The aim of the article is to present the strategy of rehabilitation of the teleology in the conception of Robert Spaemann, Reinchard Löw and Hans Jonas. That strategy takes into account a few aspects: (1) the analysis of general conception of explanation in which the character of questions activating the process of explanation is taking into consideration, (2) the analysis of the conception of the teleological and causal explanations (according to the Hempel-Oppenheim model), (3) determination of the pragmatic background of the controversies concerning teleology, (4) determination of the domain and aims of teleological and causal interpretations.

Tematem artykułu jest filozofia miłości rozwijana przez dwóch wybitnych fenomenologów wymienionych w tytule: Dietricha von Hildebranda i Karola Wojtyłę. Obydwaj korzystali w swoich badaniach z metody fenomenologicznej; celem artykułu jest pokazanie, że w obydwu wypadkach metoda ta prowadziła do podobnych rezultatów. Autor czyni to w trzech krokach. Po pierwsze, pokazuje, że miłość pojętą w sensie ogólnym obydwaj autorzy rozumieją jako odpowiedź na wartość osoby. W Lubelskiej Szkole Personalizmu zasada miłości została wyrażona w formule: persona est affirmanda propter seipsam, a treścią afirmacji, która jest należna osobie, jest miłość. W kategoriach von Hildebranda zasada ta wyrażona jest w sposób następujący: dobro osoby afirmowane jest poprzez obiektywne dobra dla osoby, które stanowią właściwą treść miłości. Po drugie, obydwaj autorzy wiele uwagi poświęcają tej specyficznej formie miłości, jaką jest miłość małżeńska. Podczas gdy mińość w sensie ogólnym stanowi odpowiedź na wyjątkową wartość osoby w stosunku do świata pozaosobowego, to miłość małżeńska jest odpowiedzią na wyjątkową wartość jednej osoby pośród wszystkich innych osób doświadczaną przez osobę płci przeciwnej. W tym sensie miłość małżeńska jest również specyficzną odpowiedzią na wartość. Po trzecie, doświadczenie miłości małżeńskiej pokazuje, że nie istnieje sprzeczność między wolnością a wzajemną przynależnością, co von Hildebrand wyraził w pojciu intentio unionis.

According to Malebranche only God can cause the interaction between mind and body, two substances having totally different characteristics. Descartes claims that in the cognition we need ideas’ mediation. While we can get to know spiritual ego in a clear manner, we know the material world only in an imperfect way because it is located outside our mind. The originality of Malebranche’s philosophy consists in the fact that he appreciates the cognition of the material world. We mustn’t forget, however, to follow our reason as well as clear and distinct ideas, not blurred sensations. The French philosopher deprives senses and imagination of their cognitive value in favour of intellectual cognition. Information received through our senses serves the body to sustain life. Imagination is in many cases the source of mistakes. It is only pure understanding that gives us the possibility for objective cognition based on eternal and unchangeable archetypes.We cannot get to know God’s immensity nor God’s attributes because of our mental limitations. Still, in the most perfect way we can apprehend ideal extension which constitutes this part of God’s substance that contains clear and distinct ideas of bodies. Archetypes of objects contain all properties of objects. Looking at the created world, we see them in different ways depending if we get to know them only intellectually or receive the movements of nerves’ fibres as well. But we can’t see God by an intermediary of an idea because nothing finite can represent infinity.

The eminent German medievalist, Joseph Koch, assumed that Neoplatonism had been handed down to the Middle Ages basically in two forms: the one given to the Neoplatonist outlook by St. Augustine, the other being the result of the reworking of Neoplatonist themes by Pseudo-Dionysius. Rev. Prof. Kurdziałek, when quoting Koch’s opinion, used to remark, that this bipartite typology was not adequate as it failed to take account of another variety of Neoplatonism that had been operative in the shaping of medieval intellectual culture, namely the Boethian Neoplatonism.Few scholars in Poland in the second half of the 20th century devoted much attention to Boethius’ philosophy; yet contrary to the general trend, Rev. Prof. Kurdziałek constantly discussed issues and themes concerning Boethius in his lectures, monographs and articles. The author of the Consolation of Philosophy was never viewed by him as a mere intermediary or transmitter standing between antiquity and the Middle Ages; rather he presented Boethius as a thinker that was seminal in shaping medieval philosophy up to and inclusive the 12th century and even later on, even though his later influence had not been predominant. This article, based upon the study and analysis of Rev. Prof. Kurdziałek’s output aims to present his contribution to the area of Boethian studies as well as contributions made in this field by his disciples and followers.

