This article explores and critically examines the concepts and value dimensions of God, process, creativity, eternal objects, and individuals in Whitehead's thought

This article addresses both philosophers of science and process philosophers. It shows that the acceptance of Einstein's general theory of relativity by British physicists in the early 1920s, and their rejection of Whitehead's experimentally indistinguishable theory of gravity, was a matter not only of empirical evaluation but also of aesthetic preference. To philosophers of science it offers a historical case study illustrating the entangled roles of empirical and aesthetic criteria in theory evaluation. To process philosophers it offers an answer to the question of why Whitehead's alternative rendering of Einstein's general relativity has been neglected both by the majority of physicists, and by the majority of philosophers.

Ongoing developments in evolutionary and systems biology highlight the deficiencies of reductionistic and mechanistic explanations of the "organic" world (and widen the meaning and application of this term). Whitehead's ontology provides the basis for a unified theory of social organization that connects the emergence of primitive life to the development and diversification of human societies along a continuum of creative ontogeneration. The metaphysical characteristic of "creativity" is precisely the manifestation of the ontogenerative relationship between possibility and actuality. Actualization is change. While all actualization necessarily exhibits some degree of continuity with the past, it is driven by the inertiac availability of specific relevant forms of possibility (etemal objects), through which it has access to an array of "novel" forms for actualization. This relation to novelty explains everything from the emergence ofprokaryotes on earth 3.6 billion years ago to the possibility of ideological resistance in human societies today.

In this article I trace back Whitehead's concept of feeling to its psychological sources. I argue that Whitehead's way of conceiving feeling was made possible by the works of British psychologists-philosophers, most importantly G. F. Stout. The latter's Analytic Psychology, a work of great authority read by Whitehead very early, contains the conceptual resources Whitehead needed to elaborate his concept of feeling as immediate experience, in partial contrast to the similar concept proposed by F. H. Bradley. I suggest that Bradley, Stout, and other prominent representatives of British philosophy-psychology are more relevant to understanding the genesis of Whitehead's ideas than William James and his followers.

A young Canadian mathematician and philosopher, Winthrop Bell, who was Edmund Husserl's first doctoral student from North America, taught as a postdoc at Harvard in the 1920s, where he took a complete set of notes in the first class at Harvard taught by Alfred North Whitehead during the 1924-1925 academic year. These notes, missing for over 80 years, have recently been found. The notes transform scholarship concerning the early development of Whitehead's mature metaphysical views, while the note-taker's own career illuminates a remarkable collaboration between the pragmatists in the U. S. and Canada and the early phenomenology movement in Europe, an intellectual exchange that was shattered during the tumultuous events of World War I and its aftermath.