Instead of understanding property and rationality individualistically as in capitalism, the ecological crisis makes it imperative that we change the priority to the social/collective point of view. Public goods/commonstock should be the default, and private property should have to be justified. Rationality should be understood not primarily from an individual perspective, but from a social/collective point of view. This does not entail the sacrifice of individual rights and freedom to the collective, but rather the synthesis of the two. Planning and freedom coincide if the planning is democratic, which can only happen in a more egalitarian society.

This paper tackles an old, yet persisting philosophical and cultural imaginary that justifies the political subjugation, marginalization and exclusion of distant others through claims that such people are less advanced and cognitively inferior, and therefore remain at the periphery of moral and political considerations of Western political culture. My premise here is that all knowledge is historically conditioned, and as such serves as a discursive formation that mirrors and sustains specific historical forms of social organization and practices. Thus, by considering the interrelated themes of epistemic and social inclusion (and exclusion) of refugees and migrants from a range of critical philosophical perspectives, I argue that successfully managing the dire humanitarian circumstances involved in admitting and receiving displaced and migrant people requires the inclusion of both the bodies of knowledge and discursive interactions (i.e., epistemic inclusion) and also diverse social and cultural perspectives (i.e., social inclusion).

The paper reflects on the methods democratic systems use for arriving at decisions. The most popular ones are elections where the majority rules and deliberative democracy. I argue that both of these do not measure up to the demands of democracy. Whether we use voting with majority rule or deliberative methods, only a portion of the citizenry is allowed to rule itself; minorities are always excluded. Instead of voting with majority ruler or deliberative methods, I suggest that we employ mediation (ADR) to reach agreement in democratic publics.

In this paper I argue that Nancy Fraser’s theory of social reproduction is misleading and that the process of exploitation is more central to women’s oppression than Fraser’s theory suggests. I argue that Fraser’s theory of women’s oppression is continuous with her theory of capitalism and political agency. I critique Fraser’s theory of capitalism at a structural level to clarify some of the ambiguity in her position about the difference between production and reproduction. I then compare Fraser’s view with a structural view of class to make my critique and extend it to her theoretical distinction between status and class.

Socialism from a feminist perspective is not an all or nothing blueprint, but rather a vision of degrees of power/freedom that people in a particular society have in economic, political, social and personal relations. Examples are discussed of societies which are more or less socialist in their class, racial/ethnic, and gender equality, power and freedom. Historical changes in affective economic relations of care, love and affection inform such class, race/ethnic, gender and sexual differences. Three types of transitional strategies are relevant for social movements working toward socialism.