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61.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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John F. Brehany
The Deepest Human Life: An Introduction to Philosophy for Everyone by Scott Samuelson
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62.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Dov Schwartz
Jewish Messianic Thought in an Age of Despair by Kenneth Seeskin
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63.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Jude P. Dougherty
Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism by Larry Siendentop
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64.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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John Safranek
Beyond Versus: The Struggle to Understand the Interaction of Nature and Nurture
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65.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Jean Rioux
Notebooks, English Virtuosi, and Early Modern Science by Richard Yeo
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66.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Jussi Backman
Language after Heidegger by Krzysztof Ziarek
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67.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Reviewer Index
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68.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Abstracts
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69.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Philip T. Grier
In Memoriam:
George L. Kline (1921-2014)
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articles |
70.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Kevin White
Act and Fact: On a Disputed Question in Recent Thomistic Metaphysics
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This article compares and contrasts three claims published in The Review of Metaphysics in recent decades: that there is, according to Aquinas, a difference between “esse as act” and “existence which is the fact of being” (Cornelio Fabro in 1974); that, to the contrary, it is the same “existence” (esse) that is conceptualized both as an “actuality” and as a “fact” (Joseph Owens in 1976); and that there is, indeed, contrary to Owens and as Fabro suggests, a distinction in Aquinas’s writings between “esse as facticity” and “esse as intrinsic actus essendi” (John F. Wippel in 1989). The article attempts to bring the differences between these interpreters on the question into sharp focus.
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71.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Gladden J. Pappin
Directing Philosophy: Aquinas, Studiousness, and Modern Curiosity
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This article examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the origin and limits of the search for knowledge. It situates Aquinas’s treatment of studiousness, the virtue to describe proper habits of intellectual inquiry, within the broader quarrel over the status of human curiosity. Avoiding curiositas is one thing, but how ought one to pursue knowledge? Aquinas partially links the search for knowledge with obligations incumbent on one’s station in life. A difficulty arises, however, in his exhortation not to understand beyond one’s own means, and not to seek out things that should not be known. Studiousness is helpful in describing the virtues necessary to succeed in a prescribed course of study. It does not, however, tell one whether to begin such a study, or whether one has fulfilled one’s quest. In precisely those areas where study would not be curiositas but studiositas offers little advice, the modern defense of curiosity makes its entrance.
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72.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Georgia Warnke
Experiencing Tradition versus Belonging to It: Gadamer’s Dilemma
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73.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Chong-Fuk Lau
Kant’s Transcendental Functionalism
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This paper develops a new functionalist interpretation of Kant that aims to unify his cognitive psychology with transcendental idealism. It argues that Kant’s faculty of cognition describes neither the phenomenal nor the noumenal mind, but a theoretical construct of the transcendental subject, comparable to the abstract Turing machine. This interpretation can be called “transcendental functionalism,” which determines what functions the mind has to realize if it is to be capable of objective cognition. Transcendental functionalism resolves problems associated with other functionalist interpretations of Kant by drawing a systematic distinction between transcendental cognitive functions and their empirical realizations. While transcendental functions stipulate abstract conceptual requirements, their empirical counterparts realize the functional constraints in appearances within the spatiotemporal and causal framework. This distinction also allows a better explanation of why Kant abandoned the subjective deduction of categories in the B-deduction.
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74.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Kevin M. Cahill
Quietism or Description? McDowell in Dispute with Dreyfus
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This paper concerns the widely discussed exchange between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell that took place a few years back. The author first provides a brief sketch of how McDowell’s practice of philosophy for the last twenty or so years is best described as “quietist” in the spirit of the later Wittgenstein. Next, he shows that this exchange with Dreyfus is best understood as carried on largely in this spirit as well, even though McDowell somewhat inexplicably fails to acknowledge this point in the course of the dispute. Finally and most importantly, the author shows how, somewhat ironically, the dispute takes a turn that suggests a remaining tension in McDowell’s own thought about the nature of philosophy. This tension comes out in his unwillingness to relinquish, or at least set aside temporarily, important parts of the traditional philosophical vocabulary that seem to be getting in the way in his dispute with Dreyfus. At the broadest level, the paper concerns difficulties with attempts to overcome the metaphysical tradition, and the role of the tradition’s vocabulary in such attempts, even in a discussion between two skilled philosophers who both have great sympathy for such a project.
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book reviews |
75.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Courtney D. Fugate
Ameriks, Karl. Kant’s Elliptical Path
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76.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Michael J. Dodds, O.P.
Amerini, Fabrizio. Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life. Translated by Mark Henninger
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77.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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David Lay Williams
Balaguer, Mark. Free Will
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78.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Peter Weigel
Buford, Thomas O. Know Thyself: An Essay in Social Personalism
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79.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Matthew Homan
Church, Jennifer. Possibilities of Perception
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80.
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The Review of Metaphysics:
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Eric Chelstrom
Cicovacki, Predrag. The Analysis of Wonder: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann
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