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Jan Woleński
Jan Woleński
O paradoksie konfirmacji
On the Paradox of Confirmation
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This paper is devoted to analysis of co-called paradox of confirmation formulated by C. G. Hempel in the 1930s. In particular, the author proposes a solution of this puzzle. The proposal consists in refining the concept of confirmation by adding a clause that if A confirms a hypothesis h, the former must be a logical consequence of a latter, eventually derived with the help of additional assumptions. This leads to an additional constraint requiring that confirmations act relatively to sets of reference. Finally, if h and h’ are logically equivalent, a sentence A confirms both to the same degree if and only if related sets of reference are the same.
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Józef Życiński
Józef Życiński
Alternatywne wersje ewolucji a problem wszechmocy Boga
The Alternative Versions of Evolution and the Problem of God’s Omnipotence
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The author discusses the question whether an alternative version of cosmological and biological evolution could have been actualized to eliminate negative phenomena specific for evolutionary processes in our universe. Specifically, one tries to answer whether the omnipotent God could have created quite different world with different logical principles and diverse laws of nature. Maybe such a world would be better than our universe regarded by Leibniz as the best of all possible universes.In trying to solve this problem, one has to remember that the process of evolution co-directs the created world to Divine ideals, values, and purposes; it does not, however, destroy by a logic of necessity or by a determinism of events, which would limit the freedom of creation. It does not eliminate pain and it does not change suffering into joy; it only shows the deepest meaning of the struggles thanks to which biological pain manifests its creative role.
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Ja Czerniawski
Ja Czerniawski
Rewolucja relatywistyczna a ontologia fizyki
Relativistic Revolution and Ontology of Physics
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In the course of the development of physics until the beginning of the twentieth century there was an evolutionary progress within its ontological frameworks. Its continuity was violated by A. Einstein’s works of 1905 and his so-called „quantum and relativistic revolution.” In its course people gave up a series of results they had achieved, and replaced them by some radical solutions that differed from common sense intuitions. In particular, in the context of the theory of relativity the concept of electromagnetic ether was rejected. Then the concept of absolute time and absolute geometry of space were removed, facts that eliminated the „flow” of time and change of the ontology of physics from the substantialist one into the eventist one. The changes turned out unnecessary, they resulted not from the very theory of relativity, but from some arbitrary solutions within the frameworks of its philosophical interpretation. On the other hand, they clash with clear ontological intuitions and make an explanation of the „flow” of time impossible. What is more, they are also not beneficial for a further progress in the development of physics, especially in the context of seeking a quantum theory of gravitation. It seems right to return to pre-relativistic concepts, starting from ether. For it is the elimination of the latter that had started the „revolution.”
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Andrzej Jastrzębski
Andrzej Jastrzębski
Zarys personalistycznej metafizyki Bordena Parkera Bowne’a
The Concept of the Personalistic Metahysics of Borden Parker Bowne
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Borden Parker Bowne was the founder of the School of Philosophy in Boston, taught there for more than a generation, and made a lasting impression on American philosophy. During Bowne’s career at Boston University (from 1876 until his death 1910), many of his students, who later also became professors in different areas, were inspired by his thinking and his person.His basic conviction is that it is the human person that is at the basis of Ontology and Ethics : the person that preserves its identity within change thanks to memory; the person that is active in knowing and choosing; the person that acts deliberately towards values; the person that thinks – all these at least potentially.The purpose of the article is to examine Bowne’s metaphysics, i.e. the roots of his view of Personalism. What emerges is his idea of existence in general and of human existence in particular. This is done also historically, by examining some earlier views of man and reality in general, which were the background for Bowne’s specific ideas.He begins from his idea of existence as active and self-determining, and of nature as activated by the intellect and will of God, the Most-High Person. That is why the human person has the attributes of awareness and self-awareness, freedom and the ability to act, and self-control.The connection of Bowne’s Personalism with idealism also presents the problem of how do we come to discover the notion of person, which is not from simple experience of reality, but is rather developed or postulated. For Bowne the model for the notion of person is the Person of God. If we look at reality from the perspective of God-Person (Person par excellence), there is the danger of theologizing Philosophical Anthropology, and a reality of Bowne’s metaphysics, which wasn’t very popular among many philosophers.Nonetheless Bowne’s ideas were positively received by the Church in America, and were used for many years as the model for defending the Christian world-view against the attacks of naturalism. In that context, his Personalism effectively fulfilled its role, showing the human person to be a spiritual being, ultimately coming from God, the Most-High Person.
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Eugeniusz Wojciechowski
Eugeniusz Wojciechowski
Bezkwantyfikatorowy rachunek nazw z regułą ekstensjonalności
A quantifier-less calculus of names with the rule of extensionality
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Ludwik Borkowski has constructed a quantifier-less calculus of names (BRN1), which is regarded as a base system here. The system can be extended with the use of the deductive power of rules of introduction and omission of functors π and σ (BRN2), which serve here as the substitutes of quantifiers. If we adopt the extensionality rule for the functor of singular inclusion (REε), we obtain yet another extending of the system (BRN3) accompanied by simultaneous considerable reduction of the primary rules. The interpretation of the last system in elementary ontology is included.
Ludwik Borkowski has constructed a quantifier-less calculus of names (BRN1), which is regarded as a base system here. The system can be extended with the use of the deductive power of rules of introduction and omission of functors π and σ (BRN2), which serve here as the substitutes of quantifiers. If we adopt the extensionality rule for the functor of singular inclusion (REε), we obtain yet another extending of the system (BRN3) accompanied by simultaneous considerable reduction of the primary rules. The interpretation of the last system in elementary ontology is included.
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