Philosophical ideas of David of Dinant were condemned by the Paris synod in 1210, which were confirmed in 1215 by Cardinal Robert Courçon, papal legate. The main reason of this condemnations was the David of Dinant’s materialistic pantheism. In consequence reading and owning the David of Dinant’s works became punishable by excommunication. A French scholar G. Théry partially developed his ideas according to excerptions of his works largely derived from Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and others. A Polish historian Aleksander Birkenmajer found in Ghent (BU 5), Oxford (Bodl. Libr. Digby 67), Paris (BnF lat. 15453) and Wien (ÖNB 4753) libraries the medieval manuscripts containing some fragments of the David of Dinant’s works. Rev. Marian Kurdziaek, a follower of A. Birkenmajer, as the author of the critical edition of David[is] de Dinanto Quaternulorum presented in a new context the early days of the Aristotle’s works reception into Latin culture. Quaternulorum fragmenta edited by M. Kurdziaek served for almost fifty years as an important source of knowledge on David of Dinant. Nowadays, Rev. M. Kurdziałek’s findings are almost fully acknowledged by the contemporary researchers of David of Dinant’s thought.

The aim of the article is to present an eminent Polish historian of medieval philosophy Marian Kurdziałek as the author of the critical edition of David of Dinant’s Quaternulorum fragmenta (1963). Owing to a very high standard of critical principles applied to the constitution of the critical text, this edition still provides a point of reference for the investigation of various aspects of the phenomenon of David of Dinant. The article examines arguments presented by M. Kurdziałek in favour of David’s authorship of the fragments. After he had proved that they all come from the same author, Kurdziałek referred to the presentation of David’s doctrine by Albert the Great that agreed with the famous metaphysical portion of the fragments and thus provided a basis for the identification of the author. He then examined in detail various problems concerning Albert’s testimony and offered a critical discussion of the biographical data concerning David of Dinant. Another important Kurdziałek’s contribution were lexical comparisons of Aristotle’s Latin texts used by David with existing medieval translations. He argued that David’s version of Aristotle was his own free translation combined with intelligent interpretations. In the article I refer to the study of G. Vuillemin-Diem that fully confirms Kurdziałek’s conclusions.

This article forms a part of Rev. Prof. Marian Kurdziałek’s lecture devoted to the pre-Thomist conceptions od philosophy-theology relationship. More precisely, this article is a reconstruction of the Prof. Kurdziałek ‘s discussion of the relevant ideas in St. Augustine’s thought. To begin with, Kurdziaek presents St. Augustine’s holistic understanding of philosophy and theology as essentially one and the same endeavor, a way leading to beatitude. He goes on to illustrate this thesis with a number of quotes, chiefly from Augustine’s philosophical dialogues, but also from his later writings. Kurdziałek then proceeds to discuss the place of ethical knowledge in Augustine’s theology and the relationship of cosmology and theology in thought of the bishop of Hippo. The lecture is concluded by a presentation of Augustine’s psychology, again conceived as a starting point of a spiritual itinerary, one of the ways ultimately leading to God.

The subject matter of the article is an idea of philosophy of history of J. Maritain, one of the most influential contemporary philosopher, inspired with Christian thought. In his interpretation of history, Jacques Maritain asks a question, if philosophy of history is possible and what is a genuine philosophy of history. French philosopher comes to believe that philosophical reflection upon history is important part of philosophy itself, but should be understand as practical philosophy. Also Maritain distances himself from historiosophical pessimism and catastrophe theories as well as naive optimism. He believe in progress, but as a personalist, he finds it as a synthesis of subjective and objective frames of human life. In his opinion, true progress is possible but it depends on human and personal activity.

The article presents the problem of freedom in Locke’s metaphysics and epistemology. The analysis of the source text shows, that he uses the concept of freedom in the three different meanings. The first one is voluntary that can be described as the power to do what the agent wants. Next is freedom of action which is the ability to do what the agent wants to do and also to stop doing this whenever he wants to. The last one is freedom of will that means the power to refrainfrom performing an action. After that the agent can think about his decision and make it more thoughtful and accurate.In order to characterize these kinds of freedom it is necessary to answer to following questions: Which kind of these three types of freedom presented by John Locke is compatible with determinism? And the second question is: what kind of freedom relates to moral responsibility?The final analysis shows that only voluntary can coexist with determinism. Therefore Locke should not be interpreted as compatibilist for all of three kinds of freedom in his theory. Answering to the second question, moral responsibility is connected with every kind of freedom. In each case an agent has the free choice and can realize his own desires.

The author of “Lectures on Religious Belief” significantly influenced the development of analytic philosophy of religion. His conception of religious belief is regarded by many commentators as controversial and radical. In this article I try to demonstrate that his remarks being the basis for this negative appraisal, are often unclear and inconclusive. I discuss critically, i.a., premises of so-called “Wittgensteinian fideism,” which consists of the following claims: (1) a lack of understanding between a theist and an atheist, (2) the autonomy of religious discourse (independence from a scientific and a common sense world view), (3) non-referential language of religion (it does not depict metaphysical reality), (4) an inability to criticize religion. Regarding the question of the autonomy of religious beliefs, I try to inquire whether, according to Wittgenstein, there are semantic “family resemblance” between the empirical and religious concepts, and also, what is the role of rational arguments in the field of faith: historical evidence, claims of natural science, arguments for the existence of God. As regards the problem of the reference and function of religious beliefs, I explain reasons why Wittgenstein’s position is classified as non-cognitivism.

The main goal of this paper is to explicate the meaning of such words as “reason”, ”knowledge” and “faith.” In addition, some relationships between these notions are analysed.Two attitudes can be distinguished: “faith — reason/knowledge” and “reason/knowledge — faith”. In the first case faith is initial, but a believer can take a rational (intellectual) effort to analyse what faith is. The second attitude is realised in the rational search to find faith.Many different types of arguments for the sentence “God exists” have been invented over years. These arguments have been the tools used in the cases of both attitudes. The arguments are analysed and discussed. The notion of argument is related to the notion of persuasion. Some different situations can be distinguished: a claim is rightly argued and somebody is persuaded by this claim; a claim is rightly argued, but somebody is not persuaded; a claim is not rightly argued, but somebody is persuaded by such a claim (e.g. by an influential leader); and a claim is not rightly argued and somebody is not persuaded.The attitude “faith — reason/knowledge” (a religious attitude) is existential and practical. It consists of some components. One of them is a religious knowledge (doctrine). If a believer confesses his or her faith using the official (institutional) text — called in Latin Credo (The Creed) — then really they believe and accept a set of rational religious beliefs, which belong to the religious knowledge (doctrine). A religious faith, understood as God’s influence, is acknowledged as the basis for such an act of believing and accepting.So the religious attitude consists of a religious faith, beliefs, emotions and also free choice (decision, acceptance). The act of an acceptance does not only concern beliefs. A believer also accepts moral and religious rules (principles). This is the type of morality motivated by religion. A religious attitude is the rational, theoretical and practical synthesis of all these components.

Zazwyczaj, najkrócej rzecz ujmujc, określa się cud jako „niezwykłe zdarzenie spowodowane przez Boga”. Bliższa analiza pojęcia niezwykłości prowadzi do wyróżnienia dwóch innych cech cudu – ponadnaturalności i naukowej niewyjaśnialności. Wyodrębnienie i przedstawienie dwóch podstawowych charakterystyk zdarzenia cudownego (ponadnaturalność i naukowa niewyjaśnialność), które występuj (choć nie zawsze w jednakowy sposób wyrażone) w definicjach i określeniach cudu proponowanych w literaturze przedmiotu, może posłużyć do wskazania zasadniczych kierunków, w których powinny być prowadzone dalsze analizy tytułowego zagadnienia. Warto także zasygnalizować główne problemy, jakie pojawiaj się w związku z przyjęciem wspomnianych określeń. Problemy te dotyczą różnorodnej treści podkładanej pod poszczególne rozumienia cudu i dlatego wymagają ponownego przemyślenia istotnego znaczenia tego pojęcia. W trakcie analizy określenia cudu jako „zdarzenia niezwykłego” zamierzam więc uzasadnić twierdzenie, że cud jako „zdarzenie niezwykłe” jest rozumiany na dwa sposoby: (1) jako zdarzenie ponadnaturalne i (2) jako zdarzenie naukowo niewyjaśnialne. Następnie będę starał się pokazać, że w przypadku (1) można mówić o zdarzeniu ponadnaturalnym jako o zdarzeniu cudownym tylko wtedy, gdy ma się na myśli to, że jest ono spowodowane ponadnaturalną przyczyną (za którą uznaje się Boga), a nie wtedy, gdy za ponadnaturalny uznaje się jego przebieg. Z kolei odnośnie do przypadku (2) proponuję przyjć pogląd, że mówienie o naukowej niewyjaśnialności zdarzenia cudownego nie ma sensu, gdyż twierdzenie to jest konsekwencją rozumienia cudu jako pogwałcenia prawidłowości przyrody, a tego nie można wykazać (i nie ma takiej potrzeby). Można natomiast utrzymywać, że zdarzenie cudowne to takie zdarzenie, które musi być niewyjaśnione naukowo w momencie, gdy zachodzi.

An axiomatic characterisation of the functor of sequential assertion is propsed here. By means of it the functor of sequential conjunction is defined. In the temporal interpretation these functors are respectively read as: next/then and and-next/and-then. It is proved that the proposed system (SAS) and its strenghtening (SAS*) comprise respectively von Wright’s And Next and And Then systems. The consistency and independence of axioms of the richer of the two proposed structures (SAS*) is settled by interpretation in the quadrivalent propositional calculus.

Some principles of general theory of being have their equivalents in laws of classical logic. For a long time this was not distinctly noticed, as logic was treated rather as technology of discussion, and not as a system of propositions stated in the objective language and concerning connections between facts. It may be generally said that some primary principles of being and some laws of logic state the same most fundamental connections between facts, between states of things. There are also principles of philosophy that do not have such equivalents in laws of logic. These include the principle of sufficient reason. The concept of intuitive truth of propositions that reappeared in modern logic first of all in connection with K. Gödel’s theorem of 1931 formed an intellectual climate that made it possible for classical logicians to accept also those principles of general theory of being that do not have equivalents in laws of standard logic. It may be said that these philosophical principles may be included in the outward basis of modern logic.