "technical distinctions" are both obscure and largely irrelevant to his central task.

The ordinary justification for my not doubting that the next bread I eat will nourish me as in the past is that we humans do not bother ourselves with doubts except where life actually prompts a doubt. Hume, however, represents this not-doubting as an inference we repeatedly draw, and not a very strong one since it concludes to a future-tense judgement from past-tense premisses. Thus Hume creates the impression that the commonest ways of leaning on past experience as a guide involve a woefully weak type of inference, and this paper challenges that impression.

The aim of this bibliography is to present a comprehensive list on the concept of promises. Its main focus is the ethical discussions of promises. It includes also some of the essential legal reference works and literature on promises and contracts, the linguistic materials on speech-acts and performatives (for example, the so-called performative analysis of John Ross) that have a bearing on the concept of promises, and some of the philosophical literature on the related topics of social contract, consent, and obligation. Readers are invited to submit to the author any omissions.

This essay examines Kant's relationship to the Stoics with respect to the affective dimension of the moral life. Besides offering a general description and comparison of the two philosophies in this particular regard, it utilizes numerous specific Kantian references to and parallels with Stoicism to argue that his own position was, throughout its development, shaped by a growing contact with and appreciation of the Stoic view. The paper proceeds from some negative remarks of Kant about suppressing or even eliminating the emotions and inclinations found mainly in the Grundlegung and the second Critique, and then goes on to show how Kant was able to draw upon a number of Stoic distinctions and concepts, such as that between the affects and the passions, in order to mitigate these negative and exclusivistic attitudes and to reincorporate the affective components of the personality into his conception of a fully human moral life. Moreover, because of the numerous subtopics explored in making the main case for the Kant-Stoa link, the essay also accomplishes its subsidiary purpose of showing the importance of the sometimes overlooked emotional factor or dimension of Kant's ethics as such